State v. Nobles
| Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 34PA14-2,34PA14-2 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. George Lee NOBLES |
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Amy Kunstling Irene, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
In this case, we must determine whether defendant has sufficiently demonstrated that he qualifies as an "Indian"1 under the federal Indian Major Crimes Act (IMCA) such that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina's courts. Because we conclude that defendant failed to demonstrate that he is an Indian for purposes of the IMCA, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On 30 September 2012, Barbara Preidt was robbed at gunpoint and fatally shot outside of a Fairfield Inn in Jackson County. The crime took place within the Qualla Boundary—land that is held in trust by the United States for the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI).
After an investigation by the Cherokee Indian Police Department, defendant, Dwayne Edward Swayney, and Ashlyn Carothers were arrested for the robbery and murder on 30 November 2012. Because Swayney and Carothers were enrolled members of the EBCI and of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, respectively, they were brought before an EBCI tribal magistrate for indictment proceedings. Tribal, state, and federal authorities, however, agreed that defendant should be prosecuted by the State of North Carolina given that he was not present in the EBCI enrollment records. Accordingly, defendant was brought before a Jackson County magistrate and then charged in Jackson County with first-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.
On 15 April 2013, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that because he was an Indian he could only be tried in federal court pursuant to the IMCA. The IMCA provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny Indian" who commits an enumerated major crime in "Indian country" is subject to "the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012).
The trial court held a pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss on 9 August 2013. The parties stipulated that defendant was born in 1976 in Florida to Donna Lorraine Smith Crowe, an enrolled member of the EBCI. The parties also stipulated that although defendant himself is not an enrolled member of the EBCI, he "would be [classified as] a first descendant" due to his mother's status.
At the hearing, the trial court received testimony from Kathie McCoy, an employee at the EBCI Office of Tribal Enrollment. McCoy testified that while defendant is neither currently enrolled nor classified as a first descendant in the EBCI database, he was nevertheless "eligible to be designated as a [f]irst [d]escendant" because his mother was an enrolled member of the EBCI.
Annette Tarnawsky, the Attorney General for the EBCI, also provided testimony explaining that while first descendants are not entitled to the full range of tribal affiliation benefits that enrolled members enjoy, first descendants are eligible for some special benefits not available to persons lacking any affiliation with the tribe. These benefits include certain property rights (such as the right to inherit land from enrolled members by valid will and to rent dwellings on tribal land), health care benefits (eligibility to receive free care at the Cherokee Indian Hospital), employment benefits (a limited hiring preference for EBCI employment), and education benefits (access to financial assistance for higher education and adult education services). Tarnawsky also testified that the list of benefits available only to enrolled EBCI members includes the right to hunt and fish on tribal lands, the ability to vote in tribal elections, and the right to hold tribal office.
The State also presented evidence that defendant had been incarcerated in Florida from 1993 until 2011 and that his pre-sentence report in Florida listed his race and sex as "W/M." When defendant was released from Florida's custody in 2011, he requested that his probation be transferred to North Carolina and listed his race as "white" on his Application for Interstate Compact Transfer.
Defendant's probation officers, Christian Clemmer and Olivia Ammons, testified that in 2011, defendant began living with family members at an address near the Qualla Boundary and working at a fast food restaurant that was also located within the Boundary. For the next fourteen months, defendant lived at various addresses on or near the Qualla Boundary until his arrest on 30 November 2012. Defendant never represented to either of his probation officers that he was an Indian. On a mandatory substance abuse screening form completed by Ammons on 7 May 2012, defendant's race was listed as "white."
Defendant's mother also testified at the hearing, stating that she is an enrolled EBCI member but that defendant's father was white and not affiliated with any tribe. She testified that defendant lived on or near the Qualla Boundary for much of his childhood and that she had enrolled defendant in both the Cherokee tribal school system and the Swain County school system. On one Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) student enrollment application, she listed defendant's "Degree Indian" as "none." On two other BIA student enrollment applications, however, she listed defendant's "Tribal Affiliation" as "Cherokee."
As a child, defendant received treatment at the Swain County Hospital for injuries suffered in a car accident, and the EBCI paid for the portion of his medical expenses not covered by health insurance. An employee of Cherokee Indian Hospital, Vickie Jenkins, testified that defendant received care at the hospital on five occasions between 1985 and 1990. The hospital serves only enrolled members of the EBCI and first descendants, both of whom receive medical services at no cost. Defendant's hospital records indicated that he was of EBCI descent and identified him as an "Indian nontribal member."
After hearing all the evidence, the trial court entered an order on 26 November 2013 denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on its determination that defendant was not an Indian within the meaning of the IMCA. The trial court's order contained hundreds of detailed findings of fact. On 31 January 2014, defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court seeking review of the trial court's order. The petition was denied on 11 June 2014.
On 14 March 2016, defendant renewed his motion to dismiss the charges against him in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, moved that the jurisdictional issue relating to his Indian status be submitted to the jury by means of a special verdict. The trial court denied both motions on 25 March 2016.
Defendant was subsequently tried in Superior Court, Jackson County, beginning on 28 March 2016, and was ultimately convicted of armed robbery, first-degree murder under the felony murder doctrine, and possession of a firearm by a felon. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. His principal argument on appeal was that the trial court had erred in denying his motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected his argument, based on its determination that defendant did not qualify as an Indian under the IMCA and that a special verdict was not required.
State v. Nobles , 818 S.E.2d 129 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).2 Defendant filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court on 7 August 2018, which we allowed.
The two issues before us in this appeal are whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to dismiss and in ruling that the jurisdictional issue was not required to be submitted to the jury by means of a special verdict. We address each issue in turn.
The IMCA provides that "[a]ny Indian who commits [an enumerated major crime] against the person or property of another ... within the Indian country[ ] shall be subject to ... the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) ; see United States v. Juvenile Male , 666 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012) (); United States v. Sands , 968 F.2d 1058, 1061 (10th Cir. 1992) ().
Here, there is no dispute that the shooting took place in "Indian country" as it occurred within the Qualla Boundary. Nor is there any dispute that the charges against defendant constituted major crimes for purposes of the IMCA. The question before us is whether defendant qualifies as an Indian under that statute.
The IMCA does not provide a definition of the term "Indian." The Supreme Court of the United States, however, suggested a two-pronged test for analyzing this issue in United States v. Rogers , 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572–73, 11 L. Ed. 1105, 1107–08 (1846). To qualify as an Indian under the Rogers test, a defendant must (1) have "some Indian blood," and (2) be "recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government or both." United States v. Stymiest , 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Rogers , 45 U.S. at 572–73, 11 L. Ed. at 1105 ); see also United States v. Zepeda , 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) ().
In the present case, ...
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