State v. Northern

Decision Date26 August 2008
Docket NumberNo. M2005-02336-SC-R11-CD.,M2005-02336-SC-R11-CD.
Citation262 S.W.3d 741
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. Marco M. NORTHERN.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Ross E. Alderman, District Public Defender; Jeffrey A. DeVasher, Assistant District Public Defender (on appeal); and Jason Gichner and Amy D. Harwell, Assistant District Public Defenders (at trial), for appellant, Marco M. Northern.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Elizabeth T. Ryan, Senior Counsel; Sophia S. Lee, Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Rachel Sobrero and Amy Eisenbeck, Assistant District Attorneys General, for appellee, State of Tennessee.

WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined. JANICE M. HOLDER, J., concurring and dissenting.

OPINION

We granted this appeal to consider whether the courts below correctly held that Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), does not bar the introduction into evidence of the defendant's Mirandized2 videotaped confession which occurred after the defendant made an incriminating admission during a prior unwarned custodial interrogation. This Court has not previously interpreted and applied Seibert. After carefully considering the plurality opinion, the concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinions in Seibert, we conclude that the courts below correctly held that Seibert does not bar admission of the defendant's videotaped confession. We further hold that this Court's decision in State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn.1992), interpreting the right against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, does not bar admission of the defendant's videotaped confession. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the defendant's conviction of second degree murder but remanded for resentencing.

I. Factual Background

On October 27, 2003, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Metropolitan Nashville police officers were dispatched to an automobile accident with injuries at the corner of Sixteenth Avenue and Wheelus Street in Nashville, a neighborhood notorious for drug deals and prostitution. Upon arriving at the scene, the police discovered that a red Dodge Ram truck had collided with a fire hydrant and a utility pole, causing the pole to collapse. The unconscious white male driver of the truck appeared to be dead, but the police were unable to aid him or to remove him from the vehicle because live electrical power lines were draped over the truck. The officers requested assistance from Nashville Electric Service ("NES") and the fire department.

After NES personnel arrived and turned off the electrical power, police and fire department personnel removed the driver, later identified as James Combs, from the vehicle and placed him in an ambulance. Emergency medical technicians were unable to revive Combs, but they discovered a gunshot wound on his left side and notified the police. Learning of the gunshot wound, the officers declared the accident scene to be a homicide crime scene and requested assistance from the homicide division.

At approximately 11:30 p.m., homicide detective Charles Robinson arrived, inspected the scene, made notes, and canvassed the neighborhood for witnesses. Detective Robinson and other officers went house-to-house inquiring whether anyone had heard or seen what had happened. Using flashlights and vehicle headlights for illumination, Detective Robinson and the officers searched the scene for shell casings for several hours. The officers did not find witnesses, shell casings, or any other evidence to assist them in solving the crime.

Over the next two days, Detective Robinson and three other detectives returned to the scene and again canvassed the area. As a result of these efforts, the detectives determined that the shooting actually occurred near Cockrill and Sixteenth Avenue. While they were unable to develop a formal suspect list, detectives were able to compile a list of persons who were seen in the vicinity of the shooting. Detectives returned to the area on each of the next several days, interviewing residents and other persons who had been seen in the vicinity of the shooting. On November 5, during one of these interviews, the detectives saw the defendant walking along the opposite side of the street. The defendant was listed among the persons seen in the vicinity of the shooting, so the detectives called out to him, intending to conduct an interview. However, the defendant ran from the area and eluded the detectives.

About the same time the next day, November 6, the detectives returned to the area. Seeing the defendant in a nearby yard, they again called out to him, and again, he ran away, but an area resident blocked his escape route, enabling the detectives to overtake him. Detective Robinson asked whether the defendant knew why the detectives wanted to speak with him, and the defendant replied, "about that white man in the red truck." When asked why he had fled, the defendant replied that he had drugs in his possession. Upon searching the defendant, the detectives found marijuana and crack cocaine. They arrested the defendant for drug possession and transported him to the Criminal Justice Center. At this time, however, the detectives did not administer the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

After they arrived at the Criminal Justice Center, Detective Robinson seated the defendant at a table in the center of the "Murder Squad Office" while he and the other detectives completed paperwork on the defendant's drug-related arrest at desks surrounding the table. As they worked, the detectives discussed the shooting among themselves. In general, the conversation minimized the shooter's responsibility and implied that the victim assumed the risk of being murdered when he drove late at night into a neighborhood notorious for crime. After listening to the detectives' conversation for about twenty minutes, the defendant announced that he had been present at the shooting. Detective Robinson then stopped his paperwork and re-located the defendant to an interview room, advising the defendant as they walked to be truthful because the defendant likely would be administered a polygraph after the interview.

As they entered the interview room, Detective Robinson turned on a videotape recorder. After Detective Robinson administered the Miranda warnings and reviewed a rights-waiver form, the defendant signed the waiver. Detective Robinson then began questioning the defendant, using open-ended questions and speaking in a conversational and non-adversarial tone. The questioning remained polite and courteous throughout the interview. Neither the defendant nor Detective Robinson ever raised his voice, became upset or excited, or left his seat. The defendant was not restrained in any way during the interview, nor did he attempt to leave the interview room. The defendant did not request an attorney or ask to speak to family members. Detective Robinson alone conducted the interrogation, and no other detective or law enforcement official came into the room during the interrogation.

Detective Robinson asked the defendant to tell him what happened, and the defendant readily confessed to shooting the victim, explaining that the shooting occurred because the victim tried to drive away with the defendant's crack cocaine without paying for it. According to the defendant, he had been riding his bicycle along the street when the victim's vehicle stopped in front of him. After directing the defendant to the driver's side window, the victim asked for "dope." The defendant handed the victim a rock of crack cocaine about the size of a pencil eraser. When the victim complained that the quantity of cocaine was not worth the defendant's asking price, the defendant told the victim to either return the drug or pay for it. According to the defendant, the victim behaved strangely and leaned away from the window, causing the defendant to point his gun at the victim and again demand the return of the drug. The defendant then heard the engine "rev up." As the victim drove away with the drug, the doorframe of the truck struck the defendant's arm, and he shot the victim. The defendant implied that the shooting was an unintentional result of the doorframe striking his arm. However, at other times during the interrogation the defendant admitted he intentionally shot the victim to prevent the victim from stealing the drug. When Detective Robinson asked about the murder weapon, the defendant said he had thrown it into the Cumberland River. The police never recovered the weapon.

The defendant was indicted for first degree premeditated murder. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress his videotaped confession, arguing that the detectives had previously interrogated him without providing Miranda warnings. Specifically, the defendant argued that the detectives' conversation about the shooting as he sat within earshot at the table in the Murder Squad Office constituted the functional equivalent of express questioning for purposes of Miranda. While the defendant admitted Detective Robinson provided him Miranda warnings at the beginning of the subsequent videotaped interrogation, the defendant maintained that the prior unwarned interrogation tainted his videotaped confession, making it inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree" and as a continuation of the prior unwarned interrogation. The defendant also argued that he had been using drugs and alcohol on the day of his arrest and was too intoxicated to understand his rights when he signed the waiver.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Robinson and the defendant testifie...

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