State v. Peltier
| Decision Date | 21 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 89502–3.,89502–3. |
| Citation | 332 P.3d 457 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Joseph A. PELTIER, Respondent. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Seth Aaron Fine, Attorney at Law, Prosecuting Attorney Snohomish, Snohomish Co Pros Ofc, Everett, WA, for Petitioner.
Thomas Michael Kummerow, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 This case is about whether a defendant can relinquish the rights conferred by the statute of limitations in a pretrial agreement. We hold that a defendant may expressly waive the criminal statute of limitations in a pretrial agreement when the statute of limitations on the underlying charge has not yet run at the time the defendant enters the agreement. We reverse.
¶ 2 The State charged Joseph A. Peltier on September 6, 2002 with two counts of second degree rape (as to B.M. and S.B.), one count of second degree child molestation (as to S.G.), and one count of second degree rape of a child (as to S.G.). The crimes occurred between 1993 and 2001. On July 14, 2003, to accommodate a negotiated settlement of his case, Peltier agreed to a stipulated trial on an amended information charging him with third degree rape (as to B.M. and J.D., a victim not referenced in the original information) and indecent liberties (as to S.B.). The charges as to S.G. were dismissed. On January 28, 2004, the trial judge found Peltier guilty and sentenced him. The statute of limitations on the four original charges had not yet run, but the statute of limitations for the charges he was convicted of had expired by January 1998, well before he was charged with and sentenced for them.
¶ 3 The agreement upon stipulation that was part of the stipulated trial agreement did not specifically mention the statute of limitations with regard to the charged crimes, but it did contain the following provisions:
If the defendant violates any other provision of this agreement, the State may either recommend a more severe sentence, file additional or greater charges, or re-file charges that were dismissed. The defendant waives any objection to the filing of additional or greater charges based on pre-charging or pre-trial delay, statutes of limitations, mandatory joinder requirements, or double jeopardy.
Clerk's Papers at 117 (emphasis added).
¶ 4 By August 30, 2008, the statute of limitations for all of the charges in the original information had expired. In 2011, toward the end of Peltier's sentence, the State filed a sexually violent predator (SVP) petition pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW. After a trial the SVP petition was granted. Peltier then filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) challenging the constitutionality of his original conviction. The State did not dispute this PRP, and the Court of Appeals, Division One, ruled that the original judgment and sentence for third degree rape and indecent liberties was invalid on its face since both charges in the amended information were filed beyond the statute of limitations. This PRP was granted, and the Court of Appeals ordered the charges to be vacated and dismissed.
¶ 5 On the same day these charges were dismissed, the State filed the second amended information charging Peltier with some of the more serious charges from the original information. The second amended information charges were rape in the second degree (as to S.B.), rape of a child in the second degree (as to S.G.), child molestation in the second degree (as to S.G.), and rape in the second degree (as to J.D.).1
¶ 6 Peltier moved to dismiss this second amended information since the statute of limitations had now run. The State argued that Peltier waived his right to object to the statute of limitations in the agreement upon stipulation, so the State had the right to refile the charges. The trial court, relying on case law describing the statute of limitations as jurisdictional, granted the motion to dismiss. The State appealed.
¶ 7 The Court of Appeals, Division One, held that a criminal statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, but rather determine the court's statutory authority to hear a case. State v. Peltier, 176 Wash.App. 732, 737, 309 P.3d 506 (2013). The Court of Appeals held that since the statute of limitations had run, the trial court no longer had the authority to sentence the defendant, and so it affirmed the trial court on these different grounds. Id. The State sought review, which we granted. State v. Peltier, 179 Wash.2d 1014, 318 P.3d 279 (2014).
¶ 8 How do we characterize a criminal statute of limitations, and can a criminal defendant waive the statute of limitations?
¶ 9 We review de novo a trial court's decision on a question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction and on questions of law. Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 150 Wash.2d 310, 314, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003); Robb v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash.2d 427, 433, 295 P.3d 212 (2013).
¶ 10 The question of whether a defendant can waive a criminal statute of limitations is a question of first impression for this court. Traditionally, whether a criminal statute of limitations can be waived depends on the characterization of these statutes. A guilty plea waives all defenses other than the failure of the information to charge an offense. In re Habeas Corpus of Garrison, 75 Wash.2d 98, 101, 449 P.2d 92 (1968). But, a guilty plea “ ‘does not preclude an appeal where collateral questions, such as the validity of the statute, the sufficiency of the information, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which the plea was made, are raised.’ ” State v. Phelps, 113 Wash.App. 347, 352, 57 P.3d 624 (2002) (quoting State ex rel. Fisher v. Bowman, 57 Wash.2d 535, 536, 358 P.2d 316 (1961)). If a statute of limitations is jurisdictional, it is not subject to waiver. One cannot consent to a court having or not having subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 11 Washington case law from the Court of Appeals specifically says that a criminal statute of limitations is jurisdictional. This holding first appears in State v. Glover, 25 Wash.App. 58, 61, 604 P.2d 1015 (1979). Relying on only out of state authority, the Glover court said, Id. (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz.App. 246, 248, 492 P.2d 742, 744 (1972)). Two years later in State v. Eppens, Division Two reaffirmed Glover, saying, 30 Wash.App. 119, 124, 633 P.2d 92 (1981) (citing Glover, 25 Wash.App. at 61, 604 P.2d 1015).
¶ 12 These phrases from Glover and Eppens have been repeated throughout subsequent cases. State v. Ansell, 36 Wash.App. 492, 496, 675 P.2d 614 (1984) (); State v. Fischer, 40 Wash.App. 506, 510, 699 P.2d 249 (1985) (); State v. Bryce, 41 Wash.App. 802, 807, 707 P.2d 694 (1985) (); State v. Novotny, 76 Wash.App. 343, 345 n. 1, 884 P.2d 1336 (1994) ; State v. N.S., 98 Wash.App. 910, 914–15, 991 P.2d 133 (2000) ( ; Phelps, 113 Wash.App. at 357, 57 P.3d 624; State v. Walker, 153 Wash.App. 701, 705, 224 P.3d 814 (2009) ().
¶ 13 But despite the use of the term, a criminal statute of limitations does not affect a court's subject matter jurisdiction. In In re Personal Restraint of Stoudmire, 141 Wash.2d 342, 353, 5 P.3d 1240 (2000), we emphasized the difference between a tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its lack of authority. There, a defendant pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent liberties and was sentenced. Id. at 347, 5 P.3d 1240. He then challenged his convictions in a PRP, taking issue with the fact that the statute of limitations had run on the offenses with which he was charged. In discussing whether the defendant was entitled to relief from his convictions, the court said:
A court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction solely because it may lack authority to enter a given order. Marley v. [Dep't] of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994). A court has subject matter jurisdiction where the court has the authority to adjudicate the type of controversy in the action, and it does not lose subject matter jurisdiction merely by interpreting the law erroneously. State...
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