State v. Metcalf

• Decision Date: 11 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. CA2015–03–022.,CA2015–03–022.
• Citation: 2016 Ohio 4923,68 N.E.3d 371
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Shawn METCALF, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

68 N.E.3d 371
2016 Ohio 4923

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Shawn METCALF, Defendant–Appellant.

No. CA2015–03–022.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Warren County.

July 11, 2016.

68 N.E.3d 372

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Lebanon, OH, for plaintiff-appellee.

Craig A. Newburger, South Lebanon, OH, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

ROBERT ALLEN HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Shawn Metcalf, appeals the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas after it issued an entry designating him as a Tier III sexual offender under the Adam Walsh Act ("AWA"). For the reasons detailed below, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

{¶ 2} Appellant was previously convicted of attempted rape in 2006, sentenced to prison, and designated as a sexually-oriented offender under Megan's Law. Following his release, appellant was ordered to serve a period of postrelease control.

{¶ 3} On August 26, 2010, appellant pled guilty to kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), a first-degree felony, which included a specification that the crime was committed with a sexual motivation as provided by R.C. 2941.147(A). As a result of his guilty plea, on September 29, 2010, appellant was sentenced to a four-year prison term. The trial court's sentencing entry also included an order revoking appellant's postrelease control and imposed an additional 278 days in prison to be served consecutive to the kidnapping conviction "for a total sentence of 4 years and 278 days." Appellant did not appeal from that decision.

{¶ 4} On February 26, 2015, two days prior to the completion of appellant's sentence, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court informed appellant that he was being resentenced because the court had forgotten to notify and designate him as a Tier III sexual offender under the AWA. The trial court then re-imposed the same sentence as the 2010 sentencing entry, but included the relevant sexual offender designation. Appellant then appealed and his appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). However, after finding an arguable issue on appeal, this court appointed new counsel, who raised the following single assignment of error for review.

{¶ 5} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS NOT MADE KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND INTELLIGENTLY.

{¶ 6} Although his assignment of error relates to his guilty plea, we note that appellant's argument arises from the imposition of the AWA Tier III sexual offender status at the February 26, 2015 resentencing hearing. Appellant claims that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because he was not

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informed of the AWA Tier III sexual offender designation.

{¶ 7} It is undisputed that at the time the trial court issued its amended sentencing entry, appellant was two days from his release from prison, and thus had served a total of four years and 276 days in prison. The issue to be resolved is whether the trial court had authority to designate appellant as a Tier III sexual offender under the AWA considering that the relevant four-year prison sentence imposed for kidnapping may have expired. Since an offender cannot be subject to the imposition of additional punishment following the completion of his sentence for that offense, this court must address several issues. See, e.g., State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, (holding that a defendant who had served the imposed sentence of incarceration had a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence and the trial court was precluded from imposing additional punishment upon him).

{¶ 8} First, we must decide whether the consecutive sentences imposed are separate and distinct from one another, or whether the sentences combine in the aggregate to form a "sentencing package." Next, if the sentences are separate and distinct, this court must determine whether appellant was serving time for the kidnapping offense, which included the sexual motivation specification, or if appellant was serving time for the postrelease control violation. Finally, if appellant was not serving time on the relevant kidnapping offense, we must determine whether the trial court erred by designating appellant as an AWA Tier III sexual offender following the completion of his four-year prison sentence for that offense.

Ohio's Felony–Sentencing Structure

{¶ 9} In beginning this analysis, we must address the nature of consecutive prison terms. In State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a criminal defendant was sentenced to a prison term of ten years for aggravated arson to be served consecutively with a five-year prison term for arson. Id. at ¶ 3. After the defendant completed his ten-year prison term for aggravated arson and began to serve his five-year prison term for arson, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing to correct its errors relating to the imposition of postrelease control for the aggravated-arson offense. Id. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals held that the trial court could resentence a defendant to properly impose postrelease control as long as the defendant was still serving a prison term for any of the other offenses included in the same sentencing entry. Id. at ¶ 4. In so doing, the Third District interpreted the terms "prison term" and "sentence" as the aggregate sentence on all convictions and found that its interpretation was consistent with R.C. 2929 et seq. State v. Holdcroft, 3d Dist., 2012-Ohio-3066, 973 N.E.2d 334, ¶ 33. As a result, the Third District referenced statutes such as R.C. 2929.14(C)(6), which provides "[w]hen consecutive prison terms are imposed pursuant to * * * [R.C. 2929.14 ], the term to be served is the aggregate of all of the terms so imposed." Id.; see also Ohio Adm.Code 5120–2–03.1 ("When consecutive stated prison terms are imposed, the term to be served is the aggregate of all of the stated prison terms so imposed").

{¶ 10} The Ohio Supreme Court determined that a conflict existed with the Third District's decision in Holdcroft and accepted the discretionary appeal. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, at ¶ 4. Thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Third District's decision. Id. As to the nature of

68 N.E.3d 374

consecutive sentencing, the Supreme Court held that consecutive sentences are separate and distinct from one another and do not combine in the aggregate to form a "sentencing package." Id. at ¶ 6; State v. Hilliard, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15CA16, 2015-Ohio-5324, 2015 WL 9305522, ¶ 40–41. Without citing R.C. 2929.14(C)(6), the Court instead began by examining the definitions of the words "sentence," "sanction," and "conviction" by reviewing its prior decision in State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, "which offers insight into Ohio's felony-sentencing structure."

In Saxon, this court addressed and rejected the use of the "sentencing package" doctrine by Ohio's appellate courts. Under that doctrine, a defendant's sentences in a multiple-conviction judgment entry are viewed in the aggregate, and if one of the sentences is vacated on appeal, the trial court has the authority to review the entire "sentencing package" on remand. In Saxon, we concluded that the doctrine did not apply in Ohio, because "Ohio's felony-sentencing scheme is clearly designed to focus the judge's attention on one offense at a time." In so holding, we observed that R.C. 2929.01(EE) (formerly numbered R.C. 2929.01(FF) ) defines "sentence" as " ‘the sanction or combination of sanctions imposed by the sentencing court on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense.’ " Further support for the Saxon rule can be found in R.C. 2929.01(DD), which states that " ‘[s]anction’ means any penalty imposed upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense, as punishment for the offense" and in State v. Gapen, * * * which recognizes that a criminal "conviction" consists of both a finding of guilt and the imposition of a sentence.

Id. at ¶ 6 (citations omitted). In sum, the court reiterated, "under both the Revised Code and this court's decisions, a conviction is composed of a finding of guilt and a sentence, a sentence is a sanction or combination of sanctions imposed for an individual offense, and incarceration and postrelease control are types of sanctions that may be imposed and combined to form a sentence." Id.

{¶ 11} Therefore, Holdcroft holds that consecutive sentences are separate and distinct from one another and do not combine in the aggregate to form a "sentencing package." Id. at ¶ 6; Hilliard, 2015-Ohio-5324, 2015 WL 9305522, at ¶ 40. As will be addressed in more detail below, based on its decision in Holdcroft, the Supreme Court held that a trial court had no authority to resentence a criminal defendant and impose a period of postrelease control on a completed sentence, even though the defendant was still in prison for other...