State v. Przeradzki, 10245

Decision Date13 September 1985
Docket NumberNo. 10245,10245
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shirley PRZERADZKI, Defendant-Appellant, and Mabel Elena Maria, Ronald Maria, Edward Hoohuli, Palmalita Hoohuli, Palmer Kua, Leimomi Kua, and Antonio Geolina, Jr., also known as Tony Geolina, Jr., Defendants, and Samuel P. King, Jr., Appellant.
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. An indigent defendant in a criminal case who does not appeal her judgment of conviction is not aggrieved by a subsequent order that authorizes payment by the state to her court-appointed attorney of less than a reasonable fee for his previously rendered legal services and, therefore, she lacks standing to appeal the order.

2. An attorney appointed by the trial court to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal case is aggrieved by and has standing to appeal an order which authorizes payment to him by the state of less than a reasonable fee for his previously rendered legal services.

3. Where Hawaii Revised Statutes § 802-5 (Supp.1984) authorizes the trial court to pay court-appointed private attorneys no more than $3,000 per non-class A felony "case," the word "case" means all matters within the numbered criminal case and not each count involved in such case.

Samuel P. King, Jr. and Adrienne S. King, Honolulu (King & King, of counsel), on briefs, for appellants.

Russell A. Suzuki, Deputy Atty. Gen., on brief, Shirley Smith, Deputy Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and TANAKA, JJ.

BURNS, Chief Judge.

Defendant Shirley Przeradzki and her court-appointed private attorney Samuel P. King, Jr., appeal the lower court's award to King of $3,000 attorney fees rather than the $10,340 he requested.

Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 802-5 (Supp.1984) authorizes the trial court to pay court-appointed private attorneys no more than $3,000 per non-class A felony "case." The sole issue raised by appellants is whether the word "case" as used in HRS § 802-5 means all matters within the numbered criminal case or each count involved in such case. 1 Our answer is that it means the numbered criminal case. Sua sponte we also hold that Przeradzki lacks standing to appeal the issue.

On December 16, 1983 Przeradzki was indicted on 80 felony counts. 2 The indictment was assigned Criminal No. 59759. 3 On March 14, 1984, because a conflict of interest prevented the public defender from representing Przeradzki, the lower court appointed King to represent her in the case.

On September 28, 1984 Przeradzki pled guilty to counts 81, 84, and 87. On October 19, 1984 the lower court allowed the prosecution to nolle prosequi counts 1 through 77.

King asked that he be paid $10,340 attorney fees. Assuming that King's fees were reasonable but concluding that under HRS § 802-5 the maximum fee payable was $3,000, the lower court authorized payment of $3,000. Przeradzki and King appealed.

Initially, our concern is appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is from an order granting part of the requested attorney fees. Not being a party "aggrieved" by that order as required by HRS § 641-11 (Supp.1984), Przeradzki lacks standing to appeal it. State v. Ui, 66 Haw. 366, 663 P.2d 630 (1983).

However, an order awarding attorney fees under HRS § 802-5 is "a final order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)." Ui, 66 Haw. at 369, 663 P.2d at 632. King was "aggrieved" by that order and has standing to appeal it. Booker v. Midpac Lumber Co., Ltd., 2 Haw.App. 569, 636 P.2d 1359 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 65 Haw. 166, 649 P.2d 376 (1982).

Section 802-5, HRS, provides:

Appointment of counsel; compensation. (a) When it shall appear to a judge that a person requesting the appointment of counsel satisfies the requirements of this chapter, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent him at all stages of the proceedings including appeal, if any. If conflicting interests exist, or if the interests of justice require, the court may appoint private counsel, who shall receive reasonable compensation for necessary expenses, including travel, the amount of which shall be determined by the court, and fees pursuant to subsection (b). All such expenses shall be certified by the court. Duly certified claims for payment shall be paid upon vouchers approved by the director of finance and warrants drawn by the comptroller.

(b) The court shall determine the amount of reasonable compensation to appointed counsel, based on the rate of $30 an hour for out-of-court services, and $40 an hour for in-court services and with a maximum fee in accordance with the following schedule:

                (1)  Class A felony case               $2,000
                (2)  Any other felony case              1,500
                (3)  Misdemeanor case--jury
                     trial                              1,000
                (4)  Misdemeanor case--jury
                     waived                               500
                (5)  Appeals to the supreme
                     court or intermediate
                     appellate court                    1,500
                (6)  Petty misdemeanor case               300
                (7)  Post conviction proceeding         1,500
                (8)  Any other type of administrative
                     or judicial proceeding
                     including cases arising
                     under chapter 571                  1,000
                

Payment in excess of any maximum provided for under paragraphs (1), (2), and (5), where extended or complex representation is needed, may be made for good cause shown on the record by the appointing judge, but shall not exceed an amount twice the maximum allowable fees for such representation.

(c) The public defender and the judiciary shall submit to the department of budget and finance for inclusion in the department's budget request for each fiscal biennium the amount required for each fiscal year for the payment of fees and expenses pursuant to subsection (a).

King argues that construing HRS § 802-5 as limiting him to no more than a $3,000 fee in Criminal No. 59759 does not comport with common sense, fairness for indigent defendants, 4 fairness to court-appointed counsel, 5 or the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So.2d 540 (Fla.1981). He contends that the word "case" as used in HRS § 802-5 means count. Under his interpretation, the maximum fee allowable to him for his services in the trial court in this case is 80 times $3,000 or $240,000. We disagree with his interpretation.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is one of statutory construction. In that regard, we abide by the guidelines set forth in In re Hawaiian Telephone, 61 Haw. 572, 577-78, 608 P.2d 383, 387 (1980):

The fundamental objective in construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Accordingly, a basic tenet of statutory interpretation is that where the language of the law in question is plain and unambiguous, construction by this court is inappropriate and our duty is only to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious...

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