State v. Moret, 91-1843

Decision Date17 June 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1843,91-1843
Citation486 N.W.2d 589
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Verle A. MORET, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., David A. Ferree, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mark Hunacek, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael E. Thole, Sp. County Prosecutor, for appellant.

Randy L. Waagmeester of DeWaay & Waagmeester, Rock Rapids, for appellee.

Considered by SCHULTZ, P.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL and ANDREASEN, JJ.

ANDREASEN, Justice.

The State appeals from an order of a district associate judge dismissing an habitual offender petition because the defendant had established his laches defense. The State challenges the decision on the ground that a district associate judge does not have jurisdiction of civil habitual offender proceedings. We treat this challenge as an action for writ of certiorari. Because there is no constitutional or statutory authority for the district associate judge's assertion of jurisdiction over an habitual offender proceeding, we sustain and remand the case to the district court.

I. Background.

On July 21, 1991, the State filed a petition asking the court to determine that Verle Moret was an habitual offender of the motor vehicle laws as defined in Iowa Code section 321.555 (1991). Attached to the petition was a certified copy of Moret's driving record and a certified abstract of convictions. Iowa Code §§ 321.556-.558.

The abstract showed that Moret had been convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) on three separate occasions in South Dakota. The three South Dakota convictions were entered between January and June 1989. The abstract also showed a January 1991 Iowa conviction for driving while under suspension or revocation. Based upon the filing of a petition and abstract by the special county prosecutor, a district judge issued a show cause order as to why Moret should not be barred from operating a motor vehicle within the State of Iowa. Iowa Code § 321.558.

The hearing was scheduled before a district associate judge. At the hearing on August 27, 1991, the State introduced Moret's driving record and abstract of convictions. Iowa Code § 321.557. Moret admitted he was the person convicted of the identified offenses.

In his defense, Moret urged that he had voluntarily submitted to inpatient treatment and had addressed his substance abuse problem. He testified that he needed his driver's license for his farming operation and to transport his son.

After the close of the evidence, Moret's attorney stated that he was "relying upon the defense of laches, or unclean hands, or timeliness." In support of this assertion, the attorney continued:

We believe that it's grossly unfair and inequitable for these proceedings to be brought against this defendant at this time, initiated by the Iowa Department of Transportation, when the Department of Transportation has had this information available for quite some time.

Mr. Moret, through his testimony, has already established that he has been unable to drive for the past year and a half. Now, if he is found to be an habitual offender, the law requires a minimum suspension of an additional two years. And we think that is very unfair to Mr. Moret since he has already been suspended for a year and a half. Had the Iowa Department of Transportation in a timely fashion initiated these proceedings as early as a year ago, the suspension could be running concurrently and he would not be penalized by this further bar at the end, that would not be tacked on to the end, as they seek to do now.

In response, the special county prosecutor stated that he was not sure "that the license suspension would always run concurrently under section 321.555 as the other, under the driving while suspended or license being suspended as a result of operating while intoxicated."

The district associate judge apparently agreed with the arguments of Moret's attorney and found that "the defendant has sustained his claim of laches by clear and convincing evidence, and accordingly, the above cause of action should be and the same is hereby dismissed at the cost of the state."

The State filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the district associate judge. This appeal followed.

II. Certiorari.

Certiorari lies when an inferior court is alleged to have exceeded its jurisdiction. State v. West, 320 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1982). The State in its appeal argues that district associate judges do not have subject matter jurisdiction over habitual offender proceedings. The State asks that the decision be vacated.

Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 304 provides:

If any case is brought by appeal, certiorari, or discretionary review, and the appellate court is of the opinion that another of these remedies was the proper one, the case shall not be dismissed, but shall proceed as though the proper form of review had been sought. Any one of the foregoing remedies may under this rule be treated by the appellate court as the one it deems appropriate.

We are of the opinion that this appeal should be classified as a certiorari action because it challenges the authority of the district associate judge. See, e.g., West, 320 N.W.2d at 573. See also Iowa City v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 456 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1990) (certiorari action challenging authority of magistrate); Wilson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 297 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1980) (certiorari action challenging authority of district judge). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa 1992). Accordingly, we grant the writ and proceed.

III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

In Iowa we have a unified court, the district court. Iowa Code § 602.6101. The jurisdiction of the district court is exercised by district judges, district associate judges, and magistrates. Iowa Code § 602.6104(1). Iowa City, 456 N.W.2d at 181. Although the district court has subject matter jurisdiction of habitual offender proceedings, district associate judges have authority to exercise only that jurisdiction provided by statute. See, e.g., In re R.A.R., 464 N.W.2d 883, 884 (Iowa 1991); Fisher v. Sedgwick, 364 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Iowa 1985).

Iowa Code section 602.6306 provides district associate judges with the authority to hear and decide certain subject matters or classes of cases. District associate judges have jurisdiction provided for magistrates. Iowa Code § 602.6306(1). Magistrates do not have the authority to conduct habitual offender proceedings. Iowa Code § 602.6405.

In addition to the authority of magistrates,

[d]istrict associate judges also have jurisdiction in civil actions for money judgment where the amount in controversy does not exceed five thousand dollars, jurisdiction of indictable misdemeanors, and felony violations of section 321J.2.

Iowa Code § 602.6306(2).

Adjudication as an habitual offender is not an indictable...

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  • State v. Bradley, 00-0894.
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    ...that license revocations are civil in nature, and as an abstract proposition cases support this contention. See, e.g., State v. Moret, 486 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1992) (driver's license suspension of a habitual offender of motor vehicle laws is for public safety, not for punishment of the of......
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