State v. Mooers

Decision Date27 June 2017
Docket NumberNo. 20150996,20150996
Citation424 P.3d 1
Parties STATE of Utah, Respondent, v. Ryan MOOERS and Darron Laven Becker, Petitioners.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Tera J. Peterson, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent

Nathalie S. Skibine, Debra M. Nelson, Heather J. Chesnut, Lacey C. Singleton, Salt Lake City, for petitioners

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Durham, and Judge Davis joined.

Having recused himself, Justice Pearce did not participate herein; District Judge Lynn Davis sat.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 We address two underlying cases in this appeal, both of which turn on the same issue: whether an order of complete restitution that is part of a plea in abeyance is a final order appealable as of right. The Utah Court of Appeals determined in the first case, State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, that it is not. In the second case, State v. Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173, another panel of the court of appeals held that it was bound by the Mooers panel's holding. Each panel dismissed its case for lack of jurisdiction, and we consolidated the cases for appeal. We hold that an order of complete restitution is a final order for purposes of appeal and therefore reverse the decisions of the court of appeals.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The first case involves a restitution order for Ryan Mooers. On April 15, 2013, Mr. Mooers entered a plea in abeyance to third-degree felony theft, a condition of which was the payment of restitution. Thereafter, the State requested that Mr. Mooers pay $5,760.50 in restitution, of which $4,660.50 represented the cost of the items stolen, window repair, and carpet replacement. The victims of the theft stated that their daughter had trouble feeling safe in her room, which had been broken into, so the restitution amount included $1,100 for bars to place over her basement window. Mr. Mooers objected to the inclusion of the cost of the window bars, but the district court found that the cost was part of the pecuniary damages stemming from the theft and, in a ruling dated February 12, 2014, ordered the $1,100 to be included in the restitution order. Thirteen days later, Mr. Mooers filed a notice of appeal. After briefing and argument, the court of appeals held that because the restitution order was part of a plea in abeyance, it was not a final order and the court therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. State v. Mooers , 2015 UT App 266, ¶¶ 1, 19, 362 P.3d 282.

¶ 3 The second case involves Darron Laven Becker's plea in abeyance for attempted aggravated assault after he attempted to hit his neighbor with a shovel. Following the entry of Mr. Becker's plea, the State requested $663.01 in restitution for medical costs that the Utah Office for Victims of Crime paid the neighbor. Mr. Becker objected to the basis for the amount, noting that the only documentation for the amount was a handwritten note from the neighbor requesting $624 for replacement glasses, $39 for an eye exam, and $480 for lost wages. The district court determined that a sufficient nexus between Mr. Becker's actions and the neighbor's requested restitution existed and, on December 9, 2013, ordered Mr. Becker to pay $663.01. Mr. Becker appealed the district court's order on December 17, 2013. The court of appeals dismissed Mr. Becker's appeal for lack of jurisdiction upon determining that it was bound by the Mooers panel's decision. State v. Becker , 2015 UT App 304, ¶¶ 7–9, 365 P.3d 173.

¶ 4 We consolidated the cases on appeal and granted certiorari review under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Whether a court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a matter of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Norris , 2007 UT 5, ¶ 7, 152 P.3d 305. Statutory interpretation is also a matter of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Smith , 2005 UT 57, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 615.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Both the State and the defendants in these cases approach the issue as one involving a single form of restitution. In taking this view, the State argues that a district court's order of restitution is not final for a plea in abeyance because the defendant has been neither convicted nor sentenced, and it is the sentence that triggers the time for appeal. The defendants argue that because conviction and restitution have separate timeframes and purposes, an order of restitution should be considered final regardless of whether or when a conviction occurs. Both arguments disregard Utah's distinctive statutory framework for restitution, which (1) requires our district courts to assess both complete and court-ordered restitution and (2) makes orders of complete restitution, as opposed to court-ordered restitution, separately appealable from a criminal sentence.

