State v. Miller
| Decision Date | 18 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. COA17-1130,COA17-1130 |
| Citation | 817 S.E.2d 921 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Juan Antonia MILLER |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Henry, for the State.
Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant-appellant.
Where defendant failed to establish the State acted in bad faith by disposing of potential impeachment evidence, we the affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Where the evidence did not support an instruction on voluntary intoxication, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury. And where the publication of a photo of defendant’s identifying tattoo was not substantially more prejudicial than probative, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
On 1 June 2015, defendant Juan Antonia Miller was indicted for first-degree murder. The matter came on for trial 6 February 2017 in Guilford County Superior Court, the Honorable Eric C. Morgan, Judge presiding.
Three days before trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to preserve evidence. Through the discovery process, defendant learned that law enforcement officers had access to and had reviewed audio recordings of 157 telephone conversations initiated by State witness Michael Devone Keel (hereinafter Michael) made from the High Point Jail to another State witness—Michael’s wife, Stephanie Grant Keel (hereinafter Stephanie). At the time of trial, almost two years later, the recordings were no longer available. The trial court entered a written order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The evidence at trial tended to show that during the early morning hours of 25 April 2015, Michael and Jamil Booker (the victim) went to a party. Defendant, who was at the party, asked Michael for a ride home. Defendant got in the backseat behind Booker and Michael drove. After riding less than a mile, defendant, who had shown no animosity toward Booker at the party or in the car, shot Booker in the back of the head. Defendant then had Michael drive to Michael’s house where he told Michael’s wife, Stephanie, that he had killed Booker. Then, after threatening to kill everyone in the house, including their children, defendant had Michael go with him to dump Booker’s body.
Once Michael returned, Stephanie called a law enforcement officer who directed them to go to a hotel and "lay low." However, on the way to the hotel, Michael and Stephanie were pulled over for a traffic stop and arrested on the basis of outstanding warrants.
Law enforcement officers discovered blood spatter in the interior of Michael’s car and a shell casing in the back seat. A search of defendant’s residence revealed jeans and a shirt that had blood stains. A forensic scientist with the State Bureau of Investigation testified that DNA from the blood stains on the shirt found in defendant’s residence matched Booker’s DNA.
Defendant presented three witnesses, each of whom testified to observing defendant in possession of a handgun after Booker was killed.
The jury was instructed on first-degree murder based on malice, premeditation, and deliberation, and the felony murder rule; and second-degree murder. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder based upon malice, premeditation, and deliberation. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and sentenced defendant to a term of life imprisonment without parole.
Defendant appeals.
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On appeal, defendant argues the trial court (I) erred by denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss; (II) committed plain error by failing to give an instruction on voluntary intoxication; and (III) erred by allowing the State to show a photo of defendant’s abdominal tattoo, "SWAMP N***A."
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss because the State failed to disclose known Giglio1 evidence that would have impeached the State’s only eyewitness. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court is "limited to determining whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law." State v. Williams , 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation omitted). "The decision that a defendant has satisfied the elements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–954(a)(4) [], and thus is entitled to a dismissal, is a conclusion of law reviewable de novo ." State v. Dorman , 225 N.C. App. 599, 619–20, 737 S.E.2d 452, 466 (2013). State v. Bone , 354 N.C. 1, 8, 550 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2001) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to our General Statutes, section 15A-954, a defendant is entitled to dismissal of the charges stated in the criminal pleading against him if his "constitutional rights have been flagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution." N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4) (2017). However, dismissal is a "drastic" form of relief to be "granted sparingly." State v. Joyner , 295 N.C. 55, 59, 243 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1978).
Defendant contends that the State’s failure to preserve and turn over recordings of Michael’s telephone calls from jail "flagrantly violated" his right to due process in accordance with Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1972).
As the movant, a defendant bears the burden of showing both the "flagrant constitutional violation" and irreparable prejudice. Williams , 362 N.C. at 634, 669 S.E.2d at 295. "To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial." State v. McNeil , 155 N.C. App. 540, 542, 574 S.E.2d 145, 147 (2002) (citing Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 10 L.Ed. 2d at 218 ). "Favorable" evidence can be either exculpatory or useful in impeaching the State’s evidence. Williams , 362 N.C. 628 at 636, 669 S.E.2d at 296. "Evidence is considered ‘material’ if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the evidence been disclosed." State v. Berry , 356 N.C. 490, 517, 573 S.E.2d 132, 149 (2002) (citing Kyles v. Whitney , 514 U.S. 419, 434, 131 L.Ed. 2d 490, 506 (1995) ); see also United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L.Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985) (). "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense." United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 109–10, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342, 353 (1976) (emphasis added), holding modified by Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 87 L.Ed. 2d 481. "[A] ‘reasonable probability ’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley , 473 U.S. at 682, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 (emphasis added).
In Dorman , this Court acknowledged that the failure to disclose material evidence diminishes confidence in the outcome of a trial.
However, when the evidence is only "potentially useful" or when " ‘no more can be said [of the evidence] than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,’ " the State’s failure to preserve the evidence does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights unless a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the State. State v. Mlo , 335 N.C. 353, 373, 440 S.E.2d 98, 108 (1994), cert. denied , 512 U.S. 1224, (1994) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood , 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988) ).
225 N.C. App. 599, 620–21, 737 S.E.2d 452, 466 (2013).
In January 2017, defendant’s counsel reviewed the State’s discovery and learned that law enforcement officers had undisclosed recordings of jail phone calls between two eye witnesses for the State. Defendant immediately requested the recordings but was informed they were no longer available.
On 3 February 2017, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him based on Brady , 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215, and State v. Williams , 190 N.C. App. 301, 660 S.E.2d 189 (2008) (). The matter was heard 6 February 2017 during a pretrial hearing.
Defendant argued that while the State may contend the content of the phone calls did not go directly to the matter to be tried before the court, the content of the conversations described by law enforcement officers who heard the recordings supported defendant’s claim that State witnesses "[Michael] and [Stephanie] [we]re not trustworthy, that they were playing both sides of the fence with law enforcement, and they would say things to law enforcement that were not true, and they were doing something else[, such as dealing drugs,] on the side." However, defendant asserted ...
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