State v. Nicoletto

Decision Date24 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–1193.,14–1193.
Citation862 N.W.2d 621
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Patrick Ryan NICOLETTO, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Steven P. Wandro, Kara M. Simons, and Shayla L. McCormally of Wandro & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Opinion

HECHT, Justice.

Patrick Nicoletto, a former high school basketball coach, was convicted of sexual exploitation by a school employee in violation of Iowa Code section 709.15(3) (2011). Immediately following his sentencing hearing, Nicoletto filed a notice of appeal, posted an appeal bond, and was released from custody. He did not spend any time inside a state penitentiary. On appeal, we determined a person holding only a coaching authorization was not subject to prosecution under the statute in force at the time, and we therefore reversed Nicoletto's conviction. State v. Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d 421, 432 (Iowa 2014), superseded by statute, 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1114, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 709.15(1)(f ) (2015)). After reversal of his conviction, Nicoletto filed an application requesting the district court enter an order finding Nicoletto is a “wrongfully imprisoned person” who is entitled to compensation from the State under Iowa Code section 663A.1 (2013). The district court granted Nicoletto's application. In this appeal, we determine whether defendants who fail to prove they were incarcerated in a prison can nonetheless be “imprisoned” within the meaning of section 663A.1.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On July 20, 2012, Nicoletto was convicted of sexual exploitation of a student. See Iowa Code § 709.15(3) (2011). On October 3, the district court sentenced Nicoletto to an indeterminate prison term of five years and set a $7500 appeal bond. Within hours of his sentencing, Nicoletto posted the appeal bond and was released from custody, never spending a night incarcerated.1 On April 11, 2014, we reversed his conviction, finding that “a mere holder of a coaching authorization without a professional license ... does not fall under the sexual exploitation statute.” Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d at 422. We remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the charges against Nicoletto. Id. at 432.

On May 7, Nicoletto filed an application seeking the district court's determination that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned person.” See Iowa Code § 663A.1(1) (2013). The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting Nicoletto's release on appeal bond precluded recovery under chapter 663A because it meant he was never imprisoned. The court found Nicoletto is a wrongfully imprisoned person under Iowa Code section 663A.1. The State appealed, and we retained the appeal.

II. Scope of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on wrongful imprisonment claims for correction of errors at law. State v. McCoy, 742 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Iowa 2007). We will uphold the district court's findings if substantial evidence supports them. Smith v. State, 845 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa 2014). We consider evidence substantial if a reasonable person would accept the evidence as adequate to reach the district court's conclusion.” State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 2006).

III. The Parties' Positions.

A. The State. The State asserts that to qualify as a wrongfully imprisoned person under section 663A.1, an individual must have been imprisoned in a state penitentiary (as opposed to a county jail) for some identifiable period of time. According to the State, the term “imprisoned,” as used in the statute, is unambiguous and requires that a defendant actually spend time in a prison. The State distinguishes wrongful conviction, which it concedes may have happened in this case, from wrongful imprisonment, which section 663A.1 requires.

B. Nicoletto. Nicoletto likewise asserts the word “imprisonment” is not ambiguous. He contends, however, that the term has a broader meaning encompassing any restraint of liberty. Thus, in Nicoletto's view, time spent in the sheriff's custody between sentencing and posting his appeal bond qualifies as compensable wrongful imprisonment.

IV. Analysis.

We conclude the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the district court's finding that Nicoletto was imprisoned within the meaning of chapter 663A. Although Nicoletto was sentenced to prison, he filed an appeal bond and therefore served no time in a penitentiary. Further, although Nicoletto spent some time in the sheriff's custody—an amount not quantified in the record—before he posted the appeal bond and was released, the record does not establish this confinement took place inside a prison.

A. Section 663A.1 Generally. Chapter 663A enables wrongfully imprisoned persons to receive compensation from the State. See Smith, 845 N.W.2d at 55; see also Iowa Code § 663A.1(1)-(3). Persons claiming compensation for wrongful imprisonment must prove: (1) they are a wrongfully imprisoned person; and (2) there is clear and convincing evidence establishing either that they did not commit the charged offense or any lesser included offenses, or that no person committed the offense for which the individual was convicted. See Iowa Code § 663A.1(1)-(2). If a district court concludes a person has proved both elements, it must enter an order establishing the person is a wrongfully imprisoned person and inform the person they may pursue a civil claim for wrongful imprisonment against the State under Iowa Code chapter 669. Id. § 663A.1(3)(b ). Damages available in a wrongful imprisonment action include lost wages; restitution, fines, and surcharges paid; liquidated damages of fifty dollars per day of wrongful imprisonment; and attorney's fees. See id. § 663A.1(6).

