State v. Taylor

Decision Date17 July 1970
Docket NumberNo. 41536,41536
Citation178 N.W.2d 892,288 Minn. 37
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Nickie Leonard TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Defendant, charged with aggravated assault in the shooting of another person, made statements to one judge of a multi-judge court which showed a likelihood that the shooting was done in self-defense, whereupon his plea of guilty was properly rejected. Thereafter, following extensive consultation with both private counsel and the public defender, defendant appeared before another judge of the same court, at which time, upon inquiry of court and counsel, he negated the element of self-defense. Defendant's plea of guilty was a negotiated plea, the consequence of which was a more lenient sentence than authorized by statute, imposition of which was stayed subject to probation. Held, acceptance of defendant's plea of guilty was not constitutionally improper.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Robert E. Oliphant, and Roberta K. Levy, Asst. Public Defenders, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., David Roston, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

OPINION

PETERSON, Justice.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of aggravated assault 1 and was sentenced to the State Reformatory for an indeterminate term not to exceed 3 years. Imposition of sentence was stayed for 3 years, subject to probation. The stay was revoked for breach of probation and sentence was imposed. 2 This appeal is from the judgment of conviction.

Defendant contends that there was no factual basis for his plea of guilty and that, as a result of insufficient inquiry by the trial court, his plea was improvidently accepted.

The alleged assault, as related by defendant, occurred on March 25, 1967, at a Clark gasoline service station in north Minneapolis, where he was employed. At about 1:30 a.m. one Victor Andrews, a part-time employee at the station, together with a few friends, came into the station. For reasons which are unclear, except that Andrews was drunk, Andrews and defendant began to fight. 3 Andrews was bigger and stronger than defendant, so Andrews had the better of the battle. The police arrived and, after separating the parties, ordered Andrews to leave. Soon thereafter defendant's sister, Roberta Wark, and brother-in-law, Harvey Wark, came to the station. Andrews returned to the station about an hour and a half later and allegedly started fights with both Wark and defendant. In the heat of the action, defendant pulled from his pocket a small-caliber pistol (furnished by his employer to station employees) and fired a shot which struck Andrews.

Defendant appeared before the Honorable Theodore B. Knudson, judge of the district court, on June 1, 1967, at which time he withdrew a prior plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty. He appeared before Judge Knudson again on July 7, 1967, following a presentence investigation. Defendant at the later date gave this account of the shooting:

'Sir, he was a heap bigger than I was, and you know, a drunk man is pretty hard to handle when he's mad. I sure wasn't doing much against him by myself, and everybody, after this was over, the police said, 'Why didn't you hit him with something? I'm standing out in the middle of a parking lot with a gas pump in my hand, the nozzle, what was I supposed to hit him with; there's nothing there to hit him with. Then he started pounding me around--I got to protect myself.' 4

Defendant's statement, together with the other circumstances he related, disclosed a likelihood of self-defense. Judge Knudson accordingly vacated defendant's plea of guilty, and a plea of not guilty was entered.

Defendant appeared before the Honorable Edward J. Parker on August 9, 1967 and again pleaded guilty. His counsel at that time interrogated him as to his understanding of the serious nature of the charge against him and his rights as an accused. 5 His counsel then developed three important facts not disclosed to Judge Knudson but relevant to acceptance of his plea of guilty. First, that the prosecutor had promised to make a recommendation of the sentence thereafter in fact imposed but with the understanding that the court was not obligated to accept that recommendation. 6 Second, that private counsel with whom he had conferred since his appearances before Judge Knudson had apprised him of 'the fact that there was an independent witness' to the shooting (although the nature of that witness' observation is undisclosed and left to surmise). Third, and most important, he responded affirmatively to questions of his counsel negating the crucial element of self-defense:

'Q Now, did you in fact fire this pistol and the bullet did in fact strike Mr. Andrews, is that correct?

'A Yes, sir.

'Q Now, was Mr. Andrews armed with any type of weapon?

'A No, sir. Not that I know of.

'Q And I have gone over with you in regard to the law of self defense, is that correct?

'A Yes, sir.

'Q And it's also true in this matter that you could have retreated, isn't that correct?

'A Yes, I could have.

'Q It was not necessary for you to stand your ground, is that correct?

'A Right, sir.

'Q And instead you chose to stand your ground and drew the pistol, is that correct?

'A Yes, sir.'

A colloquy between Judge Parker and defendant was in the same tenor:

'THE COURT: Are you satisfied that you understand now what is or what is not a good legal defense to the charge of Aggravated Assault?

'THE WITNESS: I do.

'THE COURT: And after consultation with Mr. Gill and one of the other members of the Public Defender's staff and with Mr. Narveson (private counsel), and after this legal advice that you have received from various sources, are you persuaded that you are in fact guilty of this crime as you are charged?

'THE WITNESS: Sir, I did fire the weapon for the reasons of--that has nothing to do with this. I did in fact shoot the man, yes, and the reasons behind it have nothing to do with it.

'THE COURT: You understand that the reasons that you had, motivation did not constitute a legal defense to the charge, is that correct?

'THE WITNESS: That is right, sir.

'THE COURT: So that you are in fact guilty of the crime that you are charged with?

'THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

'THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything with regard to any sentence that I may impose?

'THE WITNESS: No, sir. None at all.

'THE COURT: Has anyone made any threats to you to force you to make this plea?

'THE WITNESS: No, sir.

'THE COURT: After all of this legal consultation now, three different lawyers, you are persuaded or convinced, are you, that the wise and prudent course for you is to go ahead and enter a plea of guilty and leave the question of sentencing up to the discretion of the Court?'

We hold that acceptance of defendant's plea of guilty by Judge Parker was not improvident. It is essential, of course, that the record establish a factual basis for a plea of guilty, whether the factual showing is elicited by counsel or by the court itself. State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218; Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 162 N.W.2d 698. The issue seemingly arises only because of...

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9 cases
  • State v. Neumann
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 20, 1978
    ...must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant's guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred. State v. Taylor, 288 Minn. 37, 178 N.W.2d 892 (1970); State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968); cf. State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 240 N.W.2d 4 (1976); see, ......
  • State v. Lyle
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • July 28, 1987
    ...298 Minn. 531, 214 N.W.2d 236 (1974) (plea properly rejected where no factual basis regarding elements of crime); State v. Taylor, 288 Minn. 37, 178 N.W.2d 892 (1970) (factual basis existed where defendant negated element of self-defense before a second judge and where defendant had extensi......
  • State v. Nesmith, No. A07-0908 (Minn. App. 5/27/2008)
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 2008
    ...of receiving sentencing consideration in return for a guilty plea. Id. at 505, 217 N.W.2d at 737. See also State v. Taylor, 288 Minn. 37, 42-43, 178 N.W.2d 892, 895 (1970) ("We are mindful, however, that this was a negotiated plea of guilty with the assistance of competent counsel who were ......
  • State v. Lillemo
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • August 11, 1987
    ...of a factual basis for accepting a guilty plea from the record established when the plea was tendered. See State v. Taylor, 288 Minn. 37, 43, 178 N.W.2d 892, 895 (1970). This is particularly true in DWI cases involving hearings before multiple judges. In the present case, the factual basis ......
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