State v. One Million Seven Hundred Eleven Thousand Sixty-One Dollars & Seventy-Nine Cents (-t_T-1,711,061.79) in U.S. Currency
| Decision Date | 27 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-18-00379-CV,04-18-00379-CV |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas v. ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND SIXTY-ONE DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-NINE CENTS ($1,711,061.79) IN U.S. CURRENCY, Elgin Watch, Rope Necklace, ID Bracelet, Two (2) Costume Jewelry Rings, and Five (5) Silver Bars |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 49th Judicial District Court, Zapata County, Texas
Honorable Susan D. Reed, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
AFFIRMED
The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing its forfeiture action. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 29, 2018, the State of Texas filed an original notice of seizure and intended forfeiture ("forfeiture petition"). The forfeiture petition, which was filed-stamped by the Bexar County District Clerk and assigned a cause number, stated that the proceeding was "brought under and by virtue of [c]hapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure" and that the property in question—one million seven hundred eleven thousand sixty-one dollars and seventy-nine cents ($1,711,061.79), an Elgin watch, a rope necklace, an identification bracelet, two costume jewelry rings, and five silver bars—was seized in Zapata County, Texas, on January 5, 2018.
More than two months later, on March 14, 2018, the State filed a motion to transfer venue with the Bexar County District Clerk asking the trial court to transfer the forfeiture proceeding to Zapata County. On March 22, 2018, the trial court granted the motion to transfer venue and ordered the proceeding transferred to Zapata County, Texas.
On April 9, 2018, the owners of the seized property ("the respondents")1 filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the State had not filed its forfeiture petition in Zapata County as required by article 59.04(b) of the code of criminal procedure. The plea to the jurisdiction further asserted that the State had failed to comply with article 59.04(a) of the code of criminal procedure, which requires that a forfeiture action be commenced not later than the thirtieth day after the property is seized. The State filed a response opposing the plea to the jurisdiction. In its response, the State argued (1) the plea to the jurisdiction was defective because it was premised on the affirmative defense of limitations which cannot be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the plea to the jurisdiction was "factually erroneous" because the forfeiture petition was in effect filed in Zapata County within the "thirty-day window" by applying rule 74 of the rules of civil procedure; and (3) the State was not barred from pursuing other forfeiture methods by the election of remedies doctrine.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction.2 At the hearing, the State argued it had, in effect, filed its forfeiture petition in Zapata County because it had filedit with the trial judge pursuant to rule 74 of the rules of civil procedure. The only witness to testify at the hearing was the State's attorney, David L. Reuthinger, Jr. After the hearing, the trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction, dismissed the forfeiture action, and ordered the seized property returned to the respondents. The State appealed.
Chapter 59 of the code of criminal procedure governs civil forfeiture actions, which are in rem proceedings against contraband. State v. Silver Chevrolet Pickup, 140 S.W.3d 691, 692 (Tex. 2004). Because a forfeiture action is an in rem proceeding, a trial court's jurisdiction depends on its control over the property. State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and no/100, 136 S.W.3d 392, 405 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied). Article 59.04(a) of the code of criminal procedure provides that a forfeiture action must be commenced not later than the thirtieth day after the date of the seizure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.04(a). Article 59.04(b) provides: "A forfeiture proceeding commences under this chapter when" the State "files a notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture" "with the clerk of the district court in the county where the seizure occurred." Id. art. 59.04(b). A forfeiture action may not proceed to hearing unless the trial judge who is to conduct the hearing is satisfied that the parties have complied with the requirements set forth in article 59.04. Id. art. 59.04(l). Parties to a chapter 59 forfeiture action must comply with the pleading rules utilized in other civil suits, and a forfeiture action proceeds to trial in the same manner as other civil cases. Id. art. 59.05(a), (b).
In its first issue, the State argues the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction because "the sole ground raised in [] the plea to the jurisdiction was limitations, to wit, the 30-day filing window in [a]rticle 59.04." We disagree. The respondents based their plea to the jurisdiction not only on the State's failure to file the forfeiture petition within thirty days of seizure, but also its failure to file the petition in the county where the property was seized. In the plea, therespondents argued that the State failed to comply with both subsections 59.04(a) and (b) in filing the forfeiture petition. The primary case the respondents cited in their plea was Martinez v. State, 893 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ). In Martinez, law enforcement officers seized property in Kenedy County, Texas, but the State filed its forfeiture petition in Kleberg County, Texas. Id. at 304. The court of appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to forfeit the seized property, stating that "jurisdiction of forfeiture is governed by statute, and notice must be filed as prescribed by the statute in the [c]ounty where the property was seized." Id. at 305. Contrary to the representations in the State's brief, the plea to the jurisdiction in this case was based, at least in part, on the State's failure to file its forfeiture petition with the clerk of the district court in the county where the seizure was made. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.04(b).
Next, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction because the sole authority cited in the plea to the jurisdiction, Martinez, conflicts with precedent from the Texas Supreme Court, specifically, Silver Chevrolet Pickup, 140 S.W.3d 691. In Martinez, the court of appeals held that the failure to file the forfeiture action in the county in which the property was seized deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See 893 S.W.2d at 305. In Silver Chevrolet Pickup, the Texas Supreme Court held that the State's failure to timely file a lis pendens notice as required by article 59.04(g) of the code of criminal procedure did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. 140 S.W.3d at 692. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court examined the purpose of the statute, which was to protect the party with a claim against the real property such as the State, innocent purchasers, and those with a security interest in the property. Id. at 694. The supreme court acknowledged that the provision requiring the filing of a lis pendens within three days of commencing a forfeiture proceeding is "merely an internal timing directive that does not act to deprive a court of jurisdiction." Id. Thus, the supreme court limited its holdingto article 59.04(g) of the code of criminal procedure. Id. Furthermore, in Silver Chevrolet Pickup, the supreme court did not overrule or disapprove of Martinez. Id. at 692-95.
The State argues that the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction because "limitations is an affirmative defense which cannot be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction." To support this argument, the State cites Martinez v. Val Verde Cnty. Hosp. Dist., a case involving the pre-suit notice provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), which are found in section 101.101 of the civil practice and remedies code. 110 S.W.3d 480, 484 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003), aff'd, 140 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. 2004). In Val Verde Cnty., we were asked to determine whether the TTCA's pre-suit notice requirement was jurisdictional or simply a statutory prerequisite. Id. at 483. We concluded that compliance with section 101.101's notice requirement was not necessary to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction, and therefore, the failure to comply with section 101.101's notice requirement was comparable to the affirmative defense of limitations. Id. at 484-85. We further concluded that because section 101.101's notice requirement was comparable to an affirmative defense, it had to be raised in a summary judgment motion and could not be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 485.
The present case is distinguishable from Val Verde Cnty., where we were of the opinion that section 101.101's notice requirement was not jurisdictional.3 Here, by contrast, we are of the opinion that article 59.04(b)'s requirement that a forfeiture action be filed in the district court in the county of seizure is jurisdictional. See 1976 Harley Davidson Motorcycle v. State, 106 S.W.3d 398, 401-02 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (recognizing that article 59.04(b)'srequirement that a forfeiture action be filed in the district court in the county in which the seizure was made is jurisdictional under the Texas constitution); Martinez, 893 S.W.2d at 305 (). We conclude the trial court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction did not conflict with precedent as asserted by the State.
Finally, the State argues that the text of article 59.04(b) shows that its requirement...
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