State v. Philbrick

• Decision Date: 27 October 1981
• Citation: 436 A.2d 844
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Leland B. PHILBRICK.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 844

436 A.2d 844

STATE of Maine v.Leland B. PHILBRICK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Jan. 20, 1981.

Decided Oct. 27, 1981.

Charles K. Leadbetter(orally), William R. Stokes, Wayne S. Moss, Asst. Attys.Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Smith & Elliott, P.A., Terrence D. Garmey(orally), Stephen R. Lamson, Karen B. Lovell, Peter W. Schroeter, Saco, Willard, Kellis & Wood, George F. Wood(orally), Sanford, for defendant.

Before WERNICK, ^*GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS and CARTER, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A.R.J.

DUFRESNE, Active Retired Justice.

Indicted September 8, 1977 on a single count of criminal homicide in the 2nd degree (17-A M.R.S.A. § 202(1)(A)(Supp.1976), ¹the defendant, Leland Philbrick, was originally tried for and adjudged guilty of that crime by a Superior Court jury in York County in January, 1978.On appeal his conviction was set aside for error of the presiding justice in refusing to give the jury Philbrick's requested instruction that the defendant would be justified in using deadly force to repel a forcible sexual contact, if he reasonably believed that such a contact was about to take place and reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to repel it.State v. Philbrick, Me., 402 A.2d 59, 61(1979);see17-AM.R.S.A. § 108(2)(A)(2).

Tried a second time on the reference indictment in October 1979 before another jury of the Superior Court, York County, Philbrick was again convicted of criminal homicide in the 2nd degree.From the ensuing judgment entered on this jury verdict, the defendant brings his present appeal.We sustain the appeal and vacate the judgment.

Miranda violations

Prior to trial, the defendant presented the court with a motion to suppress all statements that he made to the Saco police officers and to Officers Letarte and Greeley of the Main State Police, on the ground that all these statements were obtained as the result of custodial interrogation in violation of the principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694(1966).At the suppression hearing, the State produced the testimony of Officer Charles Labonte of the Saco Police Department and Detective Roger Letarte of the Main State Police.Although full development of the issue would have called for the testimony of Officers Dentico, Demarco and Greeley, the parties waived the same because of its stated repetitious character.We cannot approve such practice, especially in cases of such a serious nature as criminal homicides.At trial, however, counsel's objections to all five officers' testimony respecting Philbrick's particular statements to each of them were explicitly noted by the court, although overruled.In denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the court ruled in general terms that the initial contact between the police and the defendant Philbrick "involved the greater possibility that he(Philbrick) was a victim," that Miranda warnings were timely given and that the existing influences were not so coercive "as to interfere with the Miranda context."

A

The facts leading to the shooting of the deceased, Charles M. Porterfield, sufficiently appear in our previous opinion (State v Philbrick, supra); we need not repeat them at this point.The record shows that, after the incident, one David Fleming was driving toward the scene of the struggle on Smutty Lane Road in Saco, when he was flagged down by the defendant who told him that he thought he had "just killed somebody."On Fleming's suggestion, they set out for the Saco police station, Philbrick on the way blurting out the story of his encounter with Porterfield.At the station, upon observing the defendant covered with blood, with a knife in his left hand, and holding his injured right hand, Officer Labonte, who was in uniform, invited Philbrick to sit down and asked him what happened.The defendant answered:

"I got into a fight.The guy jumped me and took my knife away from me.I think I shot him."

At trial, counsel for the defendant objected to the admissibility of the rest of the conversation between Labonte and Philbrick, for the reason that no Miranda warnings were given by the officer to the defendant at any time, a fact conceded by the State.Over objection, the following colloquy went to the jury.

(Q.)How many times the gun went off?

(A.)Three or four times.I think I killed him.

(Q.)What kind of gun was involved?

(A.)A Charter Arms .44 Bulldog.

(Q.)Was it a rifle or pistol?

(A.)A pistol.

(Q.)How many people involved?

(A.)One.

(Q.)Describe him.

(A.)Five, six.Twenty-two years old and has brown hair.

Officer Labonte testified that Philbrick was not placed under arrest and the interview lasted no more than ten minutes.We find no error in the ruling below.

Miranda requires that, when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by law enforcement personnel in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the following procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.

"He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him."Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.

In the absence of such warnings and waiver when required, both exculpatory as well as inculpatory statements are inadmissible against the accused.As stated in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, statements meant to be exculpatory by the defendant might be used by the prosecution to impeach his testimony at trial or to discredit statements given under interrogation and thus could help prove guilt by implication.

Miranda warnings are mandated only where a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation as these terms are understood under the Miranda doctrine.State v. Cochran, Me., 425 A.2d 999, 1001(1981);State v. Preston, Me., 411 A.2d 402, 405(1980).SeeState v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1357 n.5.In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 306-307(1980), interrogation in the sense of Miranda was extended to include, besides express questioning by the police, any equivalent indirect questioning or suggesting which the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response by the suspect.

Volunteered statements of any kind, on the other hand, are not within the Miranda rule.Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.And we must distinguish between statements obtained as part of a "general investigation" and those secured in "custodial interrogation."The facts of each particular case must be closely examined to determine whether the line between the two has been crossed.State v. Thurlow, Me., 434 A.2d 1(1981);State v. Preston, Me., 411 A.2d 402, 406(1980);State v. Price, Me., 406 A.2d 883, 885(1979).

There was nothing improper in Officer Labonte's inquiry of the defendant-what happened?Such a neutral and impersonal request for information at that initial stage qualified as a general on-the-scene questioning which police officers have a duty to carry on in their conventional investigation of criminal incidents or activities.At the time, Officer Labonte knew nothing about the circumstances under which Philbrick had received his injury, let alone that a possible crime had been committed by him.A noncustodial interrogation setting is not converted into a custodial interrogation situation merely because the questioning took place in a coercive environment such as in a police station or by a police officer.Psychological pressure emanating from an officer's authority or from the police station atmosphere alone is not sufficient under Miranda to create the "inherently coercive" environment triggering the application of the warning alert which the Miranda case has established as necessary for the protection of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.State v. Craney, Me., 381 A.2d 630, 632(1978);State v. Lewis, Me., 373 A.2d 603, 608(1977).

The follow-up questions by Officer Labonte for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguous situation did not constitute the critical police interrogation which Miranda contemplates.Questions asked in the wake of an event or occurrence which would naturally invite such an inquiry and which are characterized, as in the instant case, by brevity, neutrality and absence of an intent to elicit a confession or admission do not rise to the level of interrogation in the Miranda sense.State v. Simoneau, Me., 402 A.2d 870, 873-74(1979).

B

With Officer Labonte's information, the Saco police then knew that deadly force had been used in an encounter in which Philbrick and another person had been involved.Philbrick's statement that the gun went off three or four times and that he thought he had killed his alleged assailant suggested in the least that excessive force may have been used and that the defendant may have committed a serious crime.No question of identity remained.Thus, when Officer Dentico of the Saco Police Department questioned the defendant in the ambulance while on the way to the Webber Hospital in Biddeford, the interrogation took a different aspect.Its effect was to elicit the particulars of the commission of a crime by the...