State v. Pressler

• Decision Date: 21 December 1907
• Citation: 92 P. 806,16 Wyo. 214
• Parties: STATE v. PRESSLER
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

92 P. 806

16 Wyo. 214

STATE v. PRESSLER

Supreme Court of Wyoming

December 21, 1907

EXCEPTIONS by prosecuting attorney. From the District Court Laramie County, HON. RODERICK N. MATSON, Judge.

On the trial of Ray H. Pressler for murder in the first degree, the prosecuting attorney excepted to the refusal of certain instructions requested by him as to the burden of proof on the question of insanity, and filed his bill showing such exceptions, pursuant to Sections 5378-5381, Revised Statutes 1899. The instructions so refused are set forth in the opinion.

W. E Mullen, Attorney General; Clyde M. Watts, County and Prosecuting Attorney, and J. E. Dyer, Assistant County and Prosecuting Attorney, for the exceptions.

The presumption that all men are sane is well established. (Keffer v. State, 12 Wyo. 63.) It is contended for the State that where insanity is urged as a defense in a criminal case, it devolves upon the defendant to overcome the presumption of sanity by a fair preponderance of the evidence in the case. And as insanity is a general term, the proof should go to the extent of showing a degree of insanity or mental unbalance sufficient to preclude all criminal responsibility. As the great majority of insane persons are harmless and not disposed to violence, there can be no reasonable presumption that insane persons as a class will commit crime or do violence. Therefore, the mere suggestion of facts tending to show a probability of insanity, or some mental disorder on the part of a defendant, should not create the presumption of a lack of criminal responsibility and require the State to prove the sanity and criminal responsibility of defendant beyond all reasonable doubt where insanity is relied upon as a defense. In cases where insanity exists, the law provides a method of inquiry independent of a criminal trial, whereby the condition of a supposed insane person may be inquired into and determined by a jury. Insanity suggested for the first time on a criminal trial should be classed as an affirmative defense, to be established in the same manner as any other defense, and according to the same rules of evidence. There is no lack of adjudicated cases on the subject. The rule supported by the great weight of authority is that the burden is on a defendant to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (Coates v. State, 50 Ark. 330; State v. Redemier, 71 Mo. 173; Graves v. State, 45 N.J.L. 347; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc., 500; State v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 531; Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146; Ryder v. State, 100 Ga. 528; State v. Trout, 74 Iowa 545; State v. Alexander, 30 S. C., 74; Keener v. State, 97 Ga. 388; State v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404; State v. Bell, 136 Mo. 120; People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 485; People v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81; People v. Hettick, 126 Cal. 425; State v. Parks, 93 Me. 208; State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263; State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485; Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577; State v. Scott, 49 La. Ann., 253; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333; State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342; People v. Wells (Cal.), 78 P. 470; People v. Wilson, 49 Cal. 13; Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 43; Gentz v. State, 58 N.J.L. 482; State v. Hunble, 126 Iowa 462; Brown v. Com., 14 Bush., 398; Kaelin v. Com., 84 Ky. 354; State v. York, 9 Metc., 93; State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44; State v. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430; State v. Austin, 71 Ohio St. 317; State v. Hanson, 36 P. 296 (Ore.); 35 P. 796; Com. v. Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. St. 218; State v. Statke, 1 Strob. (S. C.), 479; State v. Coleman, 20 S. C., 441; State v. Cole, 45 A. 391 (Del.); Longley's Case, 99 Va. 814; State v. Stroder, 11 W.Va. 475; Casat v. State, 40 Ark.,, 511; People v. Donnelly, 135 Cal. 489; State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574.)

The question has been decided in one way or another in almost every state. The number of decisions any one way should not govern. The result most desirable is a rule based upon sound and logical reasoning supported by principles of exact and impartial justice as between the prosecution and the accused. A line of authorities hold that if a jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused is sane or not, they may acquit and that while the burden rests with the defendant to introduce evidence to raise this doubt, such evidence need not preponderate, but it is ample if it is sufficient to produce a reasonable doubt. (Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385; State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H., 244; Polk v. State, 19 Ind. 94; Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433; Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555; Hoteman v. U.S. 186 U.S. 413; German v. U.S. 120 F. 666; State v. People, 23 Mont. 358; Maas v. Terr., 10 Okl. 714; State v. Shuff, 9 Ida., 14; State v. Wetter (Ida.), 83 P. 341.) According to either rule it is well settled that the defendant must introduce some evidence in support of a defense of insanity.

