State v. Preston

• Decision Date: 21 February 1980
• Citation: 411 A.2d 402
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Dale PRESTON and Wallace Preston.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 402

411 A.2d 402

STATE of Maine v. Dale PRESTON and Wallace Preston.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 21, 1980.

Michael Povich, Dist. Atty., Sandra Hylander Collier (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael D. Seitzinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Francis J. Hallissey, Machias (orally), for Dale A.

John A. Mitchell, Calais (orally), for Wallace J.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., POMEROY, WERNICK, GODFREY, NICHOLS and GLASSMAN, JJ.

GODFREY, Justice.

The defendants, Dale and Wallace Preston, were jointly indicted for burglary, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401 (Supp.1979) and theft, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (Supp.1979). The Superior Court, Washington County, granted in part their pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence. The State appeals pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A (Supp.1965-78) and Rule 37A(d), M.R.Crim.P., contending that certain admissions to the police made by the defendants are not excludable despite the fact that the police did not give Miranda warnings. Even if Miranda warnings were required, the State urges that certain real evidence is still admissible. We deny the State's appeal.

Mr. and Mrs. Robert Kilton were caretakers for property owned by Charles Martin, located in Roque Bluffs. On the morning of September 10, 1978, Mr. Kilton discovered that the garage had been broken into during the night and that a Franklin-type stove and two army-surplus khaki mattresses were missing. Mrs. Kilton notified the police. Suspecting that defendant Dale Preston had committed the crime, she decided to do her own investigation. She went to Dale's trailer, found no one at home, and proceeded to search the premises. In a rear room she found a Franklin stove which looked like the one belonging to Martin. She reported her findings to Corporal David Burns of the state police, who incorporated them in an affidavit and request for a search warrant.

A warrant was issued on September 13, 1978. At 6:00 p. m. on that day, Corporal Burns, Game Warden Robert Carter, and two other law enforcement officers went to Dale Preston's trailer to execute the search warrant. On arrival, they found no one at home. Corporal Burns knew that Wallace Preston lived in a cabin about a hundred yards away from Dale's trailer; so, according to Burns, he and Warden Carter went to Wallace's cabin to find someone who could let them into the trailer. While he was waiting at the door, Burns said, he saw inside through some window "either in the door or right there beside the door" one khaki-colored mattress in a rear room. Burns testified that when he saw the mattress, he thought it was probably one of the two the police were looking for. Since no one answered at the cabin, Burns and the other officers returned to Dale's trailer.

A damaged lock made it easy to open the trailer door. The officers entered the trailer, where Burns found the stove in a back room. Warden Carter, having noticed what he thought was a deer roast on the table, looked in the refrigerator and discovered what he thought was deer meat. The officers seized the stove and took it to the county jail.

About an hour later, Corporal Burns and Warden Carter returned to the Preston trailer. On their arrival, Dale ran from the trailer into some nearby woods. The officers met three persons, including Wallace, outside the door of the trailer. Burns identified himself to Wallace as a police officer, told him about the seizure of the stove earlier, and informed him about seeing the mattress in his house.

Burns invited Wallace into his police cruiser, which was unmarked but "distinguishable as a police car". The two sat in the front seat. Warden Carter was in the rear seat. At no time during the conversation were Miranda warnings given. Burns testified he told Wallace that "he was talking to me of his own volition, that he could leave any time he wanted to. I didn't have any plans of making any arrest." According to Burns's testimony, Wallace admitted in the police car that he and Dale had stolen the stove and mattresses from the Martin garage, and that they had taken the mattresses to Wallace's cabin and the stove to Dale's trailer. Wallace then went over to his cabin and brought the mattresses to Corporal Burns, who put them in the police car and took them to the county jail.

