State v. Mooers
Citation | 362 P.3d 282 |
Decision Date | 05 November 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 20140170–CA.,20140170–CA. |
Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Ryan MOOERS, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
Nathalie S. Skibine and Heather J. Chesnut, for Appellant.
Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and Tera J. Peterson, for Appellee.
Opinion
¶ 1 Ryan Mooers appeals from an order to pay restitution. The primary issue on appeal is whether a restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in abeyance agreement, where the defendant's plea has not been entered and the defendant has not been sentenced, is a final and appealable order. We conclude that it is not. We therefore dismiss Mooers's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 2 In November 2012, a family returned from vacation and discovered that someone had broken into their house through a basement window and had taken jewelry and coins. For his role in the crime, Mooers was charged with burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a third degree felony.
¶ 3 Mooers ultimately pled guilty to theft and admitted to aiding "others in entering a home" and to taking items worth between $1,500 and $5,000. As part of the plea deal, Mooers agreed to attend a theft class, to pay "costs as ordered by the court," and to pay restitution. The court signed Mooers's plea form but did not enter his plea. Instead, it held the plea in abeyance for eighteen months and ordered Mooers to "pay restitution jointly and severally with the other co-defendants." It gave the State ninety days to determine the amount of restitution.
¶ 4 Later, as requested by the State, the court ordered Mooers to pay $5,760.50 in restitution. This sum included $1,100 for installing security bars on the basement window through which the thieves entered the family's house. Mooers agreed to pay everything except for this cost and requested an evidentiary hearing to establish the grounds for making him responsible for this expense.
¶ 5 At the evidentiary hearing, Mooers argued that he was not responsible for the cost of installing bars on the broken window and, in any event, those costs were not pecuniary damages as defined by Utah Code section 76–3–201. The court disagreed and again ordered Mooers to pay $5,760.50.1 Mooers now appeals the restitution order.
¶ 6 Mooers's primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that the cost of installing the security bars constitutes "pecuniary damages" under the Crime Victims Restitution Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 77–38a–102(6) (LexisNexis 2012). But before we reach this issue, we must address the State's preliminary argument that this court "lacks jurisdiction to consider [Mooers's] appeal because the restitution order is not a final judgment or sentence."
¶ 7 Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law requiring us to examine the "plain meaning of the [relevant] statute." Housing Auth. of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 724. Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 10, 359 P.3d 592 ( )(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 8 "A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from ... a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea...." Utah Code Ann. § 77–18a–1(1) (LexisNexis 2012); see also Utah R. App. P. 3(a). "In the technical legal sense, sentence is ordinarily synonymous with judgment...." State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d 753, 755 (1953). Accordingly, in criminal cases, "[i]t is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978).
Id. § 77–2a–4(1).
¶ 10 As Utah appellate courts have consistently explained, the plain language of these statutes provides that "[a]cceptance of a plea in abeyance and the entry of judgment of conviction and the imposition of sentence are not simultaneous events." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1025 n. 7 (Utah Ct.App.1996). Meza, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 18, 359 P.3d 592 ; see also id. ¶¶ 7–8 ( ); State v. Millward, 2014 UT App 174, ¶ 4, 332 P.3d 400 ( ); Salzl v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 399, ¶ 14, 122 P.3d 691 ( ); State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (per curiam) ( ); Moss, 921 P.2d at 1025 n. 7 ( ). Consistent with these cases, we conclude that a plea in abeyance is neither a sentence nor a final judgment, and therefore does not give rise to a right to appeal.
¶ 11 Mooers argues that restitution orders under the Crime Victims Restitution Act are exceptions to the final-judgment rule and are "appealable orders independent of conviction." This issue has not been directly addressed by any Utah appellate court.
¶ 12 Mooers's argument relies heavily on State v. Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, 208 P.3d 543, in which we reviewed a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 10. As part of a plea in abeyance agreement, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. She disputed the amount and requested a hearing, after which the court set restitution at nearly $240,000. Id. The defendant later moved to amend the order, arguing that the total figure was incorrect. Id. ¶ 4. Although the court denied her motion, the defendant did not appeal and instead sought to withdraw her plea. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. The trial court denied her request and imposed a sentence for failing to pay restitution as required by the conditions of the plea in abeyance agreement. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. We upheld the trial court's decision, noting that the defendant could have appealed the restitution order after the restitution hearing, id. ¶¶ 15–16, and in a footnote, stated, "The Crime Victims Restitution Act specifies that a judgment under that act has the same effect as an ordinary judgment," id. ¶ 15 n. 5 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77–38a–401(4) (2008) ).
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).
¶ 14 Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court's...
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State v. Becker
...173, rev’d sub nom. State v. Mooers , 2017 UT 36, 424 P.3d 1. Our supreme court consolidated Becker with a second case, State v. Mooers , 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, and reversed our decisions that we lacked jurisdiction in each case, concluding that the district court’s restitution orde......
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State v. Mooers
...of a plea in abeyance is a final order appealable as of right. The Utah Court of Appeals determined in the first case, State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, that it is not. In the second case, State v. Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173, another panel of the court of appeals he......
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State v. Becker
...jurisdiction and ... must dismiss." Id. ¶ 8.¶ 8 While this case was under advisement, another panel of this court decided State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, petition for cert. filed, Dec. 2, 2015 (No. 20150996). Mooers held that we lack jurisdiction to consider appeals regardin......
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State v. Mooers
...where the defendant’s plea has not been entered and the defendant has not been sentenced," is not a final and appealable order. State v. Mooers , 2015 UT App 266, ¶ 1, 362 P.3d 282, rev’d by State v. Mooers , 2017 UT 36, 424 P.3d 1. The Utah Supreme Court consolidated Mooers with a second c......
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Utah Law Developments
...to the general rule recognized in Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 2006 UT 77, 148 P.3d 983. State v. Mooers 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282 (Nov. 5, 2015) A criminal defendant appealed from an order of restitution following a plea in abeyance. The Utah Court of Appeals held that a pl......