State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 27 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. C3-94-360,C3-94-360
• Citation: 525 N.W.2d 576
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Rodney Allen MILLER, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 576

525 N.W.2d 576

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Rodney Allen MILLER, Appellant.

No. C3-94-360.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Dec. 27, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

The state's failure to bring an inmate's untried charges to trial within six months without a showing of good cause requires dismissal of the charge, regardless of its severity.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atty., Mark V. Griffin, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Susan J. Andrews, Asst. State Public Defender, St. Paul, for appellant.

Considered and decided by DAVIES, P.J., and AMUNDSON and THOREEN, ^* JJ.

OPINION

AMUNDSON, Judge.

Appellant argues that his racketeering conviction should be reversed because (1) the state failed to bring an untried charge to trial within six months; (2) the state failed to show good cause for delaying disposition of the untried charges; and (3) the sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence agreed upon by the parties without calculating his criminal history score. We agree and vacate appellant's conviction.

FACTS

Appellant Rodney Miller has been an inmate at the Stillwater correctional facility since 1984. He is serving a 134 month sentence on a murder conviction. In 1991, a police investigation linked him to a prison drug smuggling operation and to three murders committed in Hennepin County by his brother, Gary Miller. Prison officials placed Rodney Miller in segregation because of his possible involvement.

On July 31, 1991, the state charged Rodney Miller with three counts of conspiracy to commit murder. The following day, the state charged him with one count of racketeering. In August 1991, Miller requested a speedy disposition of the charges under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), Minn.Stat. § 626.292 (1990), which requires all untried complaints to be brought to trial within six months of request unless good cause is shown. He also requested the appointment of counsel. The record reflects that the Hennepin County Attorney received Miller's request around August 8, 1991.

Miller did not make his first appearance until January 15, 1992. Two days later, Miller again appeared before the court, and Mark Wernick was formally appointed as his attorney. Wernick indicated that prosecutor Kevin Johnson had told him that February 5 was the end of the six month UMDDA period. At this time, Johnson represented to the court that the state was ready for trial. Wernick stated that he was not prepared to try the case within the next two weeks. Wernick noted that the issue was whether the reasons for the delay were sufficient to go past the six month time limit. The court continued the hearing to February 4, 1992.

At the February 4 hearing, Wernick explained that he was not ready to try the case the next day. The court granted the state's motion for a continuance, finding "there is good cause to extend this period of time and to schedule this matter for trial on June 22." Four days before trial, the state dismissed both complaints against Miller. The next day, the state charged Miller with three counts of first degree murder. Each count was based on the same allegations stated in the previous complaint. Miller again requested a speedy disposition under the UMDDA. The state again dismissed the first degree murder complaint on October 2, 1992, after the primary police investigator was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident.

No charges were pending against Miller from October 1992 until July 1993. During this time, however, Miller remained imprisoned in segregation. On July 20, 1993, a grand jury indicted Miller for three counts of first degree murder. The indictment was identical to the counts charged in the state's earlier complaint. Miller again requested a speedy disposition of the indictment.

At the November omnibus hearing, the court denied Miller's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the UMDDA and scheduled trial for November 22, 1993. On November 23, the parties reached a plea agreement. Miller agreed to plead guilty to racketeering in return for an executed sentence of 15 years and dismissal of the murder indictment.

At the plea hearing, Miller again asserted his claim for violation of his speedy trial rights, but the court accepted Miller's guilty plea and imposed a 15-year concurrent, executed sentence with credit given from August 1, 1991. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

1. Does an inmate waive his speedy disposition claim by pleading guilty?

2. Did the state violate the inmate's statutory right to a speedy disposition of untried charges?

3. Did the trial court err by imposing a sentence that the parties agreed upon without determining the criminal history score or the severity level of the offense?

ANALYSIS

I. Waiver

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Miller waived his UMDDA claim by pleading guilty. Generally a guilty plea by a counseled defendant operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects arising before the entry of the plea. State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn.1980). Whether the right to a speedy disposition is a jurisdictional question has not been addressed by Minnesota courts.

The UMDDA itself provides that "[i]f, after such a request, the indictment or information is not brought to trial within [six months] or within additional time for good cause, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof." Minn.Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3 (1990) (emphasis added). The statutory language reasonably implies that the defendant's right to speedy disposition of untried charges is jurisdictional. The Michigan Supreme Court stated succinctly that "a [d]efendant may always challenge whether the state had a right to bring the prosecution in the first place." People v. Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 240 N.W.2d 729, 738 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed.2d 319 (1976). In construing the issue, the court noted:

Why an accepted, unqualified plea of guilty should cure error that a guilty verdict or finding would not has probably been best answered by the Supreme Court's observation that a guilty plea is different "in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction."

Id. (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)). Moreover, Miller consistently asserted that he was not waiving his right to appeal the detainer issue. Thus, we hold that the right to a speedy disposition is jurisdictional and that Miller did not waive his right to appeal the detainer issue by pleading guilty.

II. UMDDA Violation

The construction of a statute is a question of law, reviewed de novo by appellate courts. State v. Huynh, 504 N.W.2d 477, 481 (Minn.App.1993) (citing Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984)), aff'd, 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn.1994).

The UMDDA provides that,

any person who is imprisoned in a penal or correctional institution * * * may request final disposition of any untried indictment or complaint pending against the person in this state.

* * * * * * Within six months after the receipt of the [prisoner's] request * * *, or within such additional time as the court for good cause shown in open court may grant, the prisoner or counsel being present, the indictment or information shall be brought to trial. * * * If, after such a request, the indictment or information is not brought to trial within that period, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment or information be of any further force or effect, and the court shall dismiss it with prejudice.

Minn.Stat. § 629.292, subds. 1, 3.

Under the UMDDA, the state had until February 8, 1992 to bring Miller's case to trial. Minn.Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3 (state's six month time limit starts to run upon receipt by the court and prosecuting attorney of inmate's UMDDA request); see also State v. Hamilton, 268 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Minn.1978) (six month period begins to run from date UMDDA request is received--not from date defendant is informed of the indictment).

A. The first delay

On February 4, 1992, the court extended the time for trial for good cause. Whether good cause exists for extending the UMDDA time limit is a subjective, factual question within the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn.1987) (ruling on a request for continuance is within trial court's discretion). The trial court noted the recency of appointment of defense counsel, the potential ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the congested court calendar as reasons supporting an extension of Miller's trial date. Moreover, defense counsel consented to a trial date of June 22, approximately four and a half months beyond the 180-day time limit. But the record also reflects that, even though defense counsel consented to the June 22 trial date, the parties and the court assumed that Miller was not waiving his speedy trial rights.

B. The second delay

The record reveals no legitimate reason for the state's dismissal on June 18, 1992 and the subsequent recharge on June 19, 1992. The state apparently assumed that the dismissal of the conspiracy and racketeering charges and the filing of a new complaint for first degree murder allowed the state another six months under the UMDDA to try the murder complaint. No Minnesota appellate court has addressed this precise issue, but the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of an analogous state criminal procedure rule provides some guidance in deciding the merits of the state's assumption.

A defendant charged with a misdemeanor "must be tried within 60 days from the date of the demand" unless good cause is shown. Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06; see also Minn.R.Crim.P. 11.10 (same rule for felonies and gross misdemeanors). The Minnesota Supreme Court has...