State v. Medina

• Decision Date: 17 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 89147–8.,89147–8.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mario Alejandro MEDINA, Petitioner.

180 Wash.2d 282

324 P.3d 682

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Mario Alejandro MEDINA, Petitioner.

No. 89147–8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

April 17, 2014.

Cynthia B. Jones, Jones Legal Group, LLC, Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Thomas Michael Kummerow, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.

Andrea Ruth Vitalich, King County Prosecutor's Office, Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

GORDON McCLOUD, J.

¶ 1 While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP) (pronounced “sea-cap”): “CCAP Enhanced” and “CCAP Basic.” Medina participated in these programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a conviction. He argues that he is entitled, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. We granted review and now affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Medina was originally charged with first degree intentional murder in 1998. The jury convicted Medina and his codefendant, Felipe Ramos, of second degree felony murder based on the predicate offense of second degree assault. Those convictions were vacated in light of In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash.2d 602, 56 P.3d 981 (2002), which held that assault was not a predicate offense for felony murder. State v. Ramos, 124 Wash.App. 334, 101 P.3d 872 (2004).

¶ 3 On remand in 2005, Medina was arraigned on first degree manslaughter charges. He moved to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion, and this court granted direct review. In 2008, this court affirmed, meaning that the trial could proceed. State v. Ramos, 163 Wash.2d 654, 661–62, 184 P.3d 1256 (2008). Pending retrial, the trial court released Medina on personal recognizance on several conditions, including participation in CCAP.

¶ 4 CCAP is “a weekly itinerary ... of structured programs” administered at the Yesler Building in downtown Seattle.¹ There are two different CCAP tracks: CCAP Enhanced and CCAP Basic.² Offenders ordered into CCAP Enhanced report in person to the Yesler Building daily, while those ordered into CCAP Basic report only by phone.³ From January 2007 until July 2011, Medina alternated between CCAP Enhanced and CCAP Basic. He spent a total of about nine months in CCAP Enhanced and about three years and nine months in CCAP Basic.⁴

¶ 5 King County established CCAP under the auspices of former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988)/current RCW 9.94A.680.⁵ That statute has authorized courts to impose “alternatives to total confinement” for “offenders [with sentences] for less than one year,” since 1983. Laws of 1983, ch. 115, § 9. In 1999, it was amended to give sentencing courts permission to allow county jails to “convert jail confinement to an available county supervised community option.” Laws of 1999, ch. 197, § 6.

¶ 6 When Medina was in CCAP Enhanced, he reported in person to the Yesler Building every weekday morning at 9:00 a.m. and remained there “until discharged by department staff.” ⁶ Beyond that bare fact, the record does not contain any information about the nature of Medina's participation in CCAP Enhanced, but we note that in 2008 the King County Code (KCC) was amended to provide that offenders ordered into a “ ‘county supervised community option’... must participate for a minimum of six hours per day of structured programs offered through, or approved by, the community corrections division.” KCC 5.12.010(B).⁷

¶ 7 At his sentencing after retrial, Medina requested credit for the time he spent in both CCAP Enhanced and CCAP Basic. The trial judge stated that he would grant the request if he could—because Medina's conduct while awaiting retrial had been exemplary—but that he believed it was barred by statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Medina petitioned this court for review. State v. Ramos, noted at 174 Wash.App. 1072, 2013 WL 1956640, review granted sub nom., State v. Medina, 178 Wash.2d 1018, 312 P.3d 651 (2013).

ANALYSIS

I. The Sentencing Reform Act Does Not Entitle Medina to Credit for Time Served in CCAP Enhanced or CCAP Basic

¶ 8 Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), a defendant must be sentenced in accordance with the law in effect at the time of his or her offense. RCW 9.94A.345. In 1997, when Medina committed his offense, credit for time served was governed by former RCW 9.94A.030(8) (1988) and former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991), former RCW 9.94A.120(16) (1988), and former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988).

