State v. McKenzie

• Decision Date: 19 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. C3-95-1258,C3-95-1258
• Citation: 542 N.W.2d 616
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Amwati Pepi McKENZIE, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 616

542 N.W.2d 616

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Amwati Pepi McKENZIE, Appellant.

No. C3-95-1258.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 19, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Prison discipline proceedings do not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct under double jeopardy principles unless the prison discipline imposed can only be characterized as deterrent or retributive, rather than remedial.

2. In this case, disciplinary sanctions imposed because inmate assaulted another prisoner, including placement in segregation and loss of potential good time credit, were not so grossly disproportionate to the offense as to constitute "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

David Powers, 10th District Assistant Public Defender, Elk River, for appellant.

Nancy Logering, Assistant Sherburne County Attorney, Elk River and Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

KEITH, Chief Justice.

This case raises the issue of whether the administrative discipline of a prison inmate, including placement in segregation and loss of good time credit, bars criminal prosecution for the same misconduct under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Appellant Amwati Pepi McKenzie appeals from a district court decision rejecting his argument that the imposition of prison discipline and subsequent criminal prosecution violated his constitutional right not to be punished twice for the same offense. Because we find that the administrative discipline imposed by the prison was not "punishment" under current double jeopardy jurisprudence, we affirm.

Although the criminal charges at issue here have not yet reached a trial, the facts of McKenzie's case were presented to the district court by stipulation to allow a decision on the legal issues involved. The amended criminal complaint filed in Sherburne County District Court alleges that on September 10, 1994, McKenzie was involved in an assault upon another inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility-St. Cloud. At approximately 7:45 p.m., a staff member observed McKenzie in a prison courtyard "throwing closed-fist punches to the face and body" of another inmate. The staff member tried to separate the two inmates, but lost his grip on McKenzie when a third inmate kicked the staff member in the knee. As McKenzie tried to reach the victim again, another staff member grabbed McKenzie by the shirt. McKenzie continued to struggle until reinforcements arrived and successfully restrained him.

When the prison staff searched McKenzie, they discovered a homemade weapon, consisting of a metal combination lock attached to a black comb, in his possession. The victim later told the prison authorities that McKenzie attacked him by trying to hit him with the weapon, but he fended off McKenzie's blows and avoided injury. Several weeks later, staff members at the prison monitored a phone call by McKenzie from the prison in which they heard him describe the September 10 incident and admit that he had tried to hit the victim in the head with the combination lock.

Immediately following the altercation in the prison courtyard, the prison began disciplinary proceedings against McKenzie for violations of several provisions of the institution rules. On September 13, 1994, McKenzie agreed to waive his right to a disciplinary hearing and pleaded guilty to possession of contraband, assault and disobeying a direct order. Other charges of rule violations were dismissed, and McKenzie agreed to accept a total of 300 days in segregation. He was informed that he would not earn statutory good time credit for the days he spent in the segregation unit. ¹

As a result of the assault, the prison's special investigator filed criminal charges against McKenzie for possession of contraband, felony assault and disorderly conduct. McKenzie sought dismissal of the criminal complaint on double jeopardy grounds, and an omnibus hearing was held in Sherburne County District Court on June 1, 1995. The district court denied McKenzie's motion to dismiss the charges, holding that the administrative proceedings in the prison were remedial in nature, and therefore did not bar the criminal prosecution of McKenzie. The district court then stayed further proceedings in the matter and certified the double jeopardy issue raised by McKenzie's case to the court of appeals pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.03. This court then granted the parties' joint petition for accelerated review.

On appeal from the district court's ruling, McKenzie argues that the discipline imposed by the prison as a result of the assault was "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and therefore bars any subsequent criminal charges for the same incident. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The federal provision applies to the individual states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The Minnesota Constitution offers similar protection to criminal defendants: "[N]o person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. See State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn.1985) (declining to decide whether Minnesota Constitution affords greater double jeopardy protection than federal constitution). Furthermore, the Minnesota legislature has enacted a double jeopardy statute to eliminate multiple prosecutions and punishments: "[I]f a person's conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them." Minn.Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (1994).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause offers three separate protections: against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after either an acquittal or a conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In this case, McKenzie argues that the criminal charges brought by the State violate his constitutional and statutory rights to be free from multiple punishments for the same offense. He contends that the State has already "punished" him for his conduct in the prison by placing him in segregation and denying him good time credits. Therefore, the State cannot penalize him again through criminal prosecution. In response, the State asserts that the discipline imposed by the prison authorities was not "punishment," as defined by current caselaw, but was instead a remedial procedure employed by the prison to maintain order and protect other inmates and the prison staff.

The question of whether discipline by prison authorities triggers double jeopardy protection and therefore bars subsequent criminal prosecution for the same misconduct has not been resolved by the Supreme Court. However, numerous federal and state courts have considered this issue over the past 25 years, and the overwhelming majority have rejected such claims by prison inmates. ² This court has ruled that prison discipline is not a "prosecution" under the Double Jeopardy Clause and Minn.Stat. § 609.035, and therefore does not prevent a later criminal trial. State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Minn.1979). ³

Nonetheless, McKenzie asserts that recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly United States v. Halper, have changed the face of double jeopardy jurisprudence and have substantially broadened the protection afforded by the constitution in this area. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Thus, McKenzie argues that decisions on this issue prior to the release of Halper are not controlling, including this court's opinion in Kjeldahl.

In Halper, a unanimous Supreme Court established that the multiple-punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the federal government from imposing $130,000 in civil penalties against a defendant who already had been criminally prosecuted for the same conduct, namely the submission of $585 in false Medicare claims. 490 U.S. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903. Justice Blackmun's opinion rejected the Court's prior holding in United States v. Ward, which focused upon the label pinned to a particular sanction for purposes of assessing whether it was "punishment" under the Constitution. 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). In Ward, the Court placed great weight upon Congress' intent to impose a "civil penalty" upon the defendant, as reflected by the chosen label. Id. at 249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641-42. Unless the supposedly civil penalty was so punitive in nature as to negate that intent, its imposition upon an already-prosecuted criminal defendant would not violate double jeopardy protections. Id. After Halper, however, the labels chosen by a legislative body "are not of paramount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties." 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901.

Thus, the Halper decision revised the Supreme Court's multiple-punishments test. Now the question of whether a particular civil sanction imposes criminal punishment requires evaluation of "the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction." Id. at 447 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 n. 7. Accordingly, a civil sanction wielded against a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution will violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if "the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but...