State v. Mitchell, 41024

• Decision Date: 06 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 41024,41024
• Citation: 163 N.W.2d 310,282 Minn. 113
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John R. MITCHELL, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 310

163 N.W.2d 310

282 Minn. 113

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John R. MITCHELL, Appellant.

No. 41024.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 6, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A medical expert with extensive training and experience in the specialty of pathology, who was present during an autopsy performed on a person who had been strangled, testified that in his opinion the strangulation was 'performed from behind,' and his statement was stricken by the trial 2. The warning of constitutional rights specified by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, is essential when the investigation has focused on the accused to the point that he has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way. Statements voluntarily given by the surviving husband of a woman found dead in their burning domicle were properly received as evidence in his trial for her murder, even though the husband was receiving medical attention in a hospital at the time the statements were received and even though the police officers who solicited the statements before giving the warning were investigating the death and fire on the assumption that someone had killed the deceased and set fire to the home.

court upon motion of the defendant, who then moved for a mistrial on the theory that the opinion, once expressed, could not be eradicated from the minds of the jury. Held, upon appeal from a conviction for manslaughter, that the opinion expressed by the [282 MINN 114] witness was proper under the facts disclosed by the record and that defendant, having persuaded the trial court to strike it, was not so prejudiced by the proceedings as to justify the direction of a new trial.

3. The selection of grand jurors from a list of persons submitted by individual district judges on the basis of their personal knowledge of such persons, which allegedly results in omission from the grand jury of members of the middle and lower socio-economic groups, is held not violative of U.S. Const. Amend. XIV or of Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, upon the authority of State v. Dilliard, 279 Minn. 414, 157 N.W.2d 75.

4. The failure to afford a defendant charged by indictment with the crime of murder in the first degree a preliminary hearing where one had been demanded and scheduled before the grand jury indictment issued does not constitute deprivation of due process and equal protection of the laws under either the Federal or State Constitution.

5. While it is true generally that warrants for arrest and search warrants should be issued only on the basis of probable cause established to the satisfaction of a magistrate, a warrant for arrest can also be based upon an indictment, the determination of probable cause by the grand jury being adequate to establish that element for the purpose of issuing a warrant for the apprehension of the person charged.

Robins & Meshbesher, Minneapolis, and F. Lee Bailey, Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Henry W. McCarr, Harlan M. Goulett and David C. Weinberg Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.

OPINION

SHERAN, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree and from an order of the district court denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

On December 26, 1966, shortly before 3 a.m., the lifeless body of Nancy Mitchell, bruised and apparently beaten about the head, was discovered amid smoke and flames on the living room floor of the Mitchell home in south Minneapolis. Firemen who had responded to an alarm initiated by defendant, Dr. John R. Mitchell, notified the police. The detectives assigned to the case interviewed Mitchell at about 4 a.m. at Hennepin County General Hospital where he had been taken by ambulance for relief from the effects of smoke inhalation. On the following day a complaint was filed charging Mitchell with having killed his wife. At the preliminary appearance in the Municipal Court of Hennepin County on December 28, the date of January 12, 1967, was fixed as the time for a preliminary hearing. This preliminary hearing was never held because the grand jury of Hennepin County, on January 10, 1967, returned an indictment charging defendant with murder in the first degree. An arrest warrant was issued by the clerk of Municipal Court of Hennepin County and was executed January 11. But for the indictment, no attempt was made to establish judicially probable cause for this arrest.

Upon arraignment in the district court, defendant, without waiver of the jurisdictional question pleaded not guilty to the indictment. Trial commenced May 25, 1967. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and the judgment of conviction was entered.

Upon appeal it is contended that defendant is entitled to a new trial because:

(1) Defendant was prejudiced because the county medical examiner, called as an expert witness by the state, expressed the opinion that the victim's death resulted from strangulation 'performed from behind.'

(2) Statements made by defendant to police officers at the hospital were received in evidence against him notwithstanding the fact that the statements were made before he was notified of his constitutional rights in the manner required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

(3) The indictment by which defendant was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree was returned by a grand jury, the members of which were selected by a process which failed to meet state and Federal constitutional standards.

(4) The failure to afford defendant a preliminary hearing where one had been demanded and scheduled deprived defendant of due process and equal protection of the laws contrary to the requirements of the Federal and State Constitutions.

(5) The district court lacked jurisdiction over defendant because the warrant pursuant to which he was arrested was not issued by a judicial officer and was not supported by an adequate showing of probable cause for arrest.

1. Dr. John I. Coe was called originally by the state in support of its case in chief. He is a physician admitted to practice in the State of Minnesota for over 20 years and a specialist in anatomic pathology. He serves as chief of pathology and director of laboratories for the Hennepin County General Hospital. He has personally performed over 2,000 autopies and participated in between 8,000 and 9,000. His experience includes the observation of over 200 cases of death from strangulation, including approximately 10 instances of homicidal strangulation. Together with Dr. Calvin N. Bandt, his deputy, he performed an autopsy on the person of Nancy Mitchell on December 27, 1966, noting with particular reference to the neck and cervical region of the spine: (1) An area of hemorrhage in the skin over the fifth cervical vertebra; (2) areas of hemorrhage in the muscle surrounding the spinal column of the neck; (3) hemorrhages in the sternocleidomastoid muscles 'behind the angles of the jaw * * * on both sides'; (4) two fractures of the cricoid cartilage of the larynx with extensive hemorrhage; (5) fracture of the hyoid bone with hemorrhage at the site of this fracture; (6) signs of asphyxiation.

Upon these findings and the fact that the blood showed no evidence of carbon monoxide, the doctor expressed the opinion upon direct examination as a part of the state's case in chief that death had resulted from manual strangulation. There was no objection made to the expression of this opinion by the pathologist. His qualifications from the standpoint of education and experience are not questioned in relation to this opinion.

Defendant claimed that the strangulation was self-inflicted. With the case in this posture, Dr. Coe was recalled by the state in rebuttal. At this juncture, defendant reasons, the jury had two possible theories to consider in trying to determine cause of death: (1) That Nancy Mitchell died as a result of manual strangulation at the hands of her husband, or (2) that her death was a result of manual strangulation by her own hand.

Preliminary inquiry was made by the state during the course of which Dr. Coe repeated the findings noted during his direct examination. In addition, he testified to having found hemorrhage in the strap muscles of the neck, after which a colloquy occurred between the court and counsel with respect to the scope of the inquiry then permissible. From this exchange it was made clear that the prosecution intended to elicit from the witness his opinion that the decedent had not strangled herself. The trial judge expressed his concern about this prospective interrogation upon the ground that the prosecuting attorney in framing his questions had proposed, in effect, that the witness take into consideration all the evidence which he had heard adduced during the course of the trial. He also was concerned lest such an opinion be 'invading the province of the jury.' The attorneys for the defendant urged that the expression of the opinion by the witness would be improper in any event. The trial judge stated: 'He can be asked up to the point of whether or not he has an opinion, then at that point it changes. You can then object on the grounds that there is not a sufficient foundation.' The record then reads:

'Q. (by the State) Doctor, you have reviewed for us the distribution of injuries to the neck.

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. What do they indicate to you?

'A. They indicate to me death by a manual strangulation; and, Further, that this was performed from behind.' (Italics supplied.)

The attorneys for the defendant moved that the opinion expressed be stricken. The court directed that the phrase 'performed from behind' be stricken. Defendant moved for a mistrial upon the ground that the...