State v. McField
| Decision Date | 24 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 01-20-00739-CR |
| Citation | 649 S.W.3d 721 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant v. Damonte MCFIELD, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ryan C. Kent, Kim K. Ogg, Houston, for Appellant.
Theodore Lee Wood, Austin, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Landau and Countiss.
Appellant, the State of Texas, challenges the trial court's order granting the motion of appellee, Damonte McField, to quash and set aside the information,1 alleging that he committed the misdemeanor offense of criminal mischief.2 In its sole issue, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion.3
We reverse and remand.
Appellee was charged by information with the misdemeanor offense of criminal mischief,4 and the State alleged that appellee, on or about February 20, 2020, "did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly damage tangible property, namely a door, owned by John Buckley III," the complainant, "a person having a greater right to possession of the property than [appellee]," "without the effective consent of the [c]omplainant, namely, without any consent of any kind, and the value of the pecuniary loss so inflicted was at least one hundred dollars and under seven hundred fifty dollars, by striking the complainant's door with a screwdriver." The State also alleged that before the commission of the above-described misdemeanor offense, "on September 22, 2011, in [c]ause [n]o. 1769122, in the County Criminal Court at Law No. 4 of Harris County, Texas, [appellee] was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of [e]vading [a]rrest/[d]etention."
The information was supported by a sworn complaint, which alleged:
The complaint is signed by "G. Cruz" as the affiant and sworn to and subscribed before an assistant district attorney.
Appellee moved to quash and set aside the information, generally asserting that the sworn complaint filed with the information did not "meet the basic essential requirements provided by Texas statute, the Texas Constitution, or the U.S. Constitution." But the motion did not specify precisely how the complaint was defective. In a supplement to his motion to quash and set aside the information, appellee asserted that a complaint is invalid when there is a "failure to swear in the affiant" and "we must be able to verify that the swearing in process for each complaint [i]s properly done."
At a hearing on appellee's motion to quash and set aside the information, Gaby Cruz testified that she is an administrative assistant and log manager with the Harris County District Attorney's Office in the Intake Division. Cruz stated that she is not a licensed attorney. She is over eighteen years of age, and she has either graduated from high school or "ha[s] an equivalent GED." She has never been declared incompetent by a court.
While viewing the complaint filed in this case, Cruz testified that she recognized the document, it constituted a "[c]harging instrument," and the complaint contained her signature as the affiant.5 Cruz did not remember whether she was "aware of a complaint being filed against" appellee though, and she could not recall signing the complaint in this case, but she stated that it did contain her signature. Cruz was not the complainant in the case. Cruz did not specifically "remember being sworn in for this case."
Cruz also testified that as part of her job responsibilities she signs "misdemeanor complaints as the affiant." Cruz only signs a complaint as the affiant if she has "good reason to believe that the defendant has violated the Texas law outlined in the complaint." Cruz would not sign a complaint if she did not have "good reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense as outlined in the complaint." According to Cruz, she bases her "good reason to believe that a crime has been committed" on the sworn statement or the sworn words of a law enforcement officer. Cruz does not have any personal knowledge about a particular case.
Cruz further stated that she only ever signs a complaint in the presence of an assistant district attorney, and she would never sign a complaint if she was not in the presence of an assistant district attorney. Before Cruz signs a complaint, she "swear[s] to an oath." She says the oath orally before signing the complaint. She would never sign a complaint "without swearing to an oath." When asked if she swears to an oath, Cruz responded: "Yes." Cruz stated that she "swear[s] that everything is correct," and she says, "I swear to this document," meaning the complaint, "orally before every signature."
Although Cruz could not recall signing the complaint in this case, she knows that she swore the oath and signed the complaint in front of an assistant district attorney because that is the process that she does "every single time." Cruz "swear[s] the oath in front of an [assistant district attorney] on every single complaint" and she "always sign[s] the complaint in front of an [assistant district attorney]." The assistant district attorney signs a complaint after Cruz swears the oath and signs the complaint. Cruz stated that if she violated the oath that she had sworn there would be "perjury implications."
After the hearing, the trial court granted appellee's motion to quash and set aside the information.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash a charging instrument de novo. Smith v. State , 309 S.W.3d 10, 13–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; State v. Linares , Nos. 01-20-00598-CR, 01-20-00599-CR, 2022 WL 710098, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ; see also State v. Donaldson , 557 S.W.3d 33, 39–40 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. ref'd) (); State v. Balandrano , No. 13-13-00536-CR, 2015 WL 5136453, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reviewing de novo trial court's ruling on motion to quash information where defendant argued complaint did not meet requirements of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 15.05 and 21.22 ).
In its sole issue, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to quash and set aside the information because "[t]he evidence presented at the hearing on [a]ppellee's motion to quash did not reveal any impropriety in the procedures that gave rise to the complaint and information filed against [a]ppellee" and "Texas law does not require that the person swearing to a complaint have first-hand knowledge of the allegations contained therein."
To begin a misdemeanor prosecution, the State presents either an indictment or an information as a charging instrument. See State v. Drummond , 501 S.W.3d 78, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Marshall , 570 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ; White v. State , 50 S.W.3d 31, 51 n.23 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) ; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.20 (). When an information is used, an underlying complaint is also required. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.22 ; Drummond , 501 S.W.3d at 81 ; Marshall , 570 S.W.3d at 318 ; State v. Caves , 496 S.W.3d 153, 156 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref'd) .
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure uses the term "complaint" in three different contexts, including as a prerequisite to an information. Drummond , 501 S.W.3d at 81 (internal quotations omitted); see TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.22 ; see also Huynh v. State , 901 S.W.2d 480, 481 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ; Rodriguez v. State , 491 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) (). "A complaint to support an information is a sworn affidavit, duly attested to by the district or county attorney, that is made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense." Drummond , 501 S.W.3d at 81 (internal quotations omitted); Marshall , 570 S.W.3d at 318 n.1 (internal quotations omitted); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.22. The purpose of the complaint is to inform the defendant of the facts surrounding the charged offense to permit him to prepare a defense to the charge. Leal v....
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