State v. Mobley
| Decision Date | 07 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 11754,11754 |
| Citation | 633 A.2d 726,33 Conn.App. 103 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Sharon MOBLEY. |
Shawn G. Tiernan, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and Joseph Harry, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, FOTI and CRETELLA, JJ.
The defendant appeals from the revocation of her probation. On March 13, 1991, the defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford 1 doctrine to one count of threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 and one count of reckless endangerment in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63. The trial court Clark, J., sentenced the defendant to three months in the custody of the commissioner of correction on the threatening count and a concurrent one year sentence on the reckless endangerment count. Execution of both sentences was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for two years.
On December 23, 1991, an arrest warrant was issued charging the defendant with violating a condition of her probation mandating alcohol abuse evaluation and treatment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court Levin, J., found her in violation of her probation and, on September 8, 1992, sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of imprisonment of one year, execution suspended after three months, and eighteen months probation.
The defendant raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the trial court improperly found that the office of adult probation had imposed the conditions of her probation; (2) the imposition of those conditions by the office of adult probation violated her due process and confrontation rights; (3) General Statutes § 53a-30(b) conflicts with General Statutes § 53a-30(c); (4) the evidence was insufficient to show that alcohol abuse and treatment was necessary; and (5) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a letter under the business records exception to the hearsay evidence rule. 2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In a detailed and comprehensive memorandum of decision the trial court analyzed the defendant's first four claims consistently with the law. State v. Mobley, 42 Conn.Sup. 574, 634 A.2d 305 (1993). As to the first four arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the law on these issues. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Daw's Critical Care Registry, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 225 Conn. 99, 102, 622 A.2d 518 (1993); Bank of Boston Connecticut v. Brewster, 32 Conn.App. 215, 217, 628 A.2d 990 (1993).
Because the fifth issue did not involve the trial court's final resolution of the case but challenges a midtrial evidentiary ruling, it was not included in the trial court's memorandum of decision. Accordingly, we undertake our own analysis of the issue.
The hearsay issue arose during the testimony of the defendant's probation officer, Paul Steel. Steel testified that he had referred the defendant to the Connecticut Mental Health Center for evaluation for alcohol abuse and had received a letter from the center advising that the defendant would have to participate in treatment for alcohol abuse. The defendant flatly and unequivocally refused on numerous occasions to participate in treatment. 3 This testimony, which came into evidence without objection, was sufficient to establish the probation violation.
Consequently, we do not reach the question of the admissibility of the letter from the Connecticut Mental Health Center concerning the defendant's refusal to participate in treatment. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the defendant was correct, it would avail her nothing. An erroneous ruling is not reversible error if the evidence admitted thereby is merely cumulative of evidence that has otherwise properly entered the case. Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 155, 575 A.2d 206 (1990); State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 285, 528 A.2d 760 (1987). The probation violation was proven by Steel's direct testimony that the defendant refused to receive treatment for alcohol abuse.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other Judges concurred.
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...of probation; due process does not require hearing); State v. Mobley, 42 Conn. Sup. 574, 591-95, 634 A.2d 305, aff'd, 33 Conn. App. 103, 105, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994) (adopting as well reasoned trial court's "detailed and comprehensive memorandum......
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...and (c) are not in conflict and that the requirements of subsection (c) need not be impressed on subsection (b). See State v. Mobley, 33 Conn.App. 103, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 Our analysis of the terms of § 53a-30 (b) and (c) reveals that the General A......
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State v. Lockhart
...of his probation must be resolved in his favor; see State v. Mobley, 42 Conn. Sup. 574, 580-82, 634 A.2d 305, aff'd, 33 Conn. App. 103, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994); the revocation court found that the probation conditions were not ambiguous. That fi......
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...(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 20, 404 A.2d 873 (1978). In State v. Mobley, 33 Conn. App. 103, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994), this court affirmed and adopted the trial court's judgment that § 53a-30......