State v. Ralston
| Decision Date | 26 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 101,440.,101,440. |
| Citation | 225 P.3d 741 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. David Lee RALSTON, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Heather R. Jones, county attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., PIERRON and BUSER, JJ.
David Lee Ralston, Jr., appeals from his felony conviction for possessing marijuana without having affixed an appropriate stamp or label, in violation of K.S.A 79-5208, and misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana, in violation of K.S.A. 65-4105(d)(16) and K.S.A. 65-4162(a), and possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(2). Ralston contends the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges because he had a contract or agreement with Ottawa police officers that provided him with immunity from prosecution if he was honest and provided them with the names and addresses of drug dealers. In addition, Ralston argues entrapment and claims his convictions for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia were multiplicitous. We affirm.
On October 1, 2007, officers with the Ottawa Police Department Drug Enforcement Unit conducted a "buy-bust operation" at the Days Inn hotel. As part of the operation, an informant contacted Ralston and asked him to bring 2 ounces of marijuana to room 164 where, unbeknownst to Ralston, several undercover police officers waited for him. Ralston arrived at the room within 30 minutes of the informant's call and was immediately pulled into the room, arrested, handcuffed, and searched.
The search of Ralston resulted in the seizure of two bags of marijuana weighing about 2 ounces, and a wooden "hitter box," which was described as a box used to conceal and smoke marijuana. The hitter box contained a burnt marijuana cigarette and a pipe which was described as "a metal cylindrical tube . . . painted to look like a cigarette." Subsequent laboratory examination revealed that both the box and the pipe contained marijuana residue.
The police officers had a conversation with Ralston after his arrest. The details of this conversation were controverted. During a pretrial evidentiary hearing, Detective Procaccini testified that immediately after he advised Ralston of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), he told Ralston "that he needed to be honest with me and then I'd be able to help him." According to Detective Procaccini, Ralston told him "he would do anything to help."
Ralston then admitted that he came to the hotel room to sell marijuana and provided the officers with names of some drug dealers. Detective Procaccini testified that at some point during the conversation he told Ralston that "if he had someone deliver more drugs to this hotel room than he brought he could go home." The detective testified that when he told Ralston "he could go home" he meant that Ralston would never be arrested for his drug crimes. Sergeant Mike Hatheway, Detective Procaccini's supervisor, also testified to the conversation with Ralston and generally corroborated the detective's account.
At the pretrial hearing, Ralston testified that Detective Procaccini told him that if he was honest the detective would be able help him out. Ralston also admitted telling Detective Procaccini, "I'll do anything to help." Ralston testified that when Detective Procaccini said he would be willing to "help" him if Ralston was honest, Ralston understood that to mean the detective "would let me go." Ralston conceded, however, that at that time Detective Procaccini never specified what he meant by the phrase, "he would help me." In the end, Ralston was unable to arrange for a dealer to bring a larger quantity of drugs to the hotel room than the 2 ounces Ralston had brought with him. The police then transported Ralston from the scene. Drug charges were later filed by the Franklin County Attorney's office.
Prior to trial, Ralston moved to suppress his incriminating statements. After hearing evidence, the district court granted Ralston's motion to suppress, concluding that his "incriminating statements were induced by a promise of a specific benefit that no charges would be filed against him, that he could go home." The State does not appeal this adverse ruling.
Ralston also filed a motion to dismiss the charges. In his motion, Ralston contended that he "and law enforcement made a binding contract" to let "[Ralston] go free." The district court denied the motion to dismiss, however, finding there was no contract or agreement between Ralston and the police. The district court also ruled the officers' conduct was not outrageous and did not violate due process.
The case proceeded to a bench trial where, during closing argument, Ralston first raised the defense of entrapment with regard to the possession of marijuana charges. The district court rejected the defense, finding Ralston's possession of the hitter box showed a predisposition to possess marijuana. At the trial's conclusion, the district court found Ralston guilty of possessing marijuana without having affixed an appropriate stamp or label, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Ralston was sentenced to a controlling 11-month prison sentence but granted a downward dispositional departure and placed on a 12-month probation. He filed a timely appeal.
A district court's ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss criminal charges with prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Bolen, 270 Kan. 337, Syl. ¶ 2, 13 P.3d 1270 (2000). State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 81-82, 201 P.3d 673 (2009). Under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court also reviews whether the district court's discretion was guided by erroneous legal conclusions. State v. Moore, 287 Kan. 121, 135, 194 P.3d 18 (2008).
On appeal, Ralston contends the district court committed reversible error by not dismissing the charges against him. In particular, Ralston argues that an enforceable contract was created between him and the police officers. This contract provided that if Ralston truthfully provided the names and addresses of drug dealers, the officers would "help" him. According to Ralston, he understood "help" to mean "release and no prosecution, in return for truthful information." Ralston further contends that his "informant agreement should be treated as if it were a plea agreement." Applying contract principles, Ralston argues that he complied with his part of the bargain and the district court should have ordered specific performance of the State's part of the bargain "and let Ralston go."
The State presents a two-part argument in response. First, the State submits "[a]s stated by the district court, there was never an enforceable contract between law enforcement and the defendant — there was no meeting of the minds or mutual manifestation of assent between the defendant and law enforcement." Second, "[i]f a contract had, in fact, been solidified between law enforcement and the defendant, there is no binding Kansas authority that holds that the prosecution would be bound by such a contract."
After considering the evidence, the district court found there was no enforceable contract made between Ralston and the police. In particular, the district judge held:
An appellate court reviews the district court's findings of fact to determine if the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the district court's conclusions of law. Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 65, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009); State v. Ratley, 253 Kan. 394, 398, 855 P.2d 943 (1993).
Drach v. Bruce, 281 Kan. 1058, Syl. ¶ 2, 136 P.3d 390 (2006).
Whether any contract or agreement existed between Ralston and the officers was highly controverted. On appeal, Ralston argues the contract provided that if Ralston truthfully supplied the names and addresses of drug dealers, the police would "help" him by releasing him from custody and never prosecuting him for his drug crimes. Ralston testified, however, that Detective Procaccini never specifically told him that he would be freed by simply being honest and providing information regarding drug dealers. Ralston clarified that no specific promise was made, and the detective "just told me that if I'd help him out he'd help me out." Regardless of the detective's vague language, Ralston believed that if he did cooperate he would be released and not charged with any drug crimes.
Consistent with Ralston's testimony, Detective Procaccini testified he did not specify what he meant when he...
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