State v. Peters, 23457

• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: SCHWARTZMAN; LANSING, C.J., and PERRY
• Citation: 950 P.2d 1299,130 Idaho 960
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steven Neal PETERS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 23457,23457
• Decision Date: 24 December 1997

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950 P.2d 1299 130 Idaho 960 STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Steven Neal PETERS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 23457. Court of Appeals of Idaho. Dec. 24, 1997.

Sallaz Law Offices, Chtd., Boise, for appellant. Thomas R. Henry argued.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth M. Robins argued.

SCHWARTZMAN, Judge.

Steven Neal Peters appeals from the judgment of conviction entered following his conditional plea of guilty to the offenses of possession of methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of marijuana, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3). The sole issue raised on appeal challenges the district court's denial of Peters' motion to suppress. We affirm.

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I

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, Peters was on parole from an earlier felony conviction, and was under the supervision of the Idaho Department of Correction. Peters' direct supervisor was Officer Raul Morin. As a condition of his parole, Peters signed an agreement which provided:

Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services and s/he does waive constitutional right to be free from such searches.

Officer Morin received information from another parole officer that Peters had been in the Boise area and involved with drug users. Also, on March 12, 1996, Morin received the results of Peters' urinalysis, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Based on this information and his having recently observed someone whom he believed was under the influence of drugs during a probation home visit with Peters, Morin decided to conduct a search of Peters' residence on March 21st. Officer Morin delegated responsibility to a fellow probation officer, Jim Pishl, to search the house where Peters was currently residing. ¹ It is the search of this residence which is the subject of this appeal.

Officer Pishl enlisted members of the City County Narcotics Unit to aid him in the search. When the team approached the residence, Peters was outside, standing by a car. The officers entered the house and began to search. The narcotics unit's dog discovered methamphetamine and marijuana in some of Peters' personal belongings in the bedroom of Karen Grigg, who was the owner of the residence.

After Peters was charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of marijuana, he filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the evidence obtained in the search of the residence should be suppressed because "the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the search." An evidentiary hearing was held, whereupon the district court denied the motion. Peters subsequently entered conditional pleas of guilty to possession of methamphetamine and possession of marijuana, but reserved the right to appeal the district court's order denying Peters' motion to suppress.

II ANALYSIS

A. Standard Of Review

When evaluating the district court's denial of a motion to suppress, the proper standard of review is one of deference to the factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, while giving free review to the trial court's determination of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 130, 922 P.2d 426, 427 (Ct.App.1996); State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 603, 861 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Ct.App.1993). The determination of what is reasonable, in the search and seizure context, is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. McIntee, 124 Idaho 803, 804, 864 P.2d 641, 642 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658, 759 P.2d 947, 949 (Ct.App.1988).

B. Peters Has Standing To Contest The Search

Despite the fact that the district court implicitly found that Peters had standing to contest the search of Grigg's residence, the state argues that Peters has failed to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bedroom from which the probation officers seized the controlled substances.

In order to suppress the evidence that was seized, Peters has the threshold burden of demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed. State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 386, 707 P.2d 493, 497 (Ct.App.1985). We note initially that the

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Fourth Amendment protects people, and not places. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (declining to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, and thus holding that defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefit of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated). Therefore, because the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal protection,...