State v. Pendleton
| Decision Date | 07 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. C6-95-2162,C6-95-2162 |
| Citation | 567 N.W.2d 265 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Akeem PENDLETON, petitioner, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Fear of death or great bodily harm is not an element of a "defense of dwelling" claim. Minn.Stat. § 609.065.
2. Jury instructions that required the jury to find that the defendant feared great bodily harm or death to justify his use of deadly force in preventing the commission of a felony in his place of abode were in error, and the error was not harmless.
Lawrence Pry, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, for Appellant.
Michael Richardson, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, for Respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
This case presents the issue of whether the standard jury instructions for "defense of dwelling," given in this case, improperly require that the defendant must have feared great bodily harm or death to justify his use of deadly force in defending his home.
Akeem Pendleton was charged with attempted second-degree murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.17 (1996), Minn.Stat. § 609.19(1) (1992) and first- and second-degree assault, Minn.Stat. §§ 609.221 and 609.222, subd. 2 (1996), in the December 10, 1994 shooting of Tony Caine. At trial, Pendleton claimed the shooting was in self defense, or in the alternative, in defense of his home. He requested that the standard jury instructions on self defense be modified to make clear that the fear of great bodily harm or death required for a self defense claim was not an element of a claim of "defense of dwelling." The trial court refused, and gave the standard jury instructions, which include the fear of great bodily harm or death element for both "defense of dwelling" and self defense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first- and second-degree assault charges and not guilty on the attempted second-degree murder charge.
Pendleton appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed, holding that the jury instructions accurately reflected "the current law of self defense in Minnesota." In addition, the court of appeals concluded that even if the instructions were in error, the inclusion of the fear of great bodily harm or death element for "defense of dwelling" did not have a significant impact on the verdict and therefore, did not require a new trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
In December 1994, the defendant Akeem Pendleton and his fiance Lorraine Wilson were living with Wilson's children in a duplex in Minneapolis. On December 10, a Saturday, at about 5:00 p.m., Wilson's cousin Tony Caine came to the apartment to visit. When Caine arrived, Pendleton let him in. Also present in the apartment were Doug Buckanaga, a friend of Pendleton's from work, and Buckanaga's girlfriend, Angela Bellanger. Pendleton, Buckanaga and Bellanger were socializing in the kitchen while Pendleton prepared a meal. Caine and Wilson were talking to each other at the dining room table.
Wilson testified that she had been having conflicts with her family over various issues, including her relationship with Pendleton and her family's expectation of financial and other support from her. Earlier on the day of the crime, she had asked Caine not to come to her home anymore. On the evening in question, she and Caine were arguing about these problems, as well as Wilson's complaints that Caine took money from her and used her telephone. She described their argument as becoming heated. She eventually got up from the table and went into the bathroom.
At that point, Caine went into the kitchen looking for Pendleton. According to Buckanaga's testimony, Caine made a comment to Pendleton about his needing to keep his fiance in line and shoved Pendleton. Caine then punched Pendleton in the face a couple of times causing Pendleton to bleed beneath his eye. Pendleton started to fight back, but Buckanaga interfered and pulled Pendleton away. At the time Caine started hitting him, Pendleton had a knife in his hand, which he had been using in his cooking. Buckanaga took this knife away and set it down. Pendleton then went into the bathroom to clean the blood off his face.
According to testimony at the trial, Pendleton came out of the bathroom and asked Caine to leave. By this time, they were both standing in the front room, as were Buckanaga and Wilson. Caine refused to leave the apartment and tried to hit Pendleton again. Pendleton jumped up and grabbed a shotgun out of the ceiling tiles. As Pendleton was taking the gun out of its case, he kept telling Caine to leave. Caine rushed at Pendleton, they struggled with the gun, and Pendleton shot Caine in the shoulder. The struggle continued until Pendleton wriggled free, ran, and drove away with Buckanaga and Bellanger in Buckanaga's truck.
Pendleton and his fiance Wilson both testified that when Caine lunged at Pendleton in the front room, Caine had a knife in his hand. Buckanaga, who was standing in the same room, testified that he never saw Caine with a knife, although he did say that immediately before Caine lunged at Pendleton, Caine was standing with his hand behind his back. The police did find a knife at the scene, but did not seize it, so it was never tested for fingerprints. In his testimony, Caine denied attacking Pendleton and claimed instead that Pendleton had started the fighting.
At trial, Pendleton argued that he acted in self defense because Caine lunged at him with a knife. In the alternative, he argued that he acted to prevent the commission of a felony, either second- or third-degree assault, in his home. 1
The following jury instructions were given on these defenses:
No crime is committed when a person attempts to take the life of another person, even intentionally if defendant's action is taken in resisting or preventing an offense which defendant reasonably believes exposes defendant or another to death or great bodily harm, if defendant's action is taken in preventing the commission of the felony of Assault in the Second Degree or Assault in the Third Degree in defendant's place of abode.
In order for a killing to be justified for these reasons three conditions must be met. First, defendant's action must have been done in the belief that it was necessary to avert death or great bodily harm. Second, the judgment of defendant as to the gravity of the peril to which he or another was exposed must have been reasonable under the circumstances. Third, defendant's election to defend must have been such as a reasonable person would have made in light of the danger perceived and the existence of any alternative way of avoiding the peril. All three conditions must be met, but the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.
These instructions follow the model jury instructions for self defense, causing death. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.05 (3d ed. 1990) ("CRIMJIG 7.05").
On appeal to this court, Pendleton again argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury instructions on "defense of dwelling" were "inaccurate and misleading." In general, the trial court has considerable latitude in the selection of the language of a jury charge. Alholm v. Wilt, 394 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn.1986). Nevertheless, a jury instruction must not materially misstate the law. See State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn.1980).
We must first establish the statutory elements of "defense of dwelling," in order to decide whether the jury instruction given in this case misstated the law. The use of force is statutorily authorized only in certain situations:
[R]easonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist:
* * * *
(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person; or
(4) when used by any person in lawful possession of real or personal property, or by another assisting the person in lawful possession, in resisting a trespass upon or other unlawful interference with such property * * *.
Minn.Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1 (1996). This provision is modified by another provision entitled "Justifiable Taking of Life."
The intentional taking of a life of another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's place of abode.
Taken together, these provisions establish that reasonable force may be used when a person reasonably believes that he or she is resisting an offense against a person or a trespass upon lawfully held property. This "reasonable force" includes deadly force only when the offense against a person involves great bodily harm or death or is used to prevent the commission of a felony in one's home.
Based on the language of the statute itself, it is clear that one does not have to fear great bodily harm or death to justify the use of deadly force to defend against the commission of a felony in one's home. The language of the statute requiring fear of great bodily harm or death is contained in the clause relating to self defense. In contrast, the "defense of dwelling" clause simply states that deadly force is justified in "preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's place of abode." Minn.Stat. § 609.065.
The legislative history of section 609.065 supports our reading of this provision. Prior to the 1963 revision of the criminal code, Minnesota statutes allowed for a defense of dwelling to resist a felony, without requiring any fear of bodily injury. The statute stated that homicide was justified when committed "[i]n the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a...
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