State v. Nordstrom

• Decision Date: 24 July 1899
• Citation: 21 Wash. 403,58 P. 248
• Parties: STATE v. NORDSTROM.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

58 P. 248

21 Wash. 403

STATE v. NORDSTROM.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 24, 1899

Appeal from superior court, King county; O. Jacobs, Judge.

Charles W. Nordstrom was convicted of murder in the first degree, and the death penalty imposed. From an order refusing a stay of execution pending an examination into the question of his insanity, alleged to have arisen after sentence, he appealed. Dismissed.

James Hamilton Lewis, for appellant.

James F. McElroy, for the State.

ANDERS J.

The appellant, Charles W. Nordstrom, was tried in the superior court of King county on a charge of murder in the first degree, and on January 13, 1892, the jury returned a verdict of 'guilty as charged.' On April 2, 1892, he was adjudged guilty, and sentenced to be hanged on a day to be fixed by the court. He thereafter appealed from the judgment of conviction to this court, and this court, after argument and due consideration, affirmed the judgment. 35 P. 382. He thereupon removed the cause to the supreme court of the United States, where the judgment of this court was affirmed. 17 S.Ct. 997. He thereafter applied to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Washington, Northern division, for a writ of habeas corpus. His application was denied by said court, and the proceeding dismissed, whereupon he appealed to the supreme court of the United States, which court affirmed the decision of the said circuit court. The mandate of the supreme court of the United States in the habeas corpus proceeding was filed in said circuit court on March 8, 1899, and on March 11, 1899, a regularly certified copy thereof was filed in the superior court of King county. Soon thereafter the prosecuting attorney in and for said county moved the superior court for an order fixing the day for carrying into effect the judgment and sentence theretofore passed on the defendant. This application on the part of the state was continued from time to time, at the request of counsel for the defendant (appellant here), until the 15th day of May, 1899, at which time the superior court entered its order, and signed a death warrant, directing that the said Nordstrom be executed in the manner provided by law on Friday, the 11th day of August, 1899. During the pendency of the motion for fixing the day of execution, the appellant through his counsel, suggested to the court, and supported the suggestion by an affidavit, that the defendant had become insane since the judgment and sentence of the court, and therefore requested a stay of the order and warrant of execution. The court, in order to satisfy its mind and conscience as to the sanity or insanity of the defendant appointed a commission consisting of five expert physicians and alienists to examine the defendant, and to report to the court his present mental condition. According to the record this commission was appointed with the concurrence of counsel for defendant and for the state. The commission reported to the court, in substance, that they had carefully examined the said Nordstrom, and had taken the testimony of the officials who had had him in charge since his conviction, and that they found him capable of distinguishing between right and wrong and that, so far as they were able to ascertain, his mental condition was the same as it was at the time of the trial. Upon hearing and considering this report, the court became satisfied that the defendant was of sane mind, and therefore proceeded, over the objection and protest of counsel for defendant, to fix a day for carrying the judgment and sentence into effect in accordance with the provisions of the statute. The learned counsel for the defendant moved the court to set aside the report of the physicians, and asked to have the question of the sanity or insanity of the defendant determined by some tribunal or body in which or before whom the defendant might be represented by counsel, and produce such witnesses as he desired. The court denied the motion, and the counsel thereupon gave notice of appeal to this court from the action of the superior court (1) in refusing him a hearing upon his petition setting forth insanity, (2) in denying the motion to set aside the report of the commission, and (3) in overruling the defendant's objection to the court's taking jurisdiction of the matter, and denying the motion to suspend and stay the proceeding for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The counsel for the state have moved to dismiss this appeal, mainly upon the ground that the orders, rulings, and acts of the superior court in setting a time for carrying into effect the death sentence is not reviewable under the law of this state. Counsel for appellant have filed a motion to strike the motion to dismiss from the files on the ground that it is not authorized by law. But it is sufficient to say, regarding this latter motion, that, if the motion to dismiss is well founded, it cannot be stricken, and if, on the contrary, it is not well taken, it will be denied.

The question presented for our determination is one of first impression in this court. It is conceded that no method of procedure in cases like the present is provided by statute in this state. The question as to whether the action of the court below which is objected to by appellant is reviewable by this court involves somewhat the question whether the appellant had or had not the right to have the question of his present mental condition ascertained by a regular trial, either before a jury or in some other method known to the law. No case has been cited by counsel in which the facts were similar to those in this case, though several are referred to where the question of the trial of the defendant's sanity in criminal cases is discussed. In most of the cases, however, the suggestion of present insanity was made either at the time of the trial or after verdict and before sentence. We think the modern authorities are generally to the effect that the court is not bound to order a trial of the question if it has no reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the defendant. At common law it appears that if the prisoner, when called to the bar for sentence, appeared to be insane, the judge might, in his discretion, reprieve him until he regained his senses. 4 Bl. Comm. p. 396. In Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 549, which is more nearly in point than any other case which has been cited, it is said, on the authority of Coke, that the stay of execution for insanity depends on the discretion of the judge at common law. It is not claimed by the learned counsel for the appellant in this case that the appellant had an absolute right to a trial by jury of the question of his sanity, but the contention is that he had the right to...