State v. McKenna

Decision Date31 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 119,431,119,431
Citation459 P.3d 1274
Parties STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Tia Renee MCKENNA, Appellant.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, Topeka, for appellant.

Andrew R. Davidson, assistant district attorney, Keith Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Leben, P.J., Gardner, J., and McAnany, S.J.

Gardner, J.:

After the State charged Tia McKenna with possession of methamphetamine and possession of a stimulant, McKenna moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. She argued that the arresting officer unconstitutionally detained her without reasonable suspicion that she was committing a crime. The district court disagreed, finding that the officer conducted a valid public safety stop. It denied the suppression motion and then found McKenna guilty as charged. McKenna appeals only the district court's denial of her suppression motion. We find that the officer's contact with McKenna was a valid public safety stop and did not exceed its bounds; thus, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2017, around 2 a.m., Officer Daniel Styles of the Hutchinson Police Department was driving his police vehicle on patrol. In a residential neighborhood, he came upon a car legally parked on a dark street with its dome light on. The vehicle's driver-side window was down, and a woman, McKenna, was sitting in the driver's seat with her face tilted away from the street. She appeared to be asleep or unconscious. Styles shined his spotlight on the driver but she did not respond. By the way she was slumped over, Styles suspected that she was intoxicated so he turned his patrol car around and parked behind her car. He activated his rear emergency lights—which can be seen only from behind his patrol car—but used his front headlights to illuminate her car.

Styles walked up to the driver's door, stood outside its open window, shined his flashlight into the car, knocked on its roof, and called the woman to rouse her. After a while, she began to wake up. Styles identified himself as an officer, asked if the driver knew where she was, and asked her name. She did not answer clearly. Styles also asked if she had any identification or if she had been drinking. When the driver continued to be unresponsive, Styles reached through the open window and nudged her arm, saying "come on, I need you to get up now." When she stirred, Styles again asked what her name was, where she stayed, and whether she knew where she was. The driver, after much prompting, responded that her name was Tia McKenna. Styles asked her these questions because he was concerned for her well-being and, if she were intoxicated, wanted to give her a ride home rather than allow her to drive.

After learning her name, Styles asked dispatch to "check the in-house" for a Tia McKenna. Two minutes later, dispatch informed him that McKenna had an outstanding warrant for her arrest. Styles then arrested McKenna based on that warrant.

Styles took McKenna to the county jail. During intake, law enforcement found a bag containing methamphetamine and a bag containing Alprazolam, commonly known as Xanax, in McKenna's bra.

After the State charged McKenna with possession of methamphetamine and possession of a stimulant, she moved to suppress the evidence. Styles was the sole witness at the hearing, and the State admitted the video and audiotape he had made of his encounter with McKenna. The district court denied McKenna's motion, finding Styles was acting in a community caretaking function and did nothing wrong. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court convicted McKenna as charged. The district court sentenced McKenna to a 20-month prison sentence and granted her probation.

McKenna timely appeals.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR BY DENYING MCKENNA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ?

McKenna argues the district court should have granted her motion to suppress because Styles violated her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. She argues that (1) Styles seized her under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) he did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate this seizure, and (3) the attenuation doctrine should not apply. See Utah v. Strieff , 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016) (holding that officer's discovery of valid, preexisting arrest warrant attenuated connection between unlawful investigatory stop and drug-related evidence seized from defendant during search incident to arrest). In response, the State argues that Styles' contact with McKenna was justified as a welfare check, but if Styles unconstitutionally seized McKenna, the attenuation doctrine applies.

McKenna filed no reply brief. But during oral argument, counsel for McKenna argued that any public safety stop exceeded its lawful scope when the officer asked for McKenna's name and ran a warrants check. We invited the parties to address that issue if they desired, and they have. We consider their supplemental filings, as well as the oral arguments by counsel, because they expound upon issues previously briefed.

Standard of Review

When the material facts supporting a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are undisputed, as here, the ultimate question whether to suppress is a question of law over which we have unlimited review. State v. Hanke , 307 Kan. 823, 827, 415 P.3d 966 (2018).

Analysis

The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates these provisions to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 655-60, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights contains similar language and provides "the same protection from unlawful government searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment." State v. Neighbors , 299 Kan. 234, 239, 328 P.3d 1081 (2014). "The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973).

Kansas courts have recognized four types of police-citizen encounters: (1) voluntary encounters, (2) investigatory detentions, (3) public safety stops, and (4) arrests. State v. Phillips , 49 Kan. App. 2d 775, 783, 315 P.3d 887 (2014). The encounter at issue here is the public safety stop, or welfare check. Generally, to properly detain an individual in a public place for an investigatory detention—i.e ., a Terry stop—an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. See K.S.A. 22-2402(1) ; Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). But the State does not contend that the officer reasonably suspected McKenna of a crime.

Instead, the State relies on the public safety rationale, first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Cady , and recognized by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Vistuba , 251 Kan. 821, 840 P.2d 511 (1992), disapproved in part on other grounds by State v. Field , 252 Kan. 657, 847 P.2d 1280 (1993). That doctrine is based on the idea that the role of police is not limited to the detection, investigation, and prevention of criminal activity. Rather, police officers engage in many activities that ensure people's safety and welfare. Requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before police can investigate and give aid in these situations would hamstring their ability to protect and serve the public.

The district court found that the encounter between McKenna and Styles was a valid public safety stop. A public safety stop "does not require the police to have reasonable suspicion of a civil or criminal infraction." State v. Messner , 55 Kan. App. 2d 630, Syl. ¶ 1, 419 P.3d 642 (2018). However, a safety stop must be " "divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." "

55 Kan. App. 2d at 631, 419 P.3d 642. "[A]s with any other police encounter, the scope of the detention during a public safety stop cannot exceed the justifications for the stop." State v. Gonzales , 36 Kan. App. 2d 446, 455, 141 P.3d 501 (2006). In applying the public safety rationale to justify a police-citizen encounter, courts carefully scrutinize the facts "so the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not emasculated." 36 Kan. App. 2d at 455, 141 P.3d 501.

The Gonzales court adopted a three-part test to determine the legality of a public safety stop. First, as long as there are objective, specific, and articulable facts from which a law enforcement officer would suspect that a citizen needs help or is in peril, the officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen needs aid, the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance. Third, once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance, any actions beyond that constitute a seizure, implicating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 456, 141 P.3d 501. We use that test here. See State v. Morales , 52 Kan. App. 2d 179, 182-83, 363 P.3d 1133 (2015).

First, the record contains objective, specific, and articulable facts from which a law enforcement officer would have suspected that McKenna needed help. She was slumped over in a car, with her window rolled down and the car's dome light on, at 2 a.m. in a high drug trafficking area. And when the officer shined a spotlight at McKenna, she did not respond in any way. These are the factors Styles noted which made him concerned that McKenna either needed medical attention or was intoxicated and may try to drive while impaired, endangering herself and the public. These facts justified his initial investigation, as McKenna seems...

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