¶ 9 Former RCW 9.94A.030(8) (1988) provides that “ ‘[c]onfinement’ means total or partial confinement as defined in [RCW 9.94A.030].” LAWS OF 1996, ch. 289, § 1. Former RCW 9.94A.120(16) (1988) provides that “[t]he sentencing court shall give the offender credit for all confinement time served before the sentencing if that confinement was solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced.” Laws of 1996, ch. 275, § 2. Neither of these statutes has been amended since Medina's offense (although the latter has been recodified as RCW 9.94A.505(6)).

¶ 10 Former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) defines “partial confinement.” It provides that

“[p]artial confinement” means confinement for no more than one year in a facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state or any other unit of government, or, if home detention or work crew has been ordered by the court, in an approved residence, for a substantial portion of each day with the balance of the day spent in the community. Partial confinement includes work release, home detention, work crew, and a combination of work crew and home detention as defined in this section.

Laws of 1996, ch. 289, § 1. This statute has not been amended since 1997, but it has been recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(35).

¶ 11 The State contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) must be read together with former RCW 9.94A.180(1) (1988), which provided that “[a]n offender sentenced to a term of partial confinement shall be confined in the facility for at least eight hours per day.” Laws of 1991, ch. 181, § 4. When these statutes are harmonized, the State argues, it is clear that “a substantial portion of each day” really means “at least eight hours.” See Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 12; Ramos, 2013 WL 1956640, at *6 (“an offender must demonstrate that this partial confinement included at least eight hours per day in a ‘facility’ ” in order to qualify for time served in partial confinement.). The State argues, and the Court of Appeals concluded, that since CCAP did not confine Medina for at least eight hours each day, it did not constitute “partial confinement.” 2013 WL 1956640, at *6.

¶ 12 We disagree with that analysis. This court has held that a defendant's ineligibility for a particular type of partial confinement postconviction is not relevant to the question of whether that defendant must be credited for pretrial time served in that same type of partial confinement. State v. Speaks, 119 Wash.2d 204, 208, 829 P.2d 1096 (1992) (offender convicted of child molestation entitled to credit for presentencing time on electronic home detention (EHD) even though the SRA prohibited courts from sentencing persons convicted of child molestation to EHD). In reaching that conclusion, we noted that “[t]he appropriateness of a type of postconviction confinement ... is a different issue ... than whether the [SRA] affords credit for a type of presentence restraint.” Id. In light of the Speaks analysis, we decline to “harmonize” former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) and former RCW 9.94A.180(1) (1988) the way that the Court of Appeals below did. Ramos, 2013 WL 1956640, at *6.

¶ 13 Nevertheless, we agree with the State that Medina is not entitled to credit for time in CCAP. Former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) defines “partial confinement” in a manner that equates “confinement” with “residence” as contrasted with “work.” Laws of 1996, ch. 289, § 1 (“ ‘[p]artial confinement’ ” means “confinement for no more than one year in a facility or institution ... or, if home detention or work crew has been ordered ... in an approved residence ” (emphasis added)). By extension, we do not think that participation in the educational, counseling, and service-oriented programs entailed in CCAP meets the statutory definition of “confinement.” Participation in these programs is similar to reporting for work or school—clearly, the CCAP facility is not a residence.

¶ 14 While this is sufficient to resolve the question presented, we note that our conclusion also derives substantial support from the legislative history of former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988)/current RCW 9.94A.680.

¶ 15 Former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988)/current RCW 9.94A.680 governs “alternatives to total confinement.” In 1997, that statute read as follows:

Alternatives to total confinement are available for offenders with sentences of one year or less. These alternatives include the following sentence conditions that the court may order as substitutes for total confinement:

(1) One day of partial confinement may be substituted for one day of total confinement;

(2) in addition, for offenders convicted of nonviolent offenses only, eight hours of community service may be substituted for one day of total confinement, with a maximum conversion limit of two hundred forty hours or thirty days.

For sentences of nonviolent offenders for one year or less, the court shall consider and give priority to available alternatives to total confinement and shall state its reasons in writing on the judgment and sentence form if the alternatives are not used.

Laws of 1988, ch. 157, § 4.

¶ 16 This statute has been amended three times since 1997, and two of those amendments...