State v. Paul, 47858

• Decision Date: 05 June 1951
• Docket Number: No. 47858,47858
• Citation: 48 N.W.2d 309,242 Iowa 853
• Parties: STATE v. PAUL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 309

48 N.W.2d 309

242 Iowa 853

STATE v. PAUL.

No. 47858.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 5, 1951.

Roy L. Pell and Joe B. Tye, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Robert L. Larson, Atty. Gen., Don Hise, First Asst. Atty. Gen., E. W. Adams, County Atty. of Marshall County, Marshalltown, for appellee.

MANTZ, Justice.

By information field in the Municipal Court of the city of Marshalltown, Marshall County, Iowa, defendant was accused of the crime of failing to yield the right of way at a street intersection in said city. He entered a plea of not guilty. Upon trial, he was convicted and a fine was imposed. He has appealed to this court.

On November 15, 1950, the State of Iowa filed an amended information in the Municipal Court of Marshalltown, Iowa, against the defendant, James F. Paul, which information reads as follows:

'The defendant, James F. Paul, is accused of the crime of failing to yield right of way to pedestrian committed as follows: For that the defendant on the 1st day of November, 1950, in the County of Marshall, State of Iowa, did fail to yield the right of way to a pedestrian, John Mullen, who was proceeding north across Main Street at the intersection of Center Street, in Marshalltown, Iowa, within a marked or unmarked crosswalk, when the traffic-control signal facing said pedestrian was green, in violation of Section 321.257(1) Code of Iowa (1950) [I.C.A.].'

To this information he pleaded not guilty. He was tried and convicted and was sentenced to pay a fine of $25. in default of which he was to be confined in jail for a period of seven days.

As grounds for reversal, defendant claims the trial court erred in three particulars.

(1) In failing to hold as a matter of law that a failure to yield the right of way to a pedestrian was not a criminal offense.

(2) In instructing the jury that it was immaterial whether the defendant's car hit the pedestrian or whether the pedestrian walked into the vehicle.

(3) In failing to sustain the motion for a directed verdict made by defendant at the close of the testimony.

There is little dispute in the facts. The fact that Mr. Mullen, the pedestrian, was crossing on the east side of the intersection of Main and Center Streets of Marshalltown, Iowa is not in dispute. The defendant, driving his automobile, came from the north and made a left hand turn into Main Street and while making that turn collided with Mr. Mullen who was then proceeding northward and on the east side of Center Street. The defendant claimed that Mr. Mullen walked into the side of his vehicle, while the state claimed that the vehicle struck him, throwing him up in the air. When the vehicle stopped Mr. Mullen was stretched out on the pavement near the front of the car. At that time there was an electric control device at said intersection and it was operating and when Mr. Mullen started north he was facing the green light.

I. Defendant's first claim is that the failure to yield the right of way at an intersection is not a criminal offense. In support of this claim he cites a number of Iowa cases--State v. Brighi, 232 Iowa 1087, 7 N.W.2d 9; State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W.2d 371; State v. Williams, 238 Iowa 838, 28 N.W.2d 514.

We think the cases cited do not apply to the present situation. In order to show the difference between the statute involved in the instant case, we will set out pertinent parts thereof and follow with the statute under which State v. Brighi, supra, was decided.

The statute involved in the instant case is Section 321.257, a part of chapter 321, Code of 1946, I.C.A. Said section is designated 'Traffic-control signal legend' and states:

'Whenever traffic is controlled by trafficcontrol signals exhibiting the words 'Go', 'Caution' or 'Stop' or exhibiting different colored lights successively one at a time the following colors only shall be used and said terms and lights shall indicate as follows:

'1. Green alone or 'Go'.

'Vehicular traffic * * * may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. But vehicular traffic shall yield the right of way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection at the time such signal is exhibited.

'Pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk.'

Attention is called to the fact that the case of State v. Brighi, supra, involved an entirely different statute than the part of 321.257 above set out. That case involved the construction of Chapter 175, Acts of the 49th G.A., I.C.A. § 321.319, which is as follows:

'Section 1. Section five thousand twenty-six and one one hundredths (5026.01), Code, 1939, is hereby repealed and the following enacted in lieu thereof:

'Where two vehicles are approaching on any public street or highway so that their paths will intersect and there is danger of collision, the vehicle approaching the other from the right shall have the right of way.

"The foregoing rule is modified at through highways and otherwise as hereinafter stated in this chapter."

In the case of State v. Brighi, supra, the court expressly held that Chapter 175, Acts of the 49th G.A. could not be construed as a criminal statute and dismissed the charge against Brighi of failing to yield the right of way at an intersection. That statute and the one invoked in the instant case are different. In the instant case a pedestrian lawfully crossing an intersection has the right of way over vehicular traffic. If both are there properly the pedestrian has the right of way--the vehicle must yield and the failure of its driver to do so is declared a misdemeanor.

The factual situation between the instant case and the Brighi case is different. In the Brighi case two vehicles collided at an intersection and a fatal accident resulted. In the instant case the evidence shows that a traffic-control system was installed and was operating. It showed the various lights to advise vehicles and pedestrians as to the time to proceed. The evidence shows Mr. Mullen was one of a jury group proceeding from an eating place to the court house. Mr. Mullen was ahead of the group and the evidence shows without dispute that when he started across the intersection he was facing the green traffic light. He was some distance into the intersection when defendant came from the north and made a left hand turn and in so doing Mr. Mullen was struck. Defendant claims that he did not hit Mr. Mullen but that the latter ran into the side of his car. As a witness he described the progress of the car. He said that he saw the jury group. He said, 'I didn't see Mr. Mullen until he walked into my car.' Mr. Mullen was thrown into the air and landed on the pavement. A number of the jurors just to the rear of Mr. Mullen testified that as he proceeded the light was green and one stated that the car struck Mr. Mullen and threw him up in the air. Mr. Mullen, being lawfully within the intersection was a pedestrian within the terms of Section 321.257 above quoted; he had the right of way and it was the duty of defendant in driving his car to have yielded such right. His failure to do so was a violation of said statute. Section 321.482 of said Chapter 321 (Motor Vehicles and Law of the Road) declares that it is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or to fail to perform any act required by any of the provisions of the chapter and that anyone convicted of a misdemeanor for violation of any of its provisions where no other penalty is provided shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100 and by imprisonment for not more than thirty days.

Taking the prohibition as set forth in section 321.257 in connection with the provisions of section 321.482, there can be no doubt that a violation of the former makes the offender subject to the penal provisions of the latter. The issue was passed upon by the jury and its verdict is controlling as to the facts. No such...