State v. Mollichi
| Decision Date | 08 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 64301-6,64301-6 |
| Citation | 132 Wn.2d 80,936 P.2d 408 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Geoffray MOLLICHI, Petitioner. |
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Pamela Mohr, Deputy, Erin Riley, Deputy, Seattle, for respondent.
In this case, we must decide if the $300 restitution order entered against defendant Geoffray Mollichi is valid even though it was not entered at Mollichi's disposition hearing, as prescribed in Washington's Juvenile Justice Act. We also must determine if Mollichi could waive the Act's requirement for a disposition hearing. We hold that a restitution order not timely entered at a disposition hearing as set forth in RCW 13.40.150(3)(f) and RCW 13.40.130(8)/JuCR 7.12(a) is invalid unless the juvenile waives the statutory requirements. The State here did not meet the Act's requirements for a disposition hearing and Mollichi did not waive those statutory requirements. We vacate the restitution order.
1. Are the time frame and procedure for a disposition hearing under RCW 13.40.150(3)(f) mandatory with respect to restitution?
2. Can a juvenile waive the statutory requirements for a disposition hearing?
3. Did Mollichi waive the statutory requirements a disposition hearing with respect to the restitution?
Geoffray Mollichi, a juvenile, took a motor vehicle without the owner's permission on the night of June 27, 1993. While fleeing arrest, he leaped from the top of one building onto the roof of an adjacent residence, causing $300 damage to the roof tiling of the residence.
The State charged Mollichi with taking a motor vehicle without permission (RCW 9A.56.070); malicious mischief in the second degree (RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a)); and resisting arrest in the second degree (RCW 9A.76.040). The juvenile court entered an Order Waiving Hearing and Setting for Plea that indicated the parties had waived a case setting hearing "pursuant to the following agreement":
The respondent [Mollichi], having received discovery and discussed the case and the elements of the offense with counsel, has decided to enter a plea of guilty ... to the offense(s) charged in the information to be amended on motion of the State as listed below:
04652-1: TMVWOP [Taking a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's Permission] and MM 3? -D [Malicious Mischief in the Third Degree]
Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at App. C. By this Order, the State agreed to reduce the charge of second degree malicious mischief, a class C felony, to third degree malicious mischief, a misdemeanor, to dismiss the resisting arrest charge, and to ask for restitution. Mollichi, his attorney, and the prosecutor all signed this Order.
The State then filed an amended information to reflect the reduced malicious mischief charge. A disposition hearing occurred on September 23, 1993 before King County Superior Court Commissioner Maurice Epstein, where Mollichi entered his Statement of Juvenile Offender on Plea of Guilty. He pleaded guilty to taking a motor vehicle The State then addressed the restitution question: "On the restitution in that case, Your Honor, apparently, there is some ongoing work being done to this roof, and we request that restitution be left open for an additional 30 days, so that we may determine what the final amount is going to be there." Report of Proceedings (Disposition) at 15-16. Mollichi's attorney replied: Report of Proceedings (Disposition) at 19. The Commissioner entered an Order of Disposition containing the handwritten notation, "Restitution shall be determined w/n 30 days." Clerk's Papers at 10. 1
without permission and to the misdemeanor malicious mischief charge. He expressed his understanding the prosecuting attorney would recommend to the court that he pay restitution, but no specific amount was specified for the restitution, nor was there any agreement on when restitution would be set. Mollichi's attorney indicated restitution was appropriate: "Clearly [Mollichi] needs to be accountable; I think the days that he has done and the community service hours that will be ordered and the restitution that will be ordered all serve the purpose of accountability." Report of Proceedings (Disposition) at 18. The Commissioner imposed standard sentences for the two offenses
The State filed notice for a hearing on the restitution question on October 22, 1993, setting the "restitution hearing" for November 22, 1993, 60 days after the disposition hearing. At that hearing, held before King County Superior Court Judge Carol Schapira, Mollichi's attorney asked the court to declare the restitution request untimely On appeal, Mollichi argued the trial court had no authority to enter a restitution order against him at any time other than at the disposition hearing because RCW 13.40.150(3)(f) states: "Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall ... [d]etermine the amount of restitution owing to the victim, if any," and the trial court did not determine the amount of the restitution at the disposition hearing on September 23, 1993. (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the trial court, holding the statutory language is directory rather than mandatory. The Court of Appeals based its analysis largely on the grounds that restitution plays a central role in dispositions under the Juvenile Justice Act. State v. Mollichi, 81 Wash.App. 474, 477, 914 P.2d 782, review granted, 130 Wash.2d 1007, 928 P.2d 415 (1996). Mollichi petitioned for review, which we granted.
because the restitution amount had not been determined within the 30-day period specified in the disposition order. The trial court held the restitution request timely because the State had noted the restitution hearing within 30 days of the disposition order, and ordered Mollichi to pay $300. Mollichi then filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
RCW 13.40.150 provides:
(3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall:
...
