State v. Pryor
Decision Date | 05 October 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 826SC18,826SC18 |
Citation | 295 S.E.2d 610,59 N.C.App. 1 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Luther PRYOR, Jr. |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Associate Atty. Gen., David Ray Blackwell, Raleigh, for the State.
Appellate Defender Adam Stein by Asst. Appellate Defender Lorinzo L. Joyner, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.
During the early evening hours of 6 February, 1978, Terry Brown, operator of the Gates Service Station in Scotland Neck, and Curtis Washington, an employee, were robbed at gun point by Cecil Dickens and Richard Dickens. Cecil and Richard Dickens pled guilty to robbery with a firearm and testified on behalf of the State. The defendant, Luther Pryor, Jr., pled not guilty to the charge of robbery with a firearm. The State proceeded against the defendant on the theory that he aided and abetted Cecil and Richard Dickens, the actual perpetrators of the robbery. Both Cecil and Richard Dickens appeared as witnesses for the State pursuant to a plea agreement.
At trial, the State offered evidence tending to show that Curtis Washington, the Gates Service Station employee, planned the robbery and supplied the gun that was used. Cecil Dickens testified that on a Sunday evening previous to the robbery, he, Richard Dickens, defendant, and Curtis Washington were together at his aunt's house. Cecil Dickens stated that on this evening when plans for the robbery were made, defendant was "inside of the house" when Washington gave him the gun on the outside, and that when Washington talked to Cecil about it first, "he (defendant) was there, but I don't think he heard that."
Terry Brown, the service station operator, testified that he saw the defendant, Cecil Dickens, and Richard Dickens drive past his service station in defendant's Volkswagen on the evening of 6 February, 1978. Approximately 15 to 30 minutes later, the two Dickens men returned to the station on foot. Cecil Dickens then pulled a gun, pointed it at Brown, and demanded money from Brown and Washington. Cecil and Richard Dickens then ran from the station and across the parking lot of a nearby tire company. Brown did not see the two men again that evening.
Brown testified that he saw the defendant's Volkswagen pull out of a car wash about one and one half blocks from his station, in the vicinity of Hardee's, soon after the robbery. He did not see the driver of that car or see who else, if anyone, was in the car. Brown last saw the defendant some 15 to 30 minutes before the robbery.
Later in the evening of 6 February, 1978, Halifax County law enforcement officers stopped the car driven by the defendant on Highway 903 headed in the direction of Littleton. Cecil Dickens, Richard Dickens, and two females were passengers in the car. Deputy Sheriff Cloyd did not observe where any of the passengers were sitting.
Sheriff Cloyd told the defendant that the car fit the description of one suspected of being involved in a Scotland Neck robbery and asked defendant to return to the sheriff's office for questioning. The defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers and subsequently gave them permission to search his car. During the search, a loaded .22 caliber pistol was found under the right front seat on the passenger's side of the car. No weapons or money were found on the defendant.
When questioned, the defendant voluntarily gave the police the following statement which the State introduced into evidence:
According to Officer Sherman, the Zip Mart is three miles from the Gates Station.
Cecil Dickens testified that the defendant drove him and Richard Dickens "uptown" and then went to the car wash about one and a half blocks away to clean out his car. The car was was out of sight of the service station. Cecil stated that nobody was waiting for him after he left the service station, but that he could not remember what he did then because he'd had too much to drink that evening.
On cross-examination, Richard Dickens stated that prior to the robbery no one had any conversation in Luther Pryor's presence about robbing the service station or about the gun. Richard Dickens testified that he was drunk at the time of the robbery and could not remember what became of Luther after he dropped Cecil and Richard at the service station.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. Defendant offered no evidence, and his renewed motion was also denied. The case was submitted to the jury on the theory that defendant aided and abetted the actual perpetrators, Richard and Cecil Dickens.
Defendant first assigns error to the failure of the trial court to grant defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's evidence.
The standard for the trial court and for this Court is whether the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980). Defendant argues the State presented insufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant aided and abetted the perpetrators in the commission of the crime of armed robbery. For reasons set forth below, we disagree.
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference therefrom. See State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164 (1980). The State's evidence is sufficient if there is substantial evidence to establish each and every element of the crime charged. See State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Smith, supra; Thompson v. Board of Education, 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977).
The State relied upon a theory of aiding and abetting to carry the armed robbery charge to the jury.
The elements necessary for the State's case were set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285, 290-91, 218 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091, 96 S.Ct. 886, 47 L.Ed.2d 102 (1976).
As noted below, the State's evidence is sufficient to prove each and every element.
Defendant contends that the evidence fails to establish that he shared the felonious intent to rob the service station. Specifically, defendant argues that the State did not show that defendant was part of the plan to rob the service station or that he knew of such plan or intended to aid in its commission.
Defendant cites State v. Kendrick, 9 N.C.App. 688, 177 S.E.2d 345 (1970), for the proposition that before defendant can be guilty as an aider or abetter of a felony, he must share the felonious intent of the actual perpetrators. Defendant argues that the testimony of the perpetrators negates any inferences that defendant had any prior knowledge of the robbery plan or that he was knowingly involved in its commission.
However, the intent to aid or the showing of a felonious purpose may be inferred from the defendant's actions and his relation to the perpetrators. There need be no express words communicating the intent to aid or indicating that defendant shared a felonious purpose, State v. Sanders, supra.
Defendant's own statement to Officer Gus Sherman indicates that one of the two perpetrators told Curtis Washington, an employee at the service station, in defendant's presence, that they were going to rob the service station. Defendant stated, "Don't worry about it, man," drove up the street and let the perpetrators out. The statement further indicates that he picked them up later in his vehicle, knew that they had robbed the service station and subsequently drove away with them.
Terry Brown, the robbery victim, testified that he saw the defendant and two males, later...
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