State v. Medeiros

• Decision Date: 24 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-536-C,86-536-C
• Citation: 535 A.2d 766
• Parties: STATE v. David MEDEIROS. A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 766

535 A.2d 766

STATE v. David MEDEIROS.

No. 86-536-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 24, 1987.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Thomas Dickinson, Annie Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Kenneth Glenn Littman, Middletown, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on the defendant's appeal from judgments of conviction for manslaughter in respect to Dennis Fontaine and assault and battery upon Robert Moretti entered in the Superior Court following a trial by jury. We affirm. The facts of the case, insofar as pertinent to this appeal, are as follows.

On January 2, 1984, Robert Moretti and Dennis Fontaine met David Medeiros (defendant), Brian Fernandes and Arthur Denham at LaBoheme, a bar located in Providence at the corner of Weybosset and Dorrance Streets. Their sojourn at LaBoheme was interrupted when defendant, Fernandes, and Denham became noisily engaged in an argument with the bartender and were asked to leave. Thereafter, the five men went to an establishment known as the Mira Bar, on Eddy Street in Providence.

In this latter establishment, defendant, Fernandes, and Denham became engaged in a fight on the dance floor. Fontaine and others attempted to break up the fight, but matters were taken in hand by two bouncers, who escorted defendant, Fernandes, and Denham out of the Mira Bar. Robert Moretti left the bar shortly thereafter and noted that Fontaine had left at the same time that defendant, Fernandes, and Denham had been ejected. As he rounded the corner onto Weybosset Street, Moretti saw defendant, Fernandes, and Denham jump on Fontaine and thereafter saw Fontaine stagger and fall.

At this point Denham ran over to Moretti and with a flying leap kicked him in the chest. Immediately thereafter, Denham was joined by defendant and Fernandes. The defendant grabbed Moretti, and Fernandes stabbed Moretti in the back. This account was corroborated in general by another witness, James McLaughlin, who saw the confrontation between Fontaine and three men. He also saw one of the men, Fernandes, take out a knife. The chief resident at the Rhode Island Hospital trauma unit testified that Fontaine was dead when she examined him and that he had died as a result of blood loss, secondary to stab wounds. The resident also examined Moretti and found that he had three superficial stab wounds in his body.

We have previously considered the case of State v. Fernandes, 526 A.2d 495 (R.I. 1987), in which we affirmed the conviction of Fernandes, who had stabbed the victim, Fontaine. In that case we set out the facts in considerable detail. Naturally, the facts in that case are very similar to the facts elicited in the course of defendant's trial.

The defendant raises three issues in support of his appeal. These three issues will be considered in the order in which they are presented in defendant's brief. Further facts will be supplied as may be necessary in order to determine the issues raised.

I THE TRIAL JUSTICE'S RULING ON THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS

The defendant points out in support of this issue that two prior convictions that had been entered in the Second Division District Court on June 30, 1982, for simple assault and disorderly conduct, were used to impeach his credibility. He further asserts that during a hearing on a motion in limine to determine whether such convictions would be admissible, defense counsel represented to the court that defendant, if he were allowed to testify, would state that he was not represented by counsel, that he was not advised that he had a right to court-appointed counsel (indeed was advised that he had no right to court-appointed counsel), and that at the time he was indigent. Defense counsel further asserted that defendant never knowingly or intelligently waived his right to counsel at that time. The trial justice responded to this assertion by stating that since defendant was only fined in respect to these misdemeanor convictions, he was not entitled to court-appointed counsel. Consequently, the trial justice declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to allow defendant to testify regarding the circumstances surrounding the District Court pleas and indicated that it would be "unreasonable" to allow such a hearing.

The defendant argues that the admitting of these prior convictions of misdemeanor offenses for impeachment purposes violated the principles expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S. Ct. 1014, 31 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1972). In that case the Court, in a plurality opinion stated that the use of prior uncounseled felony-offense convictions that were void under the doctrine of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), to impeach a defendant's credibility would violate his right to due process of law.

There seems little question that for Sixth Amendment purposes a misdemeanor conviction would not be considered invalid as long as it met the requirements contained in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). These cases stand for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States mandates a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases only in the event that a defendant is sentenced to incarceration. To put it another way, a defendant who is not accorded the right to counsel may not, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, be sentenced to imprisonment, for no matter how limited a period.

As defendant properly points out, the Rhode Island Constitution, as construed in State v. Moretti, 521 A.2d 1003 (R.I. 1987), and State v. Holliday, 109 R.I. 93, 280 A.2d 333 (1971), gives a broader right to counsel than that required under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We have construed the Rhode Island Constitution to require the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant if the potential sentence exceeds six months' imprisonment even in the event that the trial justice predetermines that no prison sentence will be imposed. We further held in Moretti and in State v. Palmigiano, 112 R.I. 348, 309 A.2d 855 (1973), that in order to invoke the rule in Loper v. Beto, supra, it was necessary that the defendant make a positive representation that he was impermissibly denied counsel. We further suggested in Moretti that the defendant's bare assertion that he was impermissibly denied counsel may not meet the burden. In effect, we suggested that such a representation by the defendant requires corroboration:

"Among the options available to a defendant faced with such a circumstance would be to call a witness who was present at the hearing in which the District Court judge impermissibly denied the defendant counsel, or, the defendant might offer evidence of a timely but unsuccessful appeal of such an unlawful conviction." Moretti, 521 A.2d at 1010-11.

In the case at bar, defendant offered to testify himself but did not offer to present any corroborative evidence to show that he was impermissibly denied counsel. ¹ However, it is also true that the trial justice declined to hold an evidentiary hearing because he was of the opinion that since only fines had been imposed, defendant was not entitled to raise the question of the validity of his misdemeanor convictions. In light of this determination by the trial justice, it will be necessary for us at this time to consider whether allowing impeachment by these two misdemeanor convictions resulted in prejudice to defendant or whether it constituted harmless error as suggested by Justice White, concurring in Loper v. Beto, supra, as that term has been defined in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). See State v. Palmigiano, 112 R.I. at 356-57, 309 A.2d at 860.

In the case at bar, the prosecution sought to impeach defendant's credibility not only by the two Rhode Island misdemeanor convictions for which defendant had been fined $25 in respect to each charge but also on the basis of two Massachusetts convictions. The prosecution elicited evidence without objection that on October 14, 1983, defendant was convicted in Massachusetts of operating a motor vehicle so as to endanger and leaving the scene of an accident after damage to property. He was fined $125 on each charge. The trial justice gave a limiting instruction in regard to all four convictions that they would be admissible only for the purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility and should not be considered to indicate his guilt of the instant offense.

In view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's participation in the attacks upon Dennis Fontaine and Robert Moretti and the limiting instruction given by the trial justice, we are of the opinion that the effect of these minor Rhode Island misdemeanor convictions upon the totality of proof offered by the state was so insignificant as to render them harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

II THE TRIAL JUSTICE'S RULING CONCERNING ARTHUR DENHAM'S ASSERTION OF HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

During the course of the trial, defendant indicated to the trial justice that he desired to call Arthur Denham, who had been charged as a codefendant in the case, as a witness in his behalf. Counsel for defendant informed the trial justice that he had been advised by Denham's counsel that Denham would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in the event that he was called to testify. The defendant, by a motion in limine, requested that the trial justice rule on Denham's invocation of his privilege outside the presence of the jury. The trial justice responded that he could not rule in advance upon this question and that he would do so only if defendant raised his privilege in the course of testimony before the...