State v. McKeithen

• Decision Date: 05 February 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 17 CO 0014
• Citation: 2019 Ohio 493
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAJUAN A. McKEITHEN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2019 Ohio 493

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAJUAN A. McKEITHEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 17 CO 0014

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COLUMBIANA COUNTY

February 5, 2019

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio

Case No. 2014 CR 340

BEFORE: Kathleen Bartlett, Gene Donofrio, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

Atty. Scott Essad, 721 Boardman-Poland Road, Suite 201, Youngstown, Ohio 44512, for Appellant and

Atty. John Gamble, 105 South Market Street, Lisbon, Ohio 44432, for Appellee.

BARTLETT, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal following the Defendant-Appellant's guilty plea and sentencing hearing. Appellant contends that the trial court failed to properly advise him of his right to confront witnesses/accusers against him at his plea hearing, in violation of Criminal Rule 11. As a result, Appellant alleges that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The Appellant further contends that the trial court's holding on a motion to suppress, which occurred several months before Appellant's guilty plea, should be reversed.

{¶2} For the following reasons, Appellant's assignments of error are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶3} Defendant-Appellant JaJuan A. McKeithen (hereinafter "Appellant"), was indicted on September 17, 2015 for possession of heroin, a 1st degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). There was a forfeiture specification with the indictment concerning $1,061 that Appellant had with him which was used or intended to be used to sell or purchase heroin in violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A).

{¶4} Appellant pled not guilty.

{¶5} On August 3, 2016, a hearing was held on Appellant's motion to suppress regarding recorded telephone calls made by him to a third-party from a police department telephone while he was locked to a prisoner's bench. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress, finding that Appellant had no expectation of privacy in using a jailhouse telephone, especially when he had past "experience with phones in the prison system. . . ." (10/5/16 JE, pp. 16-17; Record on Appeal at p. 161).

{¶6} The matter was scheduled for trial on February 27, 2017. The case did not proceed to trial because Appellant changed his plea to guilty, and on March 8, 2017, a change of plea hearing was held. The trial court engaged in colloquy with Appellant prior to accepting his guilty plea. The relevant colloquy for this appeal pertains to the trial court's duty to advise the Appellant of his right to confront witnesses/accusers against him. The relevant colloquy occurred:

The Court: By offering to plead guilty today, Mr. McKeithen, you are waiving or giving up certain constitutional rights. You have a right to either a jury trial or a trial to the Court without a jury; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes.

The Court: And by offering to plead guilty, you are waiving or giving up your right to have a trial; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes.

The Court: By offering to plead guilty you are giving up your right to challenge any evidence or testimony that might be introduced against you at trial; do you understand that.

Mr. McKeithen: Yes.

The Court: By offering to plead guilty, you are giving up your right to call witnesses or have them subpoenaed to testify on your behalf at trial; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes, I do.

The Court: By offering to plead guilty, you are also giving up your right to testify and present evidence at trial on your own behalf; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes.

The Court: At trial you would have the right to remain silent, and if you chose to do so nobody could comment on that silence; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes, I do.

The Court: By offering to plead guilty, you are also giving up your right to remain silent. You are also giving up your right against self-incrimination; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes.

The Court: If you had a trial the State of Ohio would have the burden of proving your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of the offense, as well as the specification; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes, I do.

The Court: By offering to plead guilty, you are waiving or giving up your right to require the State to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes, I do.

The Court: And Mr. McKeithen, by offering to plead guilty, you are giving up your right to appeal any adverse decision that may have been made on any motions in this case; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes, I do.

The Court: By offering to plead guilty, you are also waiving your right to challenge any other violations of your rights that may have taken place under Ohio law or the United States Constitution; do you understand that?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes, I do.

The Court: Did Attorney Gillison review with you, Mr. McKeithen, your constitutional rights, as well as the constitutional rights you would be waiving or giving up by offering to plead guilty here today?

Mr. McKeithen: Yes.

(3/8/17 Tr., pp. 11-14).

{¶7} At the change of plea hearing, the trial court was advised that the Appellant had reviewed with his counsel the Felony Plea Agreement, the written Judicial Advice to Defendant¹, and his Response to the Court², and that he signed them voluntarily and did not have any questions. (3/9/17 JE; 3/8/17 Tr., pp. 6-8). The trial court held that based on the dialogue at the hearing, as well as the Felony Plea Agreement, the Judicial Advice to the Defendant, and the Defendant's Response to the Court, "the Court hereby finds that the Defendant has a knowing and intelligent understanding of the consequences of his change of plea including the nature of the charge, the minimum and maximum penalties and sanctions, including post release control, and the constitutional rights he is waiving." (3/9/17 JE).

First Assignment of Error: The trial court erred when it failed to advise JaJuan McKeithen that he was waiving the right to confront witnesses against him.

{¶8} Guilty pleas are governed by Crim.R. 11. The notice requirements for non-constitutional rights incorporated in Rule 11 are subject to a substantial compliance analysis, which looks to the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the defendant subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the rights he waived. State v. Rudai, 7th Dist. No. 18 BE 0002, 2018-Ohio-4464, citing ¶ State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990); State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). Strict compliance is required when notifying the defendant of constitutional rights incorporated in Rule 11. State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 15, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. Among the constitutional rights listed in Crim R. 11(C)(2)(c) is the right "to confront witnesses against [the defendant]."

{¶9} Appellant contends that the "right to confrontation" and the "right to challenge any evidence or testimony" are not the same and the trial court failed to inform Appellant of his right to confront witnesses against him. In State v. Martinez, No. 03 MA 196, 2004-Ohio-6806, ¶ 13, this Court held that strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) was achieved where the "trial court informed [the defendant] of his right to a jury trial, his right to cross-examine witnesses, his right to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf, his right to refuse to testify against himself, and that the state would have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." In that case, the language did not verbatim recite the "right to confront witnesses against him or her" in Crim.R. 11(C), but rather stated the "right to cross-examine witnesses." Similarly here, the trial court did not fail to inform the Appellant of his constitutional rights. "Failure to use the exact language contained in Crim.R. 11(C) in informing a criminal defendant of his [constitutional rights that he is waiving], is not grounds for vacating a plea as long as the record shows that the trial court explained these rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant." State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 27 (emphasis added in original), citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), at paragraph two of the syllabus, modifying State v. Caudill, 48 Ohio St.2d 342, 346, 358 N.E.2d 601 (1976). "With that holding, we recognized that a trial court can still convey the requisite information on constitutional rights to the defendant even when the court does not provide a word-for-word recitation of the criminal rule, so long as the trial court actually explains the rights to the defendant." Id.

{¶10} In State v. Barker, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court's description of the defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process as the "right to call witnesses to speak on your behalf" was a reasonably intelligible explanation to the defendant of that constitutional right. State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶¶ 15, 20. The Barker Court further stated "[t]he use of common, everyday words, including 'call,' instead of a rote recitation of legal terminology, can assist the defendant in understanding the rights forfeited by entry of a plea." Id. at ¶ 20.³ This Court has acknowledged that "the oral colloquy does not need to contain a 'rote recitation' of Criminal Rule 11." State v. Green, 7th Dist. No. 02 CA 217, 2004-Ohio-6371, ¶ 15, citing Ballard, supra. In the instant case, the trial court did not fail to orally inform Appellant of his right to confront witnesses against him, but used language that differed from the exact wording of Crim.R. 11. The trial court's use of the phrase "right to challenge any evidence or testimony" is a reasonably intelligible explanation to Appellan...