State v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 31 October 1973
• Docket Number: No. 6202,6202
• Citation: 113 N.H. 542,311 A.2d 134
• Parties: STATE of New Hampshire v. John MITCHELL.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 134

311 A.2d 134

113 N.H. 542

STATE of New Hampshire v. John MITCHELL.

No. 6202.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Oct. 31, 1973.

Warren B. Rudman, Atty. Gen., and Henry F. Spaloss, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Olson, Reynolds & McMahon, Keene (Arthur Olson, Jr., Keene), for defendant.

DUNCAN, Justice.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of second degree murder following trial by jury, before Johnson, J., of an indictment charging the defendant with the murder of Susan Davis at Newport in March 1970. The defendant's exceptions to denial of his motion to suppress evidence of statements made by him to police before he was warned of his constitutional rights, and to denial of his motion to set aside the verdict of guilty, were reserved and transferred by the presiding justice.

Susan Davis was found shot in the left side of the head and lying dead on the floor of the defendant's filling station by police who were notified by radio to go there in response to information received from a young man who had returned from an errand for the defendant to find the defendant, gun in hand, crouched over Susan's prostrate body, and who had left at once to telephone the police. Upon their arrival the police found the defendant in an intoxicated condition, holding a telephone receiver in one hand and a bottle of liquor in the other, with his handgun upon a nearby desk. In response to the question 'What happened?', the defendant replied, 'Sue just shot herself'.

The defendant was taken into custody and placed in a police cruiser, where he remained while other officers were summoned. While he was seated alone in the cruiser the defendant sought to speak to one of the officers who stood nearby,but the officer refused to talk with him. Soon afterward, he was heard to say 'Oh, my God, what have I done now . . . I hope I burn for this . . ..' The defendant was shortly thereafter taken to the police station with three officers present in the car. The testimony of the officers was that the defendant was not questioned upon the way to the station, but that he spontaneously repeated his previous statement.

Thus there was evidence to warrant a finding by the trial court that while there was brief general on-the-scene questioning of the defendant when the officers first arrived at the filling station, there was no interrogation after he was taken into custody in the police cruiser; and that his statements to the officers were voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation. State v. Scanlon, 110 N.H. 179, 263 A.2d 669 (1970); State v. Desjardins, 110 N.H. 511, 272 A.2d 599 (1970). See also Klamert v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Littlejohn, 441 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1971); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 683-686 (1970). In contrast, State v. Saunders, 102 Ariz. 565, 435 P.2d 39 (1967), and other cases relied upon by the defendant, involved custodial interrogation, and are inapposite.

The evidence of the defendant's statements was not incompetent under principles established by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the motion to suppress was properly denied.

An examination of the record of the trial indicates that the defendant's contention that the State's evidence failed to establish the elements of the crime cannot be adopted. The allegations of the indictment complied with the requirements of RSA 601:6 (...