¶ 7 Restitution orders are a unique animal, existing at the convergence of the civil and criminal worlds, and understanding the sui generis nature of our Crime Victims Restitution Act, UTAH CODE §§ 77-38a-101 et seq. , helps us in our task of statutory interpretation. When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Carter v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr. , 2006 UT 78, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 467. "The best evidence of the legislature's intent ‘is the plain language of the statute.’ " Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (citation omitted). We must therefore "read the plain language of the statute as a whole," interpreting its provisions in harmony with the other portions of the statute. Miller v. Weaver , 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592.

¶ 8 The plain language of the Restitution Act contains "a clear directive that district courts are to make two separate restitution determinations, one for complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution." State v. Laycock , 2009 UT 53, ¶ 20, 214 P.3d 104.

¶ 9 Complete restitution is "restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant," UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(2)(a), taking into account "all relevant facts," including

(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; (ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; (iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; (iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; (v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and (vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim.

Id. § 302(5)(b) (2013).1

¶ 10 Court-ordered restitution, on the other hand, is "the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing." Id. § 302(2)(b). In making this determination, the court considers the factors for complete restitution and then takes into account

(ii) the financial resources of the defendant ...; (iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; (iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; (v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution inappropriate.

Id. § 302(5)(c).

¶ 11 In other words, court-ordered restitution is "a subset of complete restitution that, among other things, takes into account the defendant's circumstances." State v. Brown , 2014 UT 48, ¶ 21, 342 P.3d 239.

¶ 12 Although the Restitution Act clearly requires a district court to make separate findings for the different kinds of restitution, courts often merge them into one order.2 This is error. See Laycock , 2009 UT 53, ¶ 24, 214 P.3d 104. We emphasize that courts must make two separate determinations—one for complete restitution and one for court-ordered restitution and that the two kinds of restitution may be appealed at separate times.

¶ 13 The Restitution Act makes clear that an order of complete restitution is a civil order and "shall be considered a legal judgment." UTAH CODE § 77-38a-401(2). Thus, it has "the same [e]ffect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment in a civil action." Id. § 401(4). And like a legal judgment in a civil action, it is appealable as of right within thirty days from the entry of the order. UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a) ("An appeal may be taken from a district ... court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments[.]"); id. 4(a) (noting thirty-day time period to file appeal); see Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n , 814 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1991) (explaining that when trial courts reduce certain orders in a case to judgments by virtue of rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they "thereby make them appealable as of right, effectively forcing the appellate court to review them"); see also Laycock , 2009 UT 53, ¶ 33, 214 P.3d 104 (stating that after the district court determines complete restitution, "that sum will be reduced to a civil judgment, a judgment that may only be enforced through the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure").

¶ 14 In fact, to not allow immediate appeal of an order of complete restitution would present problems where ...

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8 cases
  • State v. Grant
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • September 30, 2021
    ...caused by the defendant, taking into account all relevant facts," including those specified in Utah Code section 77-38a-302(5)(b). State v. Mooers , 2017 UT 36, ¶ 9, 424 P.3d 1 (cleaned up). In contrast, court-ordered restitution "is the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction or......
  • State v. Becker
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • May 3, 2018
    ...therefore was not a final appealable order. See State v. Becker , 2015 UT App 304, ¶¶ 9, 12, 365 P.3d 173, rev’d sub nom. State v. Mooers , 2017 UT 36, 424 P.3d 1. Our supreme court consolidated Becker with a second case, State v. Mooers , 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, and reversed our dec......
  • State v. Bruun, 20160466-CA
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • May 9, 2019
    ...than in the restitution context, which represents "a unique animal, existing at the convergence of the civil and criminal worlds," State v. Mooers , 2017 UT 36, ¶ 7, 424 P.3d 1, we are hard-pressed to envision in the civil context a situation that encompasses a prior settlement agreement th......
  • State v. Hamilton
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 25, 2018
    ...to make "two separate restitution determinations, one for complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution." State v. Mooers , 2017 UT 36, ¶ 8, 424 P.3d 1 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2017). Complete restitution is "the re......
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