State v. Ramos, 19065

• Decision Date: 03 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 19065,19065
• Citation: 1996 SD 37,545 N.W.2d 817
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joaquin Jack RAMOS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 817

545 N.W.2d 817

1996 SD 37

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joaquin Jack RAMOS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 19065.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued Nov. 28, 1995.

Decided April 3, 1996.

Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Gary Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Mark DeBoer, Office of the Public Defender, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

SABERS, Justice.

¶1 Ramos appeals a life sentence for first degree manslaughter as unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

FACTS

¶2 On February 21, 1994, Ramos returned from a bar to the home he shared with his girlfriend, Debbie Martines, and her children. Debbie was not present when he arrived and after asking the children where she was, Ramos determined she had taken a cab to the bar. He called on a cab radio for the driver to bring her back. Ramos became violent while awaiting her return and threatened Johnny Jibben, the co-worker who had given him a ride home. Jibben's wife arrived, went into the house and took the two children outside. Ramos claims Jibben yelled at the children to get into the car, and Ramos went to the door and yelled at them to return.

¶3 Ramos stated Jibben attacked him, but Jibben testified Ramos continued to threaten and swing at him. When Debbie arrived home Jibben was holding Ramos down on the floor. Debbie told Jibben she could handle the situation and asked him to let Ramos up. Ramos then slapped Debbie and threw a table. Jibben left the house and Debbie went out to bring the children back inside. Ramos went to get his gun. Debbie tried to stop him from going to the door and he grabbed her hair and hit her with the hand holding the gun. The gun discharged and Debbie was shot and killed.

¶4 Ramos was charged with second degree murder or, alternatively, first degree manslaughter. He was evaluated by a psychiatrist and the trial court ordered an examination at the Human Services Center.

¶5 Ramos pled guilty to first degree manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement. There was no agreement as to the length of the sentence. Sentencing was continued to allow counsel to provide additional information and because of a misunderstanding regarding the plea agreement. The presentence report indicated the State recommended a life sentence. The Deputy State's Attorney explained that he intended to leave the decision of a sentence to the court, and that he did not specifically recommend a life sentence. Ramos entered a stipulation waiving his right to a jury trial and allowing his guilty plea to stand. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Ramos made two motions for reconsideration of sentence and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, all of which were denied by the trial court. Ramos appeals, asking this court to allow withdrawal of his guilty plea or to reverse or vacate his sentence.

1. Is Ramos' life sentence unconstitutional?

¶6 Ramos argues his life sentence is unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment because it is either manifestly disproportionate to the crime or shocks the conscience. The maximum sentence for first degree manslaughter is life imprisonment. SDCL 22-6-1; See SDCL 22-16-15.

"On appeal, we first determine whether the sentence 'shocks the conscience' or is so disproportionate to the crime that it activates the Eight Amendment 'within and without jurisdiction' proportionality tests." It is settled law in this state that absent a sentence which is so excessive in duration that it shocks the conscience of the court, a sentence that is within statutory limits is not reviewable on appeal. This court has developed a two-fold test to determine whether the sentence is so constitutionally offensive as to shock the conscience:

First, is the punishment so excessive or so cruel, 'as to meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally.' And second, whether the punishment is so excessive or cruel as to shock the collective conscience of this court.

State v. Kaiser, 526 N.W.2d 722, 726 (S.D.1995) (citations omitted).

¶7 The first test is whether Ramos' sentence "meets the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally." Ramos argues other states do not allow life sentences for voluntary manslaughter and presents statutes from outside this jurisdiction to show that only in South Dakota and Oklahoma is it statutorily possible to receive a life sentence for voluntary manslaughter. ¹ The State claims there is no uniformity among the other states in possible manslaughter sentences. The State also argues the legislature has designated only six felonies for which a maximum of life imprisonment is allowed, and points out Ramos' crime involved a killing, a firearm and mortal endangerment of the lives of all present.

¶8 "Public intent is reflected in the legislative acts defining the permissible punishment for specific crimes." State v. Pack, 516 N.W.2d 665, 668 (S.D.1994) (quoting State v. Phipps, 318 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D.1982) appeal dismissed, 406 N.W.2d 146 (S.D.1987)). The South Dakota legislature allows a sentence of life imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter. SDCL 22-6-1. This is within their legislative prerogative. A minority position among state legislatures does not necessarily mean an un constitutional or even an un acceptable position. For these and the reasons stated hereafter, Ramos' sentence does not "meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally."

¶9 The second test is whether the punishment is so excessive or cruel as to shock the collective conscience of this court. In developing an appropriate sentence,

the sentencing court should " 'acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before it.' " This study should examine a defendant's "general moral character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record."

State v. Chase in Winter, 534 N.W.2d 350, 354 (S.D.1995) (quoting Pack, 516 N.W.2d at 667-68 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted)).

¶10 The trial court heard testimony and read letters from several parties before sentencing. ² The trial court also read a psychiatric evaluation in which the doctor found Ramos "oriented, alert and responsive." He was "tearful in discussing Debbie's death and preoccupied with her loss." Ramos showed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. He was also experiencing guilt related to causing the death of an innocent person he loved, but the doctor felt it was guilt appropriate to the situation. The psychiatric evaluation reveals Ramos attempted an overdose of a prescribed drug while in jail.

¶11 The trial court stated it considered all the testimony, but focused on the issue of Ramos' need for control:

When one drops back and focuses on your life as a whole, however, we come to the point where there is an element of control, a need to control, a desire to control that you cannot control.

¶12 The trial court considered Ramos' past relationships and determined that, "when they have been good, [they] have been very, very good. When they are bad, they are very, very bad." ³ The trial court called attention to the "danger side" of Ramos' personality which "surfaced ... when Debbie Jo Martines died."

¶13 The trial court noted Ramos' prior offenses have been misdemeanors. It stated, "When one looks at the nature of the offenses, however, they all have some degree of violence associated with them, Mr. Ramos, violence largely centered around those individuals that you supposedly hold near and dear and, ... involve women." The trial court pointed out, "[t]he instances in which you lose control have become more frequent."

¶14 Ramos claims his life sentence should shock the conscience of this court because a life sentence differs from a term of years sentence. State v. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d 306, 311 (S.D.1992); State v. Weiker, 366 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1985) (Weiker II ). This court discussed life sentences (imposed on habitual offenders) in State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7 (S.D.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1422, 79 L.Ed.2d 747 (Weiker I ). The purposes of sentencing are retribution, deterrence, both individual and general, and rehabilitation. Weiker I, 342 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). This court has also recognized incapacitation as a valid sentencing goal. State v. Gehrke, 491 N.W.2d 421, 425 (S.D.1992) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 868 (1991)). One purpose is not preeminent over any of the others. "[T]here is nothing in the Constitution that says that 'rehabilitation' is the sole permissible goal of incarceration[.]" Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1314, 101 S.Ct. 829, 830, 66 L.Ed.2d 785, 788 (1981) (per Chief Justice Rehnquist as Circuit Justice). There is no constitutional principle that prefers rehabilitation over deterrence as a sentencing goal. Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1108 (2d Cir. 1977).

¶15 The following observation regarding retribution as a sentencing goal was made by Justice Potter Stewart:

I cannot agree that retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy--of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2761, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 389 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).

¶16 However, this court has stated, "[n]o matter how much one may desire...