State v. Raybon
| Decision Date | 23 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 33942,33942 |
| Citation | 252 S.E.2d 417,242 Ga. 858 |
| Parties | The STATE v. RAYBON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Hinson McAuliffe, Sol., George Weaver, Asst. Sol., for appellant.
Horton J. Greene, Alpharetta, for appellee.
Raybon challenged as unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions Code Ann. § 26-1503(b)(2) pursuant to which he was accused of criminal trespass in that he knowingly and without authority entered the Atlanta terminal of Greyhound Lines, Inc., after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the bus station terminal manager that his entry was forbidden. The trial court granted his motion to quash the accusation ". . . on the grounds that the statute as written and applied . . . does not meet constitutional requirements of the United States Constitution and the State of Georgia Constitution . . . ." The state appeals. This court reverses. Neither the statute as written nor its application to this particular case denies either due process or equal protection in violation of the state and federal constitutions.
The Greyhound bus station manager testified on direct examination that the statute has been used to exclude from the terminal persons classified by him as "derelicts." The procedure used is for him to read to the person to be excluded from the terminal a written warning, as follows: The person is asked to sign the written notice and most persons do sign. The terminal manager testified that once such a person has received the warning he is required to remain away from the terminal premises from then on, without limitation as to time, and is not allowed to enter the terminal again for any purpose, including the transacting of business therein, such as buying or cashing in a bus ticket or purchasing food. He testified that the persons he classifies as "derelicts" often purchase bus tickets so they can contend, if challenged by him, that they are ticketholders and have legitimate reasons for being in the terminal. He testified without objection or contradiction that a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission gives Greyhound the right to refuse to transport a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, or who is incapable of taking care of himself, or whose conduct is such, or is likely to be such, as to make him objectionable to other passengers or prospective passengers; that the I.C.C. rule does not apply to persons who are ill and who are accompanied by an attendant or nurse.
He testified without objection or contradiction that he read the warning notice to Raybon and barred him from the terminal on the night in question at approximately 9 p. m.; that Raybon had been drinking and his speech was slurred; that he was unsteady on his feet and had been in and out of the terminal; that Raybon returned to the terminal about five hours later at approximately 2 a. m. on the next morning and was arrested; that at the time of the warning Raybon had no legitimate business to conduct in the terminal.
On cross-examination, the terminal manager again testified in clear and unequivocal language that once a person has received the warning notice, he cannot again enter the terminal at any time, or for any purpose, including the purchasing of a ticket.
The transcript is devoid of evidence tending to prove that Raybon entered the Greyhound terminal either the first or the second time in order to transact business therein, to meet a friend arriving on a bus, or for any other reason relating, even remotely, to any of the legitimate business activities that are conducted, or the public accommodations that are furnished, within the terminal. Evidence admitted without objection characterized Raybon as a derelict who entered the terminal premises the first time contrary to the wishes of the terminal manager and not for the purpose of transacting business or utilizing the various public accommodations furnished by Greyhound. The record is silent as to why, or in what condition of sobriety or intoxication, Raybon reentered the terminal after the warning. The trial court heard argument of counsel on the constitutional issues after the terminal manager left the witness stand, but no further evidence had been presented in behalf of either the State or Raybon when the court sustained the motion to quash.
Raybon contends that Code Ann. § 26-1503(b)(2) is vague and ambiguous, is not capable of understanding by persons of ordinary intelligence, is overbroad in its reach and is "extremely unfair." An oblique attack apparently is intended to be made in this court for the first time based upon the commerce clause.
Code Ann. § 26-1503(b)(2) provides that: ...
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