State v. Pickell
| Docket Number | SCWC-21-0000530 |
| Decision Date | 26 December 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL PICKELL, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
1
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL PICKELL, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
No. SCWC-21-0000530
Supreme Court of Hawaii
December 26, 2023
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-21-0000530; CASE NO. 2DTA-21-00138)
Jacqueline R. Dyer and William H. Jameson, Jr., with her on the briefs, for petitioner
Renee Ishikawa Delizo for respondent
RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ., and CIRCUIT JUDGE TOʻOTOʻO AND CIRCUIT JUDGE ASHFORD, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCIES
OPINION
McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
We address whether reasonable suspicion existed for a Maui County police officer to stop a driver who executed a U-turn at
a highway intersection lacking signage expressly prohibiting such turns. Instead, the intersection had left turn only markings and signage. We hold reasonable suspicion existed.
Maui Police Department Officer Rahul Mehra ("Officer Mehra") stopped Michael Pickell ("Pickell") for making a U-turn at the intersection. Pickell appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Based on indicia of alcohol consumption, field sobriety and breath alcohol tests were performed. The State of Hawai'i ("the State") then charged Pickell with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant ("OVUII") in the District Court of the Second Circuit ("district court").
Pickell filed a motion to suppress arguing Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 291C-82(c) (2020)[1] requires an express sign
prohibiting U-turns to make such turns illegal. He maintained that, therefore, Officer Mehra lacked reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop, requiring suppression of the OVUII evidence. The district court[2] denied the motion. Pickell then entered a conditional no contest plea that allowed him to file this appeal.
We hold reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop. Officer Mehra witnessed Pickell execute a U-turn despite the left turn only markings and signage. Contrary to Pickell's implicit assertion, HRS § 291C-82(c) does not preempt the Maui County ordinance requiring drivers to adhere to directional markings and signage. We therefore affirm Pickell's OVUII conviction.
II. Background
A. District court proceedings
On February 22, 2021, the State charged Pickell with OVUII in violation of HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and/or 291E-61(a)(3) (2020). Pickell filed a motion to suppress all evidence relating to the alleged OVUII, contending Officer Mehra's traffic stop was an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Pickell pointed out that the prosecution must show that a warrantless traffic stop falls within one of the narrowly-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Prendergast, 103 Hawai'i 451, 454, 83 P.3d 714, 717 (2004). The State responded that Officer Mehra had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and then had probable cause to arrest Pickell for OVUII.
At the hearing on Pickell's motion to suppress, Officer Mehra, the only witness, testified as follows.
Officer Mehra was on assignment as an OVUII enforcement officer at approximately 7:20 p.m. on January 26, 2021. He observed Pickell in the left-turn-only lane with his left-turn signal on at the intersection of Pi'ilani Highway and Ohukai Road. When Pickell's light turned green, he made a U-turn instead of turning left.
Painted on the ground in Pickell's lane was a left-turn-only sign and a left directional arrow. There was also left-turn-only signage on the overhanging light directly in front of him. When Pickell made the U-turn, he drove across double solid yellow lines and a skipped-dash white line.
Officer Mehra then initiated a traffic stop. Pickell initially said he was going home but later said he was going to Safeway. He also said he thought the U-turn was legal and that
he was from California and did not know if the U-turn was legal in Hawai'i.
There were many locations on Pi'ilani Highway with signs prohibiting U-turns from the left lane, and there was no such sign where Pickell made the U-turn. But the Maui County Code requires drivers to abide by lane markings and traffic signage.
The district court denied Pickell's motion to suppress, ruling that Pickell made an illegal U-turn. Therefore, Officer Mehra's observation of the illegal U-turn gave him reasonable suspicion to stop Pickell's vehicle. The district court also denied Pickell's motion for reconsideration.
Pickell then entered a conditional no contest plea, reserving a right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and his OVUII conviction.
