State v. Melton

Decision Date20 February 2018
Docket NumberNo. COA 17-921,COA 17-921
Citation811 S.E.2d 678,258 N.C.App. 134
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of North Carolina v. Kella MELTON

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, Raleigh, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Katy Dickinson-Schultz, for defendant-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

Kella Melton ("defendant") appeals from judgments revoking her probation and activating her suspended sentences. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court's judgments.

I. Background

On 14 July 2015 in Rutherford County Superior Court, defendant was given a suspended sentence based on a conviction for possession of methamphetamine and simple possession of a Class IV controlled substance in case number 14 CR 53301. This sentence was modified to an active sentence on 18 December 2015.

On 31 May 2016 in Rutherford County Superior Court, defendant pleaded no contest to identity theft, four counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, and three counts of uttering a forged endorsement in case numbers 15 CRS 52149, 52446-48, and 16 CRS 344. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of 13 to 25 months, 7 to 18 months, and 7 to 18 months, but suspended the sentences and placed defendant on 30 months of supervised probation.

On 4 November 2016, defendant's probation officer, Officer Tiffany Nelson, swore out probation violation reports, relating to defendant's probation for 14 CR 53301, 15 CRS 52149, 52446-48, and 16 CRS 344, alleging that, on or about 2 November 2016, defendant willfully violated her probation by absconding in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) (2017), failing to report to her supervising officer as directed in violation of § 15A-1343(b)(3), and being in arrears towards her court indebtedness in violation of § 15A-1343(b)(9). As a result of the violation reports, defendant was arrested on 9 December 2016. Defendant did not meet with Officer Nelson again until 17 January 2017.

The matter came on for hearing on 8 February 2017. At the hearing, Officer Nelson testified that defendant failed to report for scheduled meetings with her on 2 August 2016, 4 October 2016, 12 October 2016, 28 October 2016, and 2 November 2016. Prior to defendant's failure to attend the 28 October and 2 November 2016 meetings, defendant met with Officer Nelson on 26 October 2016.1 Officer Nelson testified that, when defendant failed to appear for the 2 November 2016 meeting, she attempted to contact defendant numerous times by phone and by visiting defendant's address. Defendant's phone was disconnected, and she was not present at the address. Officer Nelson also called and left messages with defendant's parents, asking for defendant to call her. On cross-examination, however, she was unable to identify with any specificity when she made the contacts, and she testified she did not have written record of these contacts with her at the hearing. At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence of absconding. The motion was denied. Defendant offered evidence through defendant's testimony.

At the close of all evidence, the trial court found that defendant violated her probation by absconding, failing to report to her scheduled appointments with her probation officer, and failing to adequately pay the funds due on her probation. The trial court also found that each violation in and of itself was a sufficient basis upon which to revoke probation. Defendant's probation was revoked, and the trial court activated her sentences in 14 CR 53301, 15 CRS 52149, 52446-48, and 16 CRS 344.

On 10 February 2017, defendant gave notice of appeal. Subsequently, on 2 March 2017, the trial court issued an order stating that probation was revoked in error with regard to case number 14 CR 53301 because the sentence in that case had previously been modified to an active sentence on 18 December 2015. Therefore, only the probation revocations involving 15 CRS 52149, 52446-48, and 16 CRS 344 are at issue in this appeal.

II. Discussion

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that she absconded under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) as alleged by the violation reports. We agree.

A hearing to revoke a defendant's probationary sentence only requires that the evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended.

State v. Young , 190 N.C. App. 458, 459, 660 S.E.2d 574, 576 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When the State presents "competent evidence establishing a defendant's failure to comply with the terms of probation, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate through competent evidence an inability to comply with the terms." State v. Talbert , 221 N.C. App. 650, 652, 727 S.E.2d 908, 910-11 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

We review a trial court's decision to revoke a defendant's probation for abuse of discretion. State v. Miller , 205 N.C. App. 291, 293, 695 S.E.2d 149, 150 (2010) (citation omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion "when a ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Murchison , 367 N.C. 461, 464, 758 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

A trial court may only revoke a defendant's probation in circumstances where the defendant: (1) commits a new criminal offense, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1), (2) absconds by willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making her whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer, in violation of § 15A-1343(b)(3a), or (3) violates any condition of probation after previously serving two periods of confinement in response to violations, pursuant to § 15A-1344(d2). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2017).

