State v. Peraza
Decision Date | 13 December 2018 |
Docket Number | No. SC17-1978,SC17-1978 |
Citation | 259 So.3d 728 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Peter PERAZA, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Melanie Dale Surber, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner
Eric T. Schwartzreich and Anthony J. Bruno of Schwartzreich & Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Respondent
Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G. Gibbons of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 31
This case is before the Court for review of State v. Peraza , 226 So.3d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). In Peraza , the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified that its decision directly conflicts with State v. Caamano , 105 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2012), on the same question of law. The Fourth District also ruled upon and certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WHO WHILE MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST, USES DEADLY FORCE WHICH HE OR SHE REASONABLY BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMMINENT DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM TO HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR ANOTHER OR TO PREVENT THE IMMINENT COMMISSION OF A FORCIBLE FELONY, IS LIMITED TO INVOKING A DEFENSE UNDER SECTION 776.05(1), OR IS ALSO PERMITTED TO SEEK IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER SECTIONS 776.012(1) AND 776.032(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2013), MORE COMMONLY KNOWN AS FLORIDA'S "STAND YOUR GROUND" LAW.
Peraza , 226 So.3d at 948. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we resolve the certified conflict and answer the certified question by holding that law enforcement officers are eligible to assert Stand Your Ground immunity, as held by the Fourth District.
On the afternoon of July 31, 2013, Jermaine McBean purchased an air rifle from a pawn shop and proceeded to carry it uncovered as he walked back to his apartment complex. A concerned citizen called the police to report that McBean appeared distraught and was acting in an aggressive manner as he walked with a weapon, reported as a firearm. It would later be revealed that McBean suffered from mental health disorders and had been hospitalized a week earlier after experiencing a mental breakdown.
Deputy Peter Peraza of the Broward County Sheriff's Office responded to an emergency police dispatch alerting officers to McBean's demeanor while walking down a highly trafficked public street displaying what appeared to be a shotgun or rifle. Deputy Peraza and another deputy quickly arrived at McBean's location and, walking closely behind him, issued loud and repeated commands for McBean to stop. Ignoring the commands, McBean turned into a nearby apartment complex and continued walking toward the apartment's gated pool. McBean finally stopped alongside the pool area but kept holding the weapon while facing away from the officers. He then brought the rifle over his head, turned towards the deputies and pointed the weapon directly at them. When Deputy Peraza perceived that McBean was aiming the weapon at him, Peraza fired his gun three times and shot McBean twice, killing him. These are the facts as found by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing. Although one witness testified that McBean did not point the weapon at the deputies, the trial judge rejected this testimony and resolved all factual disputes consistently with Deputy Peraza's self-defense theory.
After being indicted for manslaughter with a firearm, Deputy Peraza moved to dismiss the indictment, citing immunity from prosecution under sections 776.012(1) and 776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2013), commonly known as Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law, and under section 776.05, Florida Statutes (2013). After the evidentiary hearing, the judge made the findings set forth above and granted Deputy Peraza's motion to dismiss based upon Stand Your Ground immunity.
The State appealed, arguing that law enforcement officers are not eligible to assert immunity pursuant to the Stand Your Ground law because they are already provided a defense pursuant to section 776.05, which involves the justifiable use of force when making a lawful arrest. The State's argument on appeal was consistent with the holding in Caamano , 105 So.3d at 22. Significantly, a defense pursuant to section 776.05 ( ) is not subject to pretrial determination when facts are in dispute, and may only be presented as a defense at trial, before a jury.
The Fourth District disagreed with Caamano and held that a police officer making a lawful arrest may claim Stand Your Ground immunity and thereby secure a pre-trial immunity determination, just like any other person acting in self-defense in Florida. Peraza , 226 So.3d at 947.1
The certified question presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co. , 921 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006). The starting point for any statutory construction issue is the language of the statute itself—and a determination of whether that language plainly and unambiguously answers the question presented. Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) () (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey , 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931). This Court is "without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams , 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968) ).
§ 776.032(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added).
Because these statutes plainly and unambiguously afford Stand Your Ground immunity to any "person" who acts in self-defense, there should be no reason for further analysis. See Holly , 450 So.2d at 219. Put simply, a law enforcement officer is a "person" whether on duty or off, and irrespective of whether the officer is making an arrest. Although neither of the two statutes defines the word "person," it must be given its "plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State , 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992). In common understanding, "person" refers to a "human being," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1993 ed.), which is not occupation-specific and plainly includes human beings serving as law enforcement officers.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Second District Court of Appeal reasoned:
Caamano , 105 So.3d at 20-21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Fourth District criticized the Caamano court's analysis, explaining:
The source of our disagreement with Caamano appears to arise from the following statement from that case: "105 So.3d at 20 (emphasis added). Respectfully, to suggest that the doctrine of in pari materia applies in every case is incorrect as a matter of law. As the circuit court correctly found in this case, because sections 776.012(1)'s and 776.032(1)'s plain language is clear and unambiguous, Caamano "need not have gone into the doctrine of in pari materia at all." See English v. State , 191 So.3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016) () (emphasis added).
Although we generally agree with the Fourth District's analysis, we also recognize that the Second District was attempting to harmonize arguably related statutes. As the ...
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