(f) Determine the amount of restitution owing to the victim, if any; ...
(Emphasis added.) The initial question in this case is RCW 13.40.150 recites a series of issues the juvenile court must address in a disposition order, and unambiguously states the court shall determine the restitution amount at the disposition hearing. This imperative language does not permit restitution to be determined at any time subsequent to the disposition hearing, and is therefore even more restrictive than the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) for adult offenders, which permits restitution to be determined after sentencing.
whether the court has discretion to determine and enter an order of restitution at any time other than the time of the disposition hearing.
In State v. Krall, 125 Wash.2d 146, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994), we interpreted language in the SRA regarding adult restitution hearings. Former RCW 9.94A.142(1) (1994) provided, "When restitution is ordered, the court shall determine the amount of restitution due at the sentencing hearing or within sixty days." The State did not seek restitution until 108 days after the sentencing hearing, and did not obtain it until 185 days after the hearing. The issue before the Court was whether the language of the statute was mandatory or directory. After review of the legislative history, we held the word "shall" in the statute was mandatory. Notably, the Court overruled an earlier Court of Appeals case, State v. Hartwell, 38 Wash.App. 135, 684 P.2d 778 (1984), because that case failed to "recognize the general rule that 'shall' is presumptively mandatory." Krall, 125 Wash.2d at 149, 881 P.2d 1040.
The Court of Appeals here chose not to apply Krall's strict interpretation of the word "shall." Rather, the Court of Appeals observed the Juvenile Justice Act differs from the SRA insofar as the Juvenile Justice Act states as one of the "equally important purposes" of the Act "restitution to the victims of crime," RCW 13.40.010(2)(h), whereas the SRA does not list restitution as one of its purposes. Mollichi, 81 Wash.App. at 476, 914 P.2d 782. Thus, while the Court of Appeals acknowledged Krall held "shall" to be presumptively mandatory in the context of the SRA, it ruled the same The Court of Appeals' reasoning is not persuasive as to the meaning of "shall." First, the SRA itself makes restitution a key component for adult sentencing. See RCW 9.94A.120(18) (); RCW 9.94A.142(3) (); see also RCW 7.69.030(15) (). 2 It is hard to discern a stronger policy supporting restitution in juvenile sentencing than adult sentencing.
conclusion was not required in the context of the Juvenile Justice Act.
Second, in State v. Moen, 129 Wash.2d 535, 919 P.2d 69 (1996), the Court said, "Our unanimous holding in Krall recognizes that the statutory time mandate prevails over victims' rights to restitution." Id. at 542, 919 P.2d 69. Moreover, the statutory requirement to determine the restitution amount only at the disposition hearing might be indicative of legislative intent to adopt a more strictly...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 65351-8
...that if a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the language of the statute itself. State v. Mollichi, 132 Wash.2d 80, 87, 936 P.2d 408 (1997); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 107, 922 P.2d 43 (1996). Ambiguity exists if the language of a statute is ......
-
State v. Groom, 63951-5
...that we not rewrite statutes to express what we think the law should be. We simply have no such authority. State v. Mollichi, 132 Wash.2d 80, 87, 936 P.2d 408 (1997); see Graham Thrift Group, Inc. v. Pierce Cy., Country Park, Inc., 75 Wash.App. 263, 267, 877 P.2d 228 (1994). This is true ev......
-
In re Estate of Black
...court must interpret the present language of the statute and may not "rewrite explicit and unequivocal statutes." State v. Mollichi, 132 Wash.2d 80, 87-88, 936 P.2d 408 (1997). The Court of Appeals erred in reciting the statutory requirements to admit a lost will to probate and the burden o......
-
State v. Molnar
...(2000) ). Plea agreements are contracts. State v. Sledge , 133 Wash.2d 828, 838-39, 947 P.2d 1199 (1997) (quoting State v. Mollichi , 132 Wash.2d 80, 90, 936 P.2d 408 (1997) ). To determine the meaning of contract language, courts apply the "context rule." Berg v. Hudesman , 115 Wash.2d 657......
-
A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington
...71. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 137 Wash. 2d 149, 154-55, 975 P.2d 450, 452-53 (1999); see also State v. Mollichi, 132 Wash. 2d 80, 86, 936 P.2d 408, 411 (1997); State v. Krall, 125 Wash. 2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1994); Erector Co. v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 121 Wash. 2d 513, 51......
-
When Must Means May: How the Washington State Supreme Court Undermined the System of Checks and Balances in Seiu Healthcare 775nw v. Gregoire
...740 P.2d 824, 827 (Wash. 1987))). 142. Id. 143. See Buell v. City of Toppenish, 24 P.2d 431, 431 (Wash. 1933). 144. See State v. Mollichi, 936 P.2d 408, 411-12 (Wash. 1997); Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 911 P.2d 389, 392 (Wash. 1996); State v. Krall, 881 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Wash. 1994); Erecti......