About the time the conversation with Wallace ended, Dale returned from the woods. Burns told Dale he would like to talk to him a few minutes, that he had no intention of arresting him at that time, and that if he chose not to talk, he did not have to. Burns, Carter, and Dale got into the cruiser, where Burns told Dale about finding the stove and the mattresses. Dale then admitted the crime. Again no Miranda warning was given.

After the defendants were later arrested and indicted, they moved to suppress all the evidence seized on September 13 from their premises and any admissions made by the defendants. The court responded to the State's motion for specific rulings of law by stating that a warrant to search for a stove did not permit a search of the refrigerator, with the result that the deer meat had been illegally seized. ¹ The court held also that Burns' interrogation of each defendant had been custodial. Therefore, because of the lack of Miranda warnings, "the subsequent admissions and delivery of the mattresses were the product of improper interrogation." The stove had been seized pursuant to the warrant and was therefore held admissible.

After obtaining the requisite approval of the Attorney General, the State appealed. The defendants have not cross-appealed.

I.

The State challenges the exclusion of the admissions made by the defendants to the police. Miranda warnings were not given to either defendant before the admissions were elicited. Those warnings must be given to a defendant whenever he is subjected to custodial interrogation. In the absence of such warnings, any statement made by the defendant during custodial interrogation is inadmissible against him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

The presiding justice found, contrary to the State's contention, that the conduct of the police officers amounted to custodial interrogation. In reviewing the presiding justice's finding that Miranda warnings were required, the Law Court must examine the evidence with due regard for his opportunity to appraise the credibility of the testimony. State v. Craney, Me., 381 A.2d 630, 631 (1978).

Custodial interrogation occurs whenever a person is questioned by law enforcement officials while he is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. The State does not contend that interrogation did not take place. The only issue is whether defendants were in custody within the meaning of Miranda. The facts and circumstances of each case must be analyzed to determine if police conduct amounts to a significant deprivation of freedom. State v. Inman, Me., 350 A.2d 582, 597-98 (1976). Compare Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) With Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). See generally, J. Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation? 25 S.Car.L.Rev. 699 (1974).

It is clear that by the time the police interrogated the defendants, the attention of the police had focused on both of them as suspects. That questioning has begun to focus on the interrogated person as a suspect is one circumstance to be weighed in determining whether an interrogation is custodial. Miranda v. Arizona, supra 384 U.S. at 490, 86 S.Ct. at 1636; United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1969). "The more cause for believing the suspect committed the crime, the greater the tendency to bear down in interrogation and to create the kind of atmosphere of significant restraint that triggers Miranda . . . ." United States v. Hall, supra at 545 (2d Cir. 1969). See Y. Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Criminal Law and the Constitution 335 (1968).

The State argues that the fact that investigation had focused on the defendants was outweighed by the fact that the questioning took place in familiar surroundings, in the presence of a relative, and at a reasonable hour. However, the police diminished the possible effect of those factors by conducting the questioning of each defendant alone in an official police car. Certainly they increased the coercive nature of the interrogation by conducting it in the police car instead of inside the trailer or outdoors where they initially encountered the defendants.

Also significant, according to the State, is the fact that no arrest was made or any physical restraint imposed. In addition, Officer Burns informed each defendant that he was free to leave and did not have to talk. However, immediately after saying so, Burns also informed each defendant that the police knew the defendants were in possession of stolen goods. By suggesting to defendants that the police had cause to arrest them even though they were not going to do so at that time, Burns increased the potential for creating the coercive atmosphere which triggers the requirement of the Miranda warnings. In view of all the circumstances, the presiding justice could have concluded reasonably that Burns's statement to each defendant that he was free to go presented an unrealistic alternative. Moreover, the justice was in a position from hearing the testimony of Burns and Carter to ascertain the tone and technique employed in the questioning of defendants.

In all the circumstances, there was sufficient support for the presiding justice's finding that the line between general investigatory questioning and custodial interrogation was crossed in this case and that Miranda warnings were therefore required. He did not abuse his discretion in ordering suppression of the statements that defendants gave Corporal...