B. ICA proceedings
On appeal to the ICA, Pickell contended the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because Officer Mehra's traffic stop was based on a legal U-turn. The State argued Pickell's U-turn was illegal because he did not follow the traffic control signs and lane markings.
In a summary disposition order, the ICA affirmed the district court. State v. Pickell, No. CAAP-21-0000530, 2023 WL 1178774 (Haw. App. Jan. 31, 2023) (SDO). The ICA determined that even though there was no sign prohibiting U-turns, Pickell
was required to make a left turn based on the lane markings and overhead signage. Id. at 3-4. The ICA cited HRS § 291C-31(a) (2020) and Maui County Code ("MCC") § 10.24.100(E) (1965). Id. at 3. The ICA therefore held that reasonable suspicion existed and affirmed Pickell's OVUII conviction. Id. at 4 (citing State v. Estabillo, 121 Hawai'i 261, 270, 218 P.3d 749, 758 (2009)).
C. Certiorari proceedings
On certiorari, Pickell asserts the ICA gravely erred when it held the district court properly denied his motion to suppress because Officer Mehra's warrantless traffic stop was based on a U-turn not expressly prohibited by a sign as pursuant to HRS § 291C-82(c).
III. Standards of Review
A. Motion to suppress
This court reviews
a ruling on a motion to suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was 'right' or 'wrong.' Factual determinations made by the trial court deciding pretrial motions in a criminal case are governed by the clearly erroneous standard, and conclusions of law are reviewed under the right/wrong standard.
State v. Scalera, 139 Hawai'i 453, 459, 393 P.3d 1005, 1011 (2017) (cleaned up).
B. Statutory interpretation
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Milne, 149 Hawai'i 329, 333, 489 P.3d 433, 437 (2021). When reviewing questions of statutory
interpretation, this court is guided by the following principles:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory-interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Second, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.
Id. (citation omitted).
IV. Discussion
We hold Officer Mehra's traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion and that Pickell's suppression motion was therefore properly denied.
A. MCC § 10.24.100(E) is not preempted by HRS § 291C-82(c)
Pickell argues his U-turn was legal because there was no sign expressly prohibiting him from making a U-turn at the intersection as purportedly required by HRS § 291C-82(c).[3] The State argues Pickell's U-turn violated MCC § 10.24.100(E), which provides, "In all cases where official marks, buttons, signs or directional arrows painted on the pavement are placed within or adjacent to intersections, no operator of a vehicle shall execute a movement at such intersections, otherwise than as directed and required by such marks, buttons, signs, or arrows."
In essence, Pickell argues HRS 291C-82(c) preempts the Maui County ordinance. We therefore address preemption.
1. The preemption test
As we stated in Ruggles v. Yagong, 135 Hawai'i 411, 353 P.3d 953 (2015):
A county's power to promulgate ordinances is governed by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Hawai'i, which states, "The legislature shall create counties, and may create other political subdivisions within the State, and provide for the government thereof. Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general laws." (Emphasis added.) Thus, pursuant to the Hawai'i Constitution, a county's powers are limited to those conferred by the legislature under general laws. The legislature has outlined the "General powers and limitations of the counties" in HRS § 46-1.5 (2012). HRS § 46-1.5(13) [2018] provides
Each county shall have the power to enact ordinances deemed necessary to protect health, life, and property, and to preserve the order and security of the county and its inhabitants on any subject or matter not inconsistent with, or tending to defeat, the intent of any state statute where the statute does not disclose an express or implied intent that the statute shall be exclusive or uniform throughout the State[.]
Ruggles, 135 Hawai'i at 422, 353 P.3d at 964.
HRS § 46-1.5(13) was intended to mandate "the preemption of any ordinance that either conflicted with the intent of a state statute or legislated in an area already staked out by the legislature for exclusive and statewide statutory treatment." Richardson v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 868 P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994).
A municipal ordinance may be preempted by state law "if (1) it covers the same subject matter embraced...
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