To establish that he is a wrongfully imprisoned person, Nicoletto must demonstrate that he has met each of the criteria listed in section 663A.1(1) :

1. As used in this section, a wrongfully imprisoned person means an individual who meets all of the following criteria:
a. The individual was charged, by indictment or information, with the commission of a public offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.
b. The individual did not plead guilty to the public offense charged, or to any lesser included offense, but was convicted by the court or by a jury of an offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.
c. The individual was sentenced to incarceration for a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years if the offense was an aggravated misdemeanor or to an indeterminate term of years under chapter 902 if the offense was a felony, as a result of the conviction.
d. The individual's conviction was vacated or dismissed, or was reversed, and no further proceedings can be or will be held against the individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which had resulted in the conviction.
e. The individual was imprisoned solely on the basis of the conviction that was vacated, dismissed, or reversed and on which no further proceedings can be or will be had.

Id. § 663A.1(1); see also Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 2004) (“Under the Iowa statute, a ‘wrongfully imprisoned person’ is identified by means of five criteria.”). The parties agree Nicoletto proved the first four criteria in this case; the only disagreement is whether he “was imprisoned” within the meaning of Iowa Code section 663A.1(1)(e ).2

B. Imprisonment. “When interpreting a statute, we begin with the words used in the statute.” Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d at 426. “A sensible, logical construction is the goal....” City of Janesville v. McCartney, 326 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1982). We must determine whether the word “imprisonment” in the context of section 663A.1 means only confinement in a state penitentiary will support an award of compensation under the statute, or whether some lesser restriction of a defendant's liberty will support such an award. See Iowa Code § 663A.1(1)(e ).

The State asserts imprisonment does not begin at least until a defendant walks through the doors of a state penitentiary. Thus, in the State's view, a defendant who spends time exclusively in a county jail does not qualify for compensation under chapter 663A. Because Nicoletto spent at most a few hours in the sheriff's custody while his appeal bond was processed, the State contends he cannot qualify as a wrongfully imprisoned person. Nicoletto counters that because he was sentenced to serve time in prison, his imprisonment began as soon as the district court announced that sentence.

Iowa Code section 903.4 distinguishes between prisons and jails; the county bears the cost of confinement in a jail, while the state bears the cost of confinement in a prison. See Iowa Code § 903.4. The duration of a sentence of confinement controls whether the defendant serves time in a prison or a jail:

All persons sentenced to confinement for a period of one year or less shall be confined in a place to be furnished by the county where the conviction was had.... All persons sentenced to confinement for a period of more than one year shall be committed to the custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections to be confined in a place designated by the director and the cost of the confinement shall be borne by the state.

Id. ; see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 201—50.1 (defining jail as a “place administered by the county sheriff and designed to hold prisoners for as long as lawfully required but not to exceed one year”).

We agree with the State that imprisonment under chapter 663A means confinement in a prison, not a jail. To recover under the statute, an individual must establish that he or she was convicted of and sentenced for a felony offense or convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor and “sentenced to incarceration for a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years.” Iowa Code § 663A.1(1)(c ). We acknowledge, of course, that a defendant convicted of an aggravated misdemeanor can receive a lesser sentence than the maximum...

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    ...n.14 (citing statutes). We should be hesitant to read language into a statute absent a compelling reason to do so. See State v. Nicoletto , 862 N.W.2d 621, 625 (Iowa 2015) ; State v. Romer , 832 N.W.2d 169, 177–78 & n.6 (Iowa 2013) ; see also State v. Coleman , 907 N.W.2d 124, 150 (Iowa 201......
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    ...Ct. , 828 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs. , 667 N.W.2d 873, 877–78 (Iowa 2003) ); accord State v. Nicoletto , 862 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2015) ("A sensible, logical construction is the goal ...." (quoting City of Janesville v. McCartney , 326 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Io......
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    ...John Deere Dubuque Works v. Weyant , 442 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa 1989). "[W]e begin with the words used in the statute." State v. Nicoletto , 862 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2015). "We read the statute as a whole and give it its plain and obvious meaning." In re Detention of Geltz , 840 N.W.2d 273,......

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