State v. Pitt

Decision Date01 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. 99, September Term, 2003.,99, September Term, 2003.
Citation390 Md. 697,891 A.2d 312
PartiesSTATE of Maryland v. Charles Lee PITT.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Kathryn Grill Graeff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for petitioner.

Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, GREENE, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (retired, specially assigned), JJ.

BELL, C.J.

The plea agreement plays a crucial role in the administration of both this State's and the nation's criminal justice system. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 692-693, 357 A.2d 376 (1976). Indeed, courts have stated that plea agreements "eliminate many of the risks, uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law enforcement by permitting the State to exchange leniency for information and assistance." Id. at 693, 357 A.2d at 381. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1471, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 758 (1970), People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784 (N.Y. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975). Therefore, this Court has held that "plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid in the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged." Id. at 693, 357 A.2d 376, 357 A.2d at 381. Plea agreements account for the disposition of an overwhelming percentage of all criminal cases. See J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas §§ 1.02, 1.03, 1.07(2) (1975), A. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L.Rev. 931 (Summer 1983) (commenting that in some jurisdictions where plea bargaining has been prohibited, guilty pleas still account for a high percentage of felony convictions), S. Creaton, Plea Agreements: Progressing the Fight Against Crime or Bribing Witnesses?, 5 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 37 (2000) (stating that plea bargains continue to increase in usage, accounting for an overwhelming percentage of guilty pleas in criminal cases), B. Kleinhaus, Two Masters: Evaluating Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, The Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 Fordham L.Rev. 2711 (May 2005) (stating that ninety-six percent of all federal criminal convictions result from a plea agreement by the defendant); see also State v. Rodriguez, 125 Md.App. 428, 446, 725 A.2d 635, 644 (1999). Plea bargains aid the system because the number of cases that go to trial are reduced, thus, preventing the courts from becoming flooded and overcrowded. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432 (1971) ("If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities").

In Maryland, Md. Rule 4-243 prescribes the procedures to be followed and the conditions to be observed regarding plea agreements. Section (a) of that Rule, as relevant, provides:

"(a) Conditions for Agreement.

"(1) Terms. The defendant may enter into an agreement with the State's Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any proper condition, including one or more of the following:

"(A) That the State's Attorney will amend the charging document to charge a specified offense or add a specified offense, or will file a new charging document;

"(B) That the State's Attorney will enter a nolle prosequi pursuant to Rule 4-247(a) or move to mark certain charges against the defendant stet on the docket pursuant to Rule 4-248(a);

"(C) That the State's Attorney will agree to the entry of a judgment of acquittal on certain charges pending against the defendant;

"(D) That the State will not charge the defendant with the commission of certain other offenses;

"(E) That the State's Attorney will recommend, not oppose, or make no comment to the court with respect to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action;

"(F) That the parties will submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule."

Section (c) addresses the effect of a plea agreement and, in some circumstances, its disposition. It provides:

"(c) Agreements of Sentence, Disposition, or Other Judicial Action.

"(1) Presentation to the Court. If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense counsel and the State's Attorney shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs.

"(2) Not Binding on the Court. The agreement of the State's Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to whom the agreement is presented approves it.

"(3) Approval of Plea Agreement. If the plea agreement is approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement.

"(4) Rejection of Plea Agreement. If the plea agreement is rejected, the judge shall inform the parties of this fact and advise the defendant (A) that the court is not bound by the plea agreement; (B) that the defendant may withdraw the plea; and (C) that if the defendant persists in the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the sentence or other disposition of the action may be less favorable than the plea agreement. If the defendant persists in the plea, the court may accept the plea of guilty only pursuant to Rule 4-242(c) and the plea of nolo contendere only pursuant to Rule 4-242(d).

"(5) Withdrawal of Plea. If the defendant withdraws the plea and pleads not guilty, then upon the objection of the defendant or the State made at that time, the judge to whom the agreement was presented may not preside at a subsequent court trial of the defendant on any charges involved in the rejected plea agreement."

It is well settled in Maryland that "plea agreements are at times entitled to judicial enforcement." Brockman, 277 Md. at 694, 357 A.2d at 381. See Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 488, 845 A.2d 1215, 1222 (2004) (holding that where the defendant has not received the benefit of a plea bargain to which he is entitled, the defendant ordinarily may elect to have the bargain specifically enforced or withdraw the guilty plea), Jackson v. State, 120 Md.App. 113, 133, 706 A.2d 156, 166 (1998) (holding that enforcing pleas maintains the interest of the courts in sustaining the credibility of the plea bargaining process and the indispensable role that it plays in the management of an otherwise overwhelming caseload). In fact, our cases, and those of the Court of Special Appeals, make clear that we adhere to, and apply the teachings of, Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433, that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." See, e.g., Miller v. State, 272 Md 249, 253-255, 322 A.2d 527 (1974) (holding that when a defendant's guilty plea rests in part on the prosecution's promise not to make any recommendation as to sentencing or disposition, and the State violates its promise, the accused has a remedy, he or she may elect to have the guilty plea vacated or allow it to stand and have the agreement enforced at re-sentencing), State v. Bittinger, 314 Md. 96, 101-102, 549 A.2d 10, 12 (1988) (holding that a defendant successful in challenging the plea must realize that the remedy is ordinarily to place the parties in their original position).

The enforceability of the agreement is not the matter at issue in this case; it presents a question involving the admissibility of statements made by the accused during his plea negotiations. Such statements generally are inadmissible. Md. Rule 5-410;1 Fed.R.Evid. 410;2 see e.g., Elmer v. State, 353 Md. 1, 724 A.2d 625 (1999) (discussing the application of Md. Rule 5-410), see also United States v. Sockwell, 699 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 461 U.S. 936, 103 S.Ct. 2106, 77 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). There are exceptions however, one of which this Court has recognized.

In Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), where the plea agreement, which the defendant breached, provided that the defendant's inculpatory statements would be used against him in such an event and the government neither rescinded nor breached the agreement, we held those statements were admissible against the defendant. Id. at 580, 515 A.2d at 1171. On the other hand, in Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 522 A.2d 917 (1987), where the State repudiated the plea agreement, despite recognizing that the State's "repudiation of the plea agreement.... was not improper," id. at 71, 522 A.2d at 923, given the defendant's failure to pass a polygraph examination, which the trial court concluded was a part of the agreement, id. at 70-71, 522 A.2d at 923, the Court reached the opposite conclusion; we held that the inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a grand jury pursuant to the plea agreement were inadmissible at trial. Id. at 82, 522 A.2d at 928. The Allgood plea agreement did not contain the provision that...

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    ...qualified to testify about the value of his goods, Pitt v. State, 152 Md. App. 442, 465, 832 A.2d 267 (2003), aff'd, State v. Pitt, 390 Md. 697, 891 A,2d 312 (2006). See also Coffin v. State, 230 Md. 139, 142, 186 A.2d 216 (1962). Reisman's representation to the officers that the camera's v......
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    ...rendered Petitioner's statements inadmissible per se.7 I find support for this decision in the factually similar case of State v. Pitt, 390 Md. 697, 891 A.2d 312 (2006), wherein the Court of Appeals of Maryland analyzed “the proper balance when the defendant breaches the plea agreement and ......
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