State v. Powell, 6921SC416
Decision Date | 27 August 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 6921SC416,6921SC416 |
Citation | 6 N.C.App. 8,169 S.E.2d 210 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Charlie Wade POWELL. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., by Richard N. League, Raleigh, Staff Attorney, for the State.
H. Glenn Davis, Winston-Salem, for defendant.
Defendant assigns as error that the judgment of the court imposed cruel and unusual punishment upon defendant. G.S. § 14--87, under which defendant was charged and convicted, provides for a sentence of up to thirty years. The sentence imposed upon defendant is well within this limit. Since the year 1838 the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held in an unbroken line of decisions that punishment not exceeding the statutory limit cannot be considered cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense. State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367; State v. Farrington, 141 N.C. 844, 53 S.E. 954; State v. Dowdy, 145 N.C. 432, 58 S.E. 1002; State v. Daniels, 197 N.C. 285, 148 S.E. 244; State v. Smith, 238 N.C. 82, 76 S.E.2d 363; State v. Lee, 247 N.C. 230, 100 S.E.2d 372; State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39; State v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 150 S.E.2d 216; State v. LePard, 270 N.C. 157, 153 S.E.2d 875; State v. Robinson, 271 N.C. 448, 156 S.E.2d 854; State v. Lovelace, 271 N.C. 593, 157 S.E.2d 81; State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E.2d 386; State v. Foster, 271 N.C. 727, 157 S.E.2d 542; State v. Pardon, 272 N.C. 72, 157 S.E.2d 698; State v. Wright, 272 N.C. 264, 158 S.E.2d 50; State v. Bethea, 272 N.C. 521, 158 S.E.2d 591; State v. McCall, 273 N.C. 135, 159 S.E.2d 316; State v. Weston, 273 N.C. 275, 159 S.E.2d 883.
Also, since this Court entered into its first session it has invariably adhered to the same principle. State v. Burgess, 1 N.C.App. 142, 160 S.E.2d 105; State v. Chapman, 1 N.C.App. 622, 162 S.E.2d 142; State v. Abernathy, 1 N.C.App. 625, 162 S.E.2d 114; State v. Morris, 2 N.C.App. 611, 163 S.E.2d 539; State v. Mosteller, 3 N.C.App. 67, 164 S.E.2d 27; State v. Jones, 3 N.C.App. 69, 163 S.E.2d 910; State v. Mitchell, 3 N.C.App. 70, 164 S.E.2d 62; State v. Kelly, 3 N.C.App. 72, 164 S.E.2d 22; State v. McKinney, 4 N.C.App. 107, 165 S.E.2d 689; State v. Reed, 4 N.C.App. 107, 109, 165 S.E.2d 674; State v. Stewart, 4 N.C.App. 249, 166 S.E.2d 458; State v. Kotofsky, 4 N.C.App. 302, 166 S.E.2d 484; State v. Cleaves, 4 N.C.App. 506, 166 S.E.2d 861; State v. Perryman, 4 N.C.App. 684, 167 S.E.2d 517. The reasons for this principle are clear and sound. The trial judge is in position to observe the conduct and attitude of the defendant; he can observe defendant's prior record; he can cause investigations into defendant's past and present circumstances. In these and other ways the trial judge is in the best position to determine appropriate punishment for the protection of society and rehabilitation of the defendant. Of necessity the trial judge must be allowed to exercise wide discretion within the statutory limits. To this principle of law we apply the rule of Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next assigns as error that the trial judge overruled his motions for nonsuit. Defendant asserts that there can be no attempt to commit robbery in the absence of an overt act in part execution of the intent to commit the crime. This principle of law is sound and enjoys wide acceptance by the courts of this country. The problem generally facing the courts is whether there is evidence of an overt act sufficient to submit the case to the jury. Concerning this, the rule is well-established in this state that '(i)f there is any evidence tending to prove the fact of guilt or which reasonably conduces to this conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not such as merely raises a suspicion or conjecture of guilt, it is for the jury to say whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the fact of guilt.' 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, § 106, p. 654. Annot., 55 A.L.R. 714.
In this case the State's evidence tends to show that the defendant undertook to disguise himself by the use of a woman's wig, lipstick and pocketbook; and by wearing dark glasses and gloves. The evidence tends to show that he also armed himself with a .38 caliber automatic pistol, fully loaded and ready for use. He went into the A.B.C. Store three to four minutes before closing time and delayed his purchase by looking over duplicate price lists and ordering the three bottles of whiskey one at a time, and the clear inference from this delaying conduct is that he was waiting for all customers to leave the store and for the door to be locked. Then, when he was told the amount of the three purchases, he reached into the pocketbook and pulled out the pistol.
The fact that he had no money, coupled with his actions is clearly sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that he Intended to commit the offense of armed robbery. The only question remaining is whether there was sufficient evidence of an Overt act to justify submission of the case to the jury.
Defendant argues that because he never pointed the pistol at anyone, never demanded that the employees do anything, and never demanded or tried to take money or property, his conduct at most was merely preparatory and does not constitute an overt act towards the commission of the crime.
Defendant's actions all but completed the crime of armed robbery itself. It was only the alert and overpowering action of the employee, Mr. Simo, in grabbing defendant's wrist and holding it, and consequently the pistol, pinned against the counter, that prevented the actual consummation of the offense of armed robbery. Only a second beyond this point, defendant would have had the employees at his mercy. It would be a travesty upon justice to permit defendant to escape punishment for his carefully planned robbery, which was only frustrated by the surprise action of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Stamey, No. COA04-1031 (NC 6/7/2005)
...position to determine appropriate punishment for the protection of society and rehabilitation of the defendant." State v. Powell, 6 N.C. App. 8, 11, 169 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1969). Accordingly, "the trial judge must be allowed to exercise wide discretion within the statutory limits." Id. "Withi......
-
State v. Everett, No. COA05-912 (N.C. App. 8/15/2006)
...of shooting and robbing [the victim], he could no longer abandon the crime of attempted armed robbery."), and State v. Powell, 6 N.C. App. 8, 13, 169 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1969) ("The act of reaching into the pocketbook, and pulling out the pistol was sufficient evidence of an overt act which we......
-
State v. Neal
...not exceed the limit fixed by statute, it cannot be considered cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense. Accord State v. Powell, 6 N.C.App. 8, 169 S.E.2d 210 (1969); State v. Atkinson, 278 N.C. 168, 179 S.E.2d 410 We have reviewed all of defendants' assignments of error, and in our opini......
-
State v. Harris
...store, hitting the car with several of the shots. After the stabbing, Ewing was hospitalized for three days. In State v. Powell, 6 N.C.App. 8, 12, 169 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1969), we find the following quoted from an Annotation in 55 A.L.R. 'In determining whether a person has been guilty of the......