State v. Myers

• Decision Date: 10 October 1975
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Roy R. MYERS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 500

345 A.2d 500

STATE of Maine v. Roy R. MYERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 10, 1975.

Donald H. Marden, County Atty., Joseph M. Jabar, Dist. Atty., Robert Daviau, Asst. Dist. Atty., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Levine, Brody & Levine by Frederick E. Levine, Waterville, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.

POMEROY, Justice.

This appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict of guilty of breaking, entering and larceny in the nighttime (17 M.R.S.A. § 2103), following a jury-waived trial causes us to focus again as we have done many times before ¹ upon Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

We deny the appeal.

In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, a majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court expressed concern with, in their words,

'. . . questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.' 384 U.S. at 439, 86 S.Ct. at 1609.

With numerous empirical studies of widespread police practices cited as the basis for its concern, it mandated:

'. . . the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective of secure the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. . . . If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.' 384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

In the same opinion it was held that

'Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.' 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.

See also State v. Lafferty, supra, and cases cited therein.

In later cases it has been established that,

(1) "[A] confession is not necessarily invalid because the 'Miranda' warning is not repeated in full each time the interrogation process is resumed after an interruption.' Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1968).

There is no litmus paper test for determining when 'Miranda,' warnings must be repeated in the course of an ongoing interrogation. Miller v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Riggins, 451 Pa. 519, 304 A.2d 473 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wideman, Pa., 334 A.2d 594 (1975).

(3) Several objective indicia are significant in determining when an accused must be reinformed of his constitutional rights. They are:

'(1) the time lapse between the last Miranda warnings and the accused's statements;

(2) interruptions in the continuity of the interrogation;

(3) whether there was a change of location between the place where the last Miranda warnings were given and the place where the accused's statement was made;

(4) whether the same officer who gave the warnings also conducted the interrogation resulting in the accused's statement; and

(5) whether the statement elicited during the complained of interrogation differed significantly from other statements which had been preceded by Miranda warnings.' Commonwealth v. Wideman, supra, at 598.

(4) A statement made without 'Miranda' warnings is admissible on rebuttal to impeach a defendant whose testimony is different from that made in the extrajudicial statement. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).

(5) Where 'Miranda' warnings are not repeated during an ongoing interrogation the ultimate question is, did the defendant with full knowledge of his legal rights knowingly and intentionally relinquish them? Miller v. United States, supra, at 496.

(6) Voluntariness of the waiver of the Fifth Amendment rights during an extrajudicial interrogation must be established by the State beyond a reasonable doubt on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Collins, supra; State v. Hazelton, supra.

We have tested the defendant's claim that the confession which he made to police officers during an in-custody interrogation was improperly admitted into evidence because of the claimed inadequacy of 'Miranda' warnings ² against the factual framework of this case as revealed by the record.

We find the appellant's claimed error to be without merit.

The factual framework within which our decision is reached is substantially as follows:

Sometime during the evening of January 23, 1974, or the early morning hours of January 24th, the F. O'Connor Company of Augusta was broken into and a small quantity of money was taken. On January 24th, the police apprehended one Raymond Norton in connection with the break. Norton signed a written statement confessing his involvement and accusing the defendant Roy Myers of complicity.

At about 4:30 that same afternoon, Roy Myers was arrested and brought to the Augusta City Jail, where he was questioned on two separate occasions. The first questioning took place at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon at which time complete 'Miranda...