State v. Myers

• Decision Date: 14 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0071.,01-0071.
• Citation: 653 N.W.2d 574
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tifany Ann MYERS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

653 N.W.2d 574

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tifany Ann MYERS, Appellant.

No. 01-0071.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 14, 2002.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat and Teresa Vens, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Tifany Myers pled guilty to second-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.3 (1999). She filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was denied. The court sentenced her to a prison term not to exceed fifty years and ordered her to pay restitution to the victim's estate. Myers appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

The Polk County attorney charged that, on January 20, 2000, Myers, who was baby-sitting for twenty-one-month-old Joel Vasquez, shook him and slammed him to the floor, causing his death. Myers was charged with first-degree murder. She filed a notice of diminished responsibility, alleging that an abortion she had had a few days before the incident exacerbated her preexisting depression. As a result, her mental state was "greatly compromised."

Myers' trial began on October 18, 2000. On October 23 she pled guilty to second-degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement. On November 29 she filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was denied. She was sentenced and ordered to pay restitution to the victim's estate. Myers appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in that her attorney failed to (1) object to the district court's failure to advise her of her constitutional right to compulsory process; (2) challenge the factual basis for the plea; (3) challenge the court's order for restitution, on constitutional grounds; and (4) argue that Iowa Code section 910.3(B)(1), which precludes her from discharging the restitution debt in bankruptcy, was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

The court of appeals agreed that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the district court's failure to comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) by advising her she had the right to compulsory process. Because the court of appeals resolved the case on the basis of that issue, it did not address Myers' other issues. The State petitioned for further review, asserting that the court of appeals erred in applying rule 2.8(2)(b) and our existing case law, including State v. Moore, 638 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 2002), and State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865 (Iowa 2001), which require "literal" compliance with the guilty-plea requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b).

II. Legal Principles on Review.

Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed de novo. Kane v. State, 436 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa 1989). In order to succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant ordinarily must show (1) her counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) because of counsel's error, the defendant was prejudiced. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). The court of appeals concluded that defense counsel's failure to object to the omission of the compulsory-process information in the guilty plea excused her from preserving error on the issue and that, but for that error, the plea would have been set aside. The court of appeals concluded she was prejudiced as a result of her lawyer's omission.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) provides the blueprint for guilty pleas:

Pleas of guilty. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:

. . . .

(4) That the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury, and that at trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, and the right to present witnesses in the defendant's own behalf and to have compulsory process in securing their attendance.

(Emphasis added.)

We held in State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1990), that substantial compliance with this rule is all that is required, and the State relies on that principle here. The district court advised Myers with respect to her right to secure the attendance of witnesses in this language:

THE COURT: You are also waiving the following rights: The right to have your attorney present at the time of trial; the right to have a jury of 12 people to decide whether or not you've committed this offense. You have the right through your attorney to cross-exam the State's witness and you would have the right to present any witnesses in your own defense....

(Emphasis added.) The State argues that this information substantially complied with the requirements of the rule with respect to the right to compulsory process, citing Kirchoff.

After the district court accepted this plea, we decided the cases of Hook, 623 N.W.2d at 870, and Moore, 638 N.W.2d at 738-39, concerning the required level of compliance with then-rule of criminal procedure 8(2)(b) (previous number assigned to present rule 2.8(2)(b)). The specific issue raised in both cases was whether the in-person colloquy required by the rule may be supplanted to any extent by written pleas of guilty that track the language of the rule. We held it could not; substantial compliance with this requirement would not suffice in felony cases. Moore, 638 N.W.2d at 738-39; Hook, 623 N.W.2d at 870. We said in Moore that "a court... must literally, not just substantially, comply with rule 8(2)(b)." Moore, 638 N.W.2d at 738. Not surprisingly, Myers relies on Hook and Moore to support her contention that substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(b) is no longer enough.

We think our decisions in Hook and Moore are distinguishable from the present case. The issue in those cases was whether substantial compliance with the requirement for an in-person colloquy was sufficient in felony cases. In contrast, here the issue is whether there is adequate compliance with the requirement that the defendant be informed of certain rights before the guilty plea is accepted by the court. With respect to the latter requirement, we have consistently held that substantial compliance is all that is required, even in felony cases. See State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001).

In Kress, a felony guilty-plea case, we considered whether the defendant had been accurately informed with respect to the consequences of his guilty plea. 636 N.W.2d at 21. Citing Kirchoff, we stated, "Substantial — not strict — compliance with the rule is all that is required." Id. Similarly, in the present case, where the defect in the plea proceeding concerns the content of the information conveyed to Myers, not whether it was imparted in person, only substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(b) is required.

Under the substantial-compliance standard, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of his rights using the precise language of the rule; it is sufficient that the defendant be informed of his rights in such a way that he is made aware of them. See State v. Smothers, 309 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Iowa 1981). Here, the trial court did not convey the idea that the defendant could force the attendance of witnesses, as required by rule 2.8(2)(b)(4). Because the court failed to inform Myers of her right to compulsory process, her guilty plea did not substantially conform to the requirements of the rule. The failure of Myers' attorney to raise this deficiency establishes the first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, breach of a duty. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694 (1984).

The second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice, is more problematic for this defendant. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the Supreme Court discussed the Strickland test in the context of a guilty plea. In Hill the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief, claiming his counsel was ineffective in failing to accurately inform him as to his parole eligibility by telling him that, if he pled guilty, he would be eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. In fact, because Hill had a prior felony conviction, he was required to serve half of his sentence. Hill, 474 U.S. at 54-55, 106 S.Ct. at 368, 88 L.Ed.2d at 207. Hill contended that, because of this error,

his plea was "involuntary" as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney supplied him with information about parole eligibility that was erroneous.

Id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 369, 88 L.Ed.2d at 208. The Court held

that the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland... test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in [prior cases]. The second, or "prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Id. at 58-59, 106 S.Ct. at 370, 88 L.Ed.2d at 210 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

We conclude Myers failed to...