T. Blake Kennedy, contra, maintained that the most logical and the fairest rule is that requiring the sanity of an accused to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, like any other element of the crime, and cited: Jones v. People, 47 Pac. (Colo.), 276; Maas v. Terr., 63 Pac. (Okla.), 960; State v. Nixon, 4 Pac. (Kan.), 159; State v. Peel, 59 Pac. (Mont.), 199; Faulkner v. Territory, 30 Pac. (N. M.), 905; Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269; State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H., 224; State v. Pike, 49 N. H., 399; Ballard v. State, 19 Neb. 609; Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225; Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467; Brotherton v. People, 75 N.Y. 159; O'Connell v. People, 87 N.Y. 377; Moett v. People, 85 N.Y. 373; People v. Taylor, 138 N.Y. 398; Anderson v. State, 42 Ga. 9; Polk v. State, 19 Ind. 170; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485; Armstrong v. State, 27 Fla. 367; Brown v. State, 91 Tenn. 617; Hopp v. People, 31 Ill. 385; Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 352; Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555; Langdon v. People, 133 Ill. 382; Montag v. People, 141 Ill. 75; Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620; Jameson v. People, 145 Ill. 357; Lilly v. People, 148 Ill. 467; State v. Coleman, 20 S. C., 441; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; King v. State, 9 Tex.App. 515; Revoir v. State, 82 Wis. 295; U. S. v. Faulkner, 35 F. 730; Davis v. U.S. 160 U.S. 469; Hotema v. U.S. 186 U.S. 413.

BEARD, JUSTICE. POTTER, C. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.

OPINION

BEARD, JUSTICE.

This case comes to this court under the provisions of Sections 5378, 5379, 5380 and 5381, Revised Statutes of 1899, upon exceptions taken by the county and prosecuting attorney to the ruling of the district court in refusing to give to the jury certain instructions requested by the prosecution.

The facts of the case as shown by the record are, that the defendant was charged in an information filed in the district court of Laramie County by the county and prosecuting attorney with the crime of murder in the first degree. At the proper time during the trial of the case the county and prosecuting attorney requested the court to instruct the jury as follows:

"You are instructed that it is a presumption of law that all men are of sound mind; and that presumption of law sustains the burden of proof, unless it is rebutted and overcome by satisfactory evidence to the contrary. In order to overcome the presumption of law, and shield the defendant from legal responsibility, the burden is on him to prove, to the satisfaction of the jury, by a preponderance of the whole evidence in the case, that at the time of committing the homicide he was not of sound mind." And, "You are instructed that every man is presumed to be sane, and to intend the natural and usual consequences of his own acts. As the law presumes a man to be sane until the contrary is shown, I charge you that the burden of proving insanity as a defense to a crime is upon the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, and unless insanity is established by a fair preponderance of the evidence the presumption of sanity must prevail."

The court refused to give these instructions, to which ruling exceptions were taken, and the court on its own motion instructed the jury as follows: "The law presumes the defendant to be sane; it presumes all men to be sane till the contrary is shown. This presumption of law stands until it is met and overcome by the evidence in the case. This evidence may come, of course, as well from the witnesses for the State as the witnesses for the defense; and when the evidence is all in, the jury must be satisfied, in order to convict the prisoner, not only of the doing of the acts which constitute murder, but that they proceeded from a responsible agent, one capable of committing the offense. The burden is upon the State to prove everything essential beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden, so far as the matter of sanity is concerned, is ordinarily satisfactorily sustained by the presumption that every person of sufficient age is of sound mind and understands the nature of his acts. But when the circumstances are all in on the one side and on the other, on the one side going to show the want of capacity, on the other side going to show usual intelligence, when the whole is in, the burden rests upon the State to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. And if the jury, upon all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt whether he was legally capable of committing crime, then it is your duty to acquit the defendant."

This court being of the opinion that the question presented should be decided upon to govern in similar cases which may be pending or which may hereafter arise in the State, allowed the bill of exceptions to be filed under the provision of Sections 5380 and 5381, supra.

The record brought to this court does not contain the evidence and, therefore, the only question to be determined is whether the court should have given the instructions...