State v. McCoy

• Decision Date: 31 March 1864
• Citation: 34 Mo. 531
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. CATHARINE MCCOY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

34 Mo. 531

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,

v.CATHARINE MCCOY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1864.

Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court.

Jecko, Gantt & Johnson, for appellant.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State v. Baldwin, 11 Mo., by which the court (sitting as a nisi prius judge) was undoubtedly governed in framing his charge to the jury in this case, and upon which decision the State here principally relies; as also the decision in the case of Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell, by which the court in the case of State v. Baldwin seems to have been governed, seem at first view to establish the rule of law laid down by the court in this case. But it will be borne in mind that the quantity of testimony necessary to sustain the defence of insanity was not at all considered, either in the Baldwin case, or in the case of Clary v. Clary.

In the case of State v. Baldwin, the court charged the jury that they should be satisfied of the insanity of the defendant at the time of committing the murder.

When the killing is shown, malice and sound memory, and discretion or sanity are presumed; but, as has been remarked by an able judge, “this inference is merely one of fact,” and it is for the jury to say from the evidence before them, whether the killing was malicious or accidental, or in self-defence, or whether the party killing was at the time of sound discretion; nor does this presumption relieve the obligation of the State to remove all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. When either of these facts are put in question by the testimony adduced in the cause, the inference which the law makes of sanity, malice, and the like, is to be regarded as merely a matter of evidence, and standing upon the same ground as the testimony of a witness, (1 Greenl. Ev. § 33 & 34,) and in this respect is like the presumption of innocence. (Sutton v. Sadler, 91 Com. Law, 87.) The criminal intent must be proven as much as the overt act, and without a “sound memory and discretion,” or sanity, such intent could not exist.

Certain English authors have held that when insanity was set up in defence, the onus probandi was on the defendant. (Rosc. Ev. 5 ed. 944-946; 1 Russell on Crimes, 10; 1 Collison on Lunacy, 636; Fost. Crown Law, 255.)

But the question of the amount of proof necessary to establish insanity does not seem to have been considered, or at all decided by them, while a large number of the most able English jurists have held to the opposite opinion. And our American courts have not only held that a preponderance of evidence was sufficient, but have gone so far as to say that it rested with the State to prove all and each of the material allegations in the indictment. (State v. Brenyean, 5 Ala. 244; State v. Murler, 2 Ala. 43; Crawford v. State, 12 Geo. 142; Bennett & Heard's L. Crim. Cas. 347.)

In the case of the Commonwealth v. Eddy, in 7 Gray, Judge Metcalf says: “The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove all that is necessary to the crime of murder; and as that crime can only be committed by a reasonable being, a person of sane mind, the burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to prove that defendant was of sound mind when he committed the act of killing.” The presumption of law is that the defendant was sane, which can only be rebutted by proof to the satisfaction of the jury by a “preponderance of the whole testimony in the case,” that at the time of committing the homicide he was not of sane mind. (State v. Bartlett, lately tried before the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire, and reported in the October No., 1863, of Monthly Law Reporter; Commonwealth v. York, 9 Met. 93.)

Voullaire, for respondent.

Where the defence of a defendant to a charge is insanity, the burden of proof rests on him, particularly when he admits the commission of the offence (as in this case), and he is not entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to his insanity. (Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223; State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; State v. Stark, 1 Strobhart, 505; Rex. v. Offord, 5 Carrington & P. 168; 1 Col. Law of Lunatics, 52; Id. 670 & following: Stock on Non compos mentis, 23 Law Library, p. 43; 2 Greenl. on Ev. 296 & following; 10 Clark & Finnelly, McNaghten's case, 210; State v. Spencer, 1 Zabriskie, 201; 2 Ev. Starkie on 929 & following; Farrell's Adm'r v. Brennan's Adm'r, 32 Mo. 328; 1 Jarm. on Wills, 72; Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 John. 157; McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 545; Sloane v. Maxwell, 2 Green's Ch. 581; Grabill v. Barr, 5 Penn. 441; Landis v. Landis, 1 Grant's Cases, 250; Pettes v. Bingham, 10 N. Hamp. 514; Copeland v. Copeland's heirs, 32 Ala. 512; Brown v. Toney, 24 Barb. 583.)

BAY, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

At the May term, 1863, of the St. Louis Criminal Court, the defendant was indicted for the murder of Catharine Moran, alleged to have been committed on the 20th of April, 1863. Upon the trial, the killing was admitted, and the plea of insanity set up by the prisoner's counsel. Being convicted of murder in the first degree, a motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled, and the defendant now appeals to this court. The main ground relied upon by defendant's counsel for a reversal of the judgment is the giving by the court below of the 2d, 3d and 13th instructions, which are as follows:

“The law presumes every man who has arrived at the years of discretion to be sane, and...