We first consider defendant's argument that the trial court erred by making an oral finding that defendant absconded from 2 November 2016 until she was arrested on 9 December 2016, instead of limiting its consideration of the evidence to the dates alleged in the violation reports. Specifically, defendant claims that considering evidence up until her arrest was in error because the violation reports only specifically allege that defendant absconded from "on or about" 2 November 2016 to the date the reports were filed, 4 November 2016. We agree.

In order to provide a defendant with notice of the allegations against him, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1345(e), probation violation reports must contain a statement of the specific violations alleged. See State v. Moore , ––– N.C. ––––, ––––, 807 S.E.2d 550, 555 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard , 198 N.C. App. 154, 159, 678 S.E.2d 390, 394 (2009) ). However, we note that, after making the contested oral finding, the trial judge entered written judgments finding defendant violated her probation by absconding from supervision, as alleged in the violation reports, which the judgments incorporated by reference. Because the written findings are more favorable to defendant than those announced from the bench, we consider the written judgments as reflective of the trial court's will. See State v. Morston , 336 N.C. 381, 410, 445 S.E.2d 1, 17 (1994).

Therefore, we review for whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant absconded in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) based on the dates alleged in the violation reports—on or about 2 November to 4 November 2016. For the reasons that follow, the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding.

Prior to our Legislature's enactment of the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011 ("JRA"), the term "abscond" was not defined by statute. State v. Williams , 243 N.C. App. 198, 205, 776 S.E.2d 741, 746 (2015) (citations omitted). Instead, our case law used the term to refer to instances where a defendant failed to remain in the court's jurisdiction or failed to report to a probation officer as directed. See, e.g. , State v. Hunnicutt , 226 N.C. App. 348, 355, 740 S.E.2d 906, 911 (2013). Presently, "abscond" is defined by statute, and a defendant on supervised probation only absconds when he "willfully avoid[s] supervision" or "willfully mak[es] [his] whereabouts unknown to [his] supervising probation officer[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a). This change was in line with the JRA's purpose to be "part of a national criminal justice reform effort" which, among other changes, "made it more difficult to revoke offenders' probation and send them to prison." State v. Johnson , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 783 S.E.2d 21, 26 (2016). Under the statutory definition set out in § 15A-1343(b)(3a), we have held that a defendant absconds when he willfully makes his whereabouts unknown to his probation officer, and the probation officer is unable to contact the defendant. See State v. Trent , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 803 S.E.2d 224, 232, temporary stay allowed , ––– N.C. ––––, 802 S.E.2d 725 (2017).

Here, the State presented evidence of the alleged violations through Officer Nelson's testimony. Officer Nelson testified that defendant absconded a week after the 26 October 2016 meeting because she failed to attend the 28 October and 2 November meetings, and did not contact Officer Nelson thereafter, even though the officer attempted to call and visit defendant multiple times over the course of two days, and called and left messages with defendant's parents for defendant to call her. However, on cross-examination, Officer Nelson could not support her...

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23 cases
  • Brendoff v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 1, 2019
    ...decision interpreting the definition of "absconding" under North Carolina's Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011. State v. Melton , 811 S.E.2d 678, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). There, the trial court found that Melton violated her probation by absconding within the meaning of North Carolina's JRA,......
  • State v. Bailey
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 6, 2022
    ... ...          ¶ ... 33 The trial court appropriately revoked Defendant's ... probation as authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) ... (2021) after he admitted to the alleged probation violation ... of committing a new criminal offense. See, e.g., State v ... Melton , 258 N.C.App. 134, 136-37, 811 S.E.2d 678, 680-81 ... ("A trial court may only revoke a defendant's ... probation in circumstances when the defendant: (1) commits a ... new criminal offense, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § ... 15A-1343(b)(1) ... ") ...          ¶ ... 34 ... ...
  • State v. Cottrell
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 7, 2020
    ...We disagree."We review a trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s probation for abuse of discretion." State v. Melton , 258 N.C. App. 134, 136, 811 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2018) (citing State v. Miller , 205 N.C. App. 291, 293, 695 S.E.2d 149, 150 (2010) ). An abuse of discretion occurs when......
  • State v. Crompton
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 2020
    ...violation of Section 15A-1343(b)(3a).Relying on State v. Williams , 243 N.C. App. 198, 776 S.E.2d 741 (2015), and State v. Melton , 258 N.C. App. 134, 811 S.E.2d 678 (2018), our dissenting colleague contends that the State has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that ......
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