State v. Patton

Decision Date22 October 2009
Docket NumberNo. 80518-1.,80518-1.
Citation167 Wn.2d 379,219 P.3d 651
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Randall J. PATTON, Petitioner.

George A. Kolin, Washougal, for Petitioner/Appellant.

Peter S. Banks, Skamania County Prosecutor's Office, Stevenson, for Appellee/Respondent.

Douglas B. Klunder, Seattle, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

STEPHENS, J.

¶ 1 This case asks us to determine the validity of an automobile search under the "incident to arrest" exception to the general warrant requirement of article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Sheriff's deputies attempted to effectuate an arrest warrant for Randall J. Patton while he stood in his driveway next to his parked car with his head in the window. When told he was under arrest, Patton fled from the car into his home, where law enforcement officers physically detained him. They subsequently searched his car. The trial court found the search invalid as a search incident to arrest because police did not physically detain Patton while he stood next to his car. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Patton was arrested next to his automobile, and therefore, the search of his car was valid incident to his arrest. Though we agree Patton was under arrest while he stood next to his car, the search incident to arrest exception requires a nexus between the arrestee, the vehicle, and the crime of arrest, implicating safety concerns or concern for the destruction of evidence of the crime of arrest. Because no such nexus existed here, we reverse the Court of Appeals. We hold that an automobile search incident to arrest is not justified unless the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, and the search is necessary for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest that could be concealed or destroyed.1

FACTS

¶ 2 The underlying facts are set forth in the unchallenged findings of fact determined at the hearing on Patton's motion to suppress evidence. On March 19, 2005, Skamania County Sheriff Deputy Tim Converse was watching Patton's trailer in the hope of locating Patton to arrest him on an outstanding felony warrant. He ran the license on a blue Chevy parked in the driveway and confirmed that the car belonged to Patton. Deputy Converse called for backup.

¶ 3 After waiting a short time, Deputy Converse saw the dome light illuminate in the parked car and saw someone generally fitting Patton's description "rummaging around" inside the car. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 16. Concerned the person might try to drive away, Deputy Converse activated his lights and pulled into the driveway behind the car. He approached Patton, announced that he was under arrest, and ordered him to put his hands behind his back. Patton, who still had his head inside the car when Deputy Converse spoke, stood up and ran inside the trailer. He did not respond to the deputy's verbal commands to exit the trailer.

¶ 4 After two other backup deputies arrived, they entered the trailer and found Patton hiding behind a bedroom door. Patton was taken into custody, handcuffed, and placed in the back of Deputy Converse's patrol car. The deputies then searched Patton's vehicle, where they found two baggies of methamphetamine and $122 cash under the driver's seat.2

¶ 5 The State charged Patton with one count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine and one count of resisting arrest. Patton moved under CrR 3.6 to suppress the evidence obtained from his vehicle. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the search was not incident to arrest because Patton was not arrested until he was taken into physical custody in the trailer. The State appealed, arguing the arrest occurred beside the car and therefore the search was valid incident to the arrest. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court. We granted Patton's petition for review to address whether the search incident to arrest exception applies in these circumstances.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Patton claims the search of his car violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. When a party claims both state and federal constitutional violations, we turn first to our state constitution. State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).3 Article I, section 7 provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." We have specifically recognized that Washington State citizens hold a constitutionally protected privacy interest in their automobiles and the contents therein. State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486, 496, 987 P.2d 73 (1999); State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 187-88, 203 P. 390 (1922).

¶ 7 Our analysis under article I, section 7 begins with the presumption that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless it falls within one of the carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. These exceptions are limited by the reasons that brought them into existence; they are not devices to undermine the warrant requirement. State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 356, 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

¶ 8 One such exception, and the one at issue here, is the automobile search incident to arrest exception.4 Officer safety and the risk of destruction of evidence of the crime of arrest are the reasons that brought this exception into existence. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash.2d 686, 693-700, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (reviewing historical development of search incident to arrest exception under federal and state law). Necessarily, these factors — also described as exigencies — limit the scope of the exception.5 Like all judicially created exceptions, the automobile search incident to arrest exception is limited and narrowly drawn, and it is the State's burden to establish that it applies. Parker, 139 Wash.2d at 496, 987 P.2d 73.

¶ 9 The focus of Patton's argument is that the search of his vehicle was not valid incident to his arrest because he was not arrested until the sheriff's deputies took him into physical custody inside the trailer. He also argues that the arrest here had no connection to the car and was merely used "to bootstrap a search of the automobile and its contents." Br. of Resp't at 12. Patton is supported by amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, which urges us to reexamine our decision in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), and limit the search incident to arrest exception. We address separately the questions of when Patton was arrested and whether the subsequent search falls within the narrow exceptions we have recognized.

When Was Patton Arrested?

¶ 10 The trial court concluded Patton was not arrested until he was placed under physical control in the trailer. We disagree. "An arrest takes place when a duly authorized officer of the law manifests an intent to take a person into custody and actually seizes or detains such person. The existence of an arrest depends in each case upon an objective evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances." 12 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3104, at 741 (3d ed.2004) (footnote omitted).6

¶ 11 Although Patton was not physically restrained until the police caught up with him in the trailer, Deputy Converse pulled into the driveway behind Patton's car with his lights activated. He immediately approached Patton, told him he was under arrest and to put his hands behind his back. Under an objective evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances, an arrest occurred. The fact that Patton chose to flee does not undermine the validity of the arrest.

¶ 12 We have seen recently a number of Court of Appeals cases in which a suspect flees from a car prior to being arrested, and the question arises whether a subsequent search of the car is valid incident to the arrest. State v. Adams, 146 Wash.App. 595, 191 P.3d 93 (2008); State v. Quinlivan, 142 Wash.App. 960, 176 P.3d 605 (2008); State v. Rathbun, 124 Wash.App. 372, 101 P.3d 119 (2004); State v. Perea, 85 Wash.App. 339, 932 P.2d 1258 (1997). In each of these cases except Adams, the Court of Appeals invalidated an automobile search incident to arrest because law enforcement officers did not initiate an arrest before the suspect exited and left the area of the car. See Quinlivan, 142 Wash.App. at 962-63, 176 P.3d 605 (noting no dispute over when suspect was arrested, some distance from car); Rathbun, 124 Wash.App. at 378-79, 101 P.3d 119 (distinguishing cases in which the arrestee fled from his vehicle, and noting Rathbun was far from his vehicle at the time police initiated the arrest); Perea, 85 Wash.App. at 344-45, 932 P.2d 1258 (noting that Perea was not arrested until after leaving and locking his car and that his actions in fleeing "[did] not diminish the lawfulness of the act of locking his car").

¶ 13 These cases should not be read broadly to suggest that the initiation of an arrest is ineffective so long as the fleeing suspect eludes physical restraint. To adopt Patton's argument that he was not arrested until he was chased down and restrained would send a dangerous message and jeopardize peaceable arrest. It would encourage flight as the means to avoid a search incident to arrest and concomitantly encourage greater force by law enforcement at the first moment of the arrest process to eliminate flight as an option. We have previously held that under article I, section 7, an individual cannot avoid seizure by failing to yield to a show of authority. State v. Young, 135 Wash.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). We conclude the same is true of attempts to avoid arrest by fleeing instead of yielding to an officer's exercise of authority to arrest. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Patton was placed under arrest as he stood beside his car.

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