State v. Morrissey
Decision Date | 20 June 1980 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 295 N.W.2d 307 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Timothy MORRISSEY, Defendant and Appellant. o. 712. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
William G. Goetz, State's Atty., Hettinger, for plaintiff and appellee.
Greenwood, Greenwood & Greenwood, P. C., Dickinson, for defendant and appellant; argued by Mark L. Greenwood, Dickinson.
Timothy Morrissey appeals from an order of the Adams County District Court denying his writ of certiorari. We affirm the order denying writ of certiorari and affirm the decision that probable cause existed to bind Morrissey over for trial.
On November 20, 1979, Morrissey was charged with the crime of murder pursuant to § 12.1-16-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, a class AA felony. The complaint charged that Morrissey did "intentionally cause the death of Val Scott Blade". Two other persons were also charged with the murder of Val Blade, one Reginald Trieb and the other a minor whose initials are R. H.
A preliminary hearing was held before the county justice of Adams County. The county justice found that probable cause existed and bound Morrissey and Trieb over for trial. Morrissey petitioned the Adams County District Court for a writ of certiorari claiming that the county justice had exceeded his jurisdiction in making a finding of probable cause. This writ of certiorari was quashed by the Adams County District Court on January 4, 1980, and Morrissey has appealed from the order quashing his writ of certiorari.
We must first determine whether or not North Dakota statutory law provides for an appeal from an order denying a writ of certiorari. We find that it does. The North Dakota statutory scheme relating to writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition dates back to territorial days. Most of the pertinent statutes were enacted in 1877 and have survived to the present day without amendment. See Chapter 32-32 through 32-35, N.D.C.C.; and Waltman v. Austin, 142 N.W.2d 517, 523 (N.D.1966). Recently this court has experienced an increasing use among North Dakota practitioners of these somewhat antiquated and dust-laden procedural devices. It may well be time for the Legislature to take a long and searching look at these devices to determine how they fit into modern legal practices.
A writ of certiorari is a "special proceeding" as that term is defined in § 32-32-01, N.D.C.C., which provides as follows:
"Special proceedings" are civil, not criminal, actions. Pursuant to § 28-27-01, N.D.C.C., a judgment in a special proceeding in any of the district courts may be removed to the Supreme Court by appeal. Section 28-27-01, N.D.C.C., provides as follows:
Section 28-27-02(2), N.D.C.C., provides that "A final order affecting a substantial right made in special proceedings" may be "carried to the supreme court". A judgment in a special proceeding is defined in § 32-32-03, N.D.C.C., as follows:
Because we find that the order denying Morrissey's writ of certiorari was a final determination of his rights in a special proceeding, we conclude that his appeal is properly before this court.
We have found two previous North Dakota cases in which an appeal was permitted from an order denying a writ of certiorari when certiorari was sought after a determination was made in a preliminary hearing to bind a defendant over for trial. State v. Persons, 201 N.W.2d 895 (N.D.1972); Green v. Whipple, 89 N.W.2d 881 (N.D.1958).
Persons was decided in 1972 and since that time we have adopted the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure which became effective on November 1, 1973. Rule 59(a), N.D.R.Crim.P. Preliminary examinations are now governed by Rule 5.1, N.D.R.Crim.P. In pertinent part, Rule 5.1, N.D.R.Crim.P., provides as follows:
Rule 5.1, N.D.R.Crim.P., has superseded §§ 29-07-18 and 29-07-20, N.D.C.C., which were at issue in Persons, supra 201 N.W.2d at 897.
Pursuant to Rule 5.1, N.D.R.Crim.P., the magistrate may consider evidence which will later be inadmissible at trial. The rule of law set down in Whipple, supra 89 N.W.2d 881, and Persons, supra 201 N.W.2d 895, regarding the applicable standard of review when certiorari is taken to the district court from a probable cause determination in a preliminary examination, is still valid. Review by certiorari to the district court of an order of a committing magistrate holding a defendant to answer is limited to a determination of whether or not the magistrate exceeded the authority vested in him by the rule. Green v. Whipple, 89 N.W.2d 881 (N.D.1958); and State v. Persons, 201 N.W.2d 895 (N.D.1972).
Section 32-33-09, N.D.C.C., provides that the extent of review upon a writ of certiorari is as follows:
It is well settled in this State that review by certiorari is limited to questions of jurisdiction. City of Fargo v. Annexation Review Commission, 148 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1967).
On appeal from a denial of a writ of certiorari, our standard of review is also limited to the question of jurisdiction as required by § 32-33-09, N.D.C.C. For an appellate court to broaden the scope of review beyond that exercised by the court in which certiorari was sought would be to frustrate the statutory purpose and permit counsel to accomplish by indirection what he cannot do directly. In the instant case, therefore, our review is limited to whether or not the committing magistrate exceeded his authority in binding Morrissey over for trial.
Under Rule 5.1, N.D.R.Crim.P., the magistrate is required to determine from the evidence if there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. Review of the record in this case reveals that Dr. Thomas Henry, who performed the autopsy on Val Blade, testified to the fact that Blade was murdered. This satisfies the requirement of probable cause to believe an offense has been committed.
Norbert Sickler, an investigator for the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified that he obtained signed statements for Morrissey, Trieb, and the minor, R. H., that implicated them in the murder of Val Blade. Sickler testified that Morrissey gave a voluntary statement on November 19, 1979. A copy of that statement is included in the record as State's Exhibit #5.
In State v. Chaussee, 138 N.W.2d 788, 792 (N.D.1965), we quoted with approval the following language of the United States Supreme Court in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949):
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