State v. Naititi
Decision Date | 12 April 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 25779.,25779. |
Citation | 87 P.3d 893,104 Haw. 224 |
Parties | STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Samuel NAITITI, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Alexa D.M. Fujise, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for the plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i.
Deborah L. Kim, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for the defendant-appellee Samuel Naititi.
The plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai'i [hereinafter, "the prosecution"] appeals from the findings of fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (COLs), and order of the first circuit court, the Honorable Sandra A. Simms presiding, ruling that certain statements that the defendant-appellee Samuel Naititi made to Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Detective Phillip Lavarias were involuntary, within the meaning of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 621-26 (1993),1 and therefore inadmissible at trial. As a threshold matter, the prosecution asserts that it is entitled to appeal the circuit court's order as a matter of right, pursuant to HRS § 641-13(7) (1993).2 On the merits, the prosecution contends that the circuit court erred in suppressing Naititi's statements because: (1) they were not the product of "interrogation" and, therefore, the mandate of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was not implicated; and (2) they were communicated spontaneously—albeit nonresponsively to Detective Lavarias's preliminary inquiry as to whether Naititi wished to make a statement—and, accordingly, were voluntarily made, whether Naititi understood Detective Lavarias's preliminary question or not.
Naititi responds (1) that the prosecution lacked the right of direct appeal conferred by HRS § 641-13(7) and that this court therefore is without jurisdiction to entertain the present matter and (2) that, in any event, the circuit court correctly excluded Naititi's un-Mirandized custodial and involuntary statements.
We hold that the circuit court's order foreclosing the admission of Naititi's statements into evidence is the functional equivalent of a "pretrial order granting a motion for the suppression of evidence," within the meaning of HRS § 641-13(7), and that we have jurisdiction to consider the prosecution's appeal. On the merits, we hold that Naititi's "confession" was "voluntarily made" for purposes of HRS § 621-26 and that his right to Miranda warnings had not ripened as of the time he "confessed" because, although Naititi was clearly "in custody," Detective Lavarias had not yet subjected him to "interrogation." Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's FOFs, COLs, and order ruling that Naititi's statements to Detective Lavarias were involuntary, and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On June 12, 2002, an O'ahu Grand Jury returned an indictment against Naititi charging him with two counts of sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(b) (1993).3 On April 16, 2003, Naititi filed a motion in limine urging the circuit court to enter an order excluding the evidentiary use at trial of all of Naititi's pretrial statements made to Detective Lavarias and any testimony that Detective Lavarias might otherwise give regarding Naititi's utterances.
On April 17, 2003, the prosecution filed a motion to determine the voluntariness of Naititi's statements [hereinafter, "the prosecution's motion"], pursuant to HRS § 621-26, see supra note 1, wherein the prosecution sought to establish the admissibility at trial of allegedly incriminating statements that Naititi, who is deaf and mute, uttered by sign language to Detective Lavarias through a sign language interpreter.
The circuit court conducted a hearing on the prosecution's motion to determine voluntariness on April 21, 2003. Prior to addressing the prosecution's motion, the circuit court allowed the deputy public defender (DPD) to clarify Naititi's motion in limine seeking an order of exclusion; the DPD explained that the motion pertained to the statements that Naititi made at the police station. The circuit court ruled, with regard to Naititi's statements, that the issue was being taken up by the prosecution's motion to determine voluntariness.
Turning to the prosecution's motion, the circuit court heard the testimony of Detective Lavarias and Hugh Prickett, an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, regarding the custodial interview of Naititi, which occurred on June 5, 2002. It was undisputed that Prickett was a well-qualified ASL interpreter. Prickett testified that he received a referral from Hawai'i Services on Deafness on June 5, 2002, directing him to the HPD police station on Beretania Street to interview a deaf suspect. Prickett recounted that he was introduced to Naititi in an interview room at the police station and that he interpreted everything that Detective Lavarias said to Naititi. Prickett then testified that Naititi signed "sorry," demonstrating the sign from the witness stand. Prickett testified that Detective Lavarias next Prickett interpreted Naititi's signing to signify "touch not," which Prickett interpreted to mean "touch but did not penetrate." Prickett opined, based on his observations, that Naititi did not understand Prickett's ASL gestures and signs and that Naititi was "[d]efinitely not responsive." Finally, Prickett testified that "the detective said, `We have to stop this [interview] now,' and that was the end of it."
Detective Lavarias identified Naititi and described the circumstances giving rise to his investigation. The deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) asked Detective Lavarias whether he was aware of a "special accommodation that needed to be met in order to possibly get an interview from [Naititi]." Detective Lavarias responded that he understood Naititi was deaf and, therefore, that he procured the services of an ASL interpreter. Detective Lavarias further testified as follows:
On the same day, the circuit court orally ruled that Naititi's utterances were "not voluntary" and therefore inadmissible at trial on the dual grounds that they were made before Naititi had been Mirandized and that, Mirandized or not, the statements were made without "understanding." With regard to the first ground, the circuit court adhered to the view that Naititi was entitled to "be advised of [his] Miranda rights before even being asked whether or not he wanted to make a statement[.]"
On April 22, 2003, the prosecution filed its notice of appeal from the circuit court's April 21, 2003 oral ruling on its motion to determine voluntariness. On April 23, 2003, prior to jury selection, the circuit court addressed the prosecution's notice of appeal. The prosecution asserted that the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction to conduct any further trial proceedings, inasmuch as the circuit court's oral ruling was the functional equivalent of an order granting a motion to suppress Naititi's statements, which thereby enabled the prosecution to exercise its right of direct appeal pursuant to HRS § 641-13(7) see supra note 2. The prosecution disputed the circuit court's suggestion that the prosecution's appeal was interlocutory, pursuant to HRS § 641-17 (1993).5 Nevertheless, the circuit court ruled as follows:
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...response); or where a sign language interpreter asked a deaf-mute defendant if he wished to make a statement, State v. Naititi, 104 Hawai‘i 224, 237, 87 P.3d 893, 906 (2004).17 Agent Domingo also testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he presented the search warrant and affidavits......
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...demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.'"4 State v. Naititi, 104 Hawai'i 224, 235, 87 P.3d 893, 904 (2004) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)) (emphases in The "Miranda rule......
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State v. Chang
...outcome ofthe appeal....H. Stand Comm. Rep. No. 515-72, in 1972 House Journal, at 876 (emphases added); see also State v. Naititi, 104 Hawai‘i 224, 235, 87 P.3d 893, 904 (2004) (holding that "the intent of" HRS § 641-13(7) is "to facilitate the administration of justice in criminal cases by......
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State v. Kazanas, SCWC–12–0001011.
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