State v. White

• Citation: 587 N.W.2d 240
• Decision Date: 23 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2052,97-2052
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Dean WHITE, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 240

587 N.W.2d 240

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Dean WHITE, Appellant.

No. 97-2052.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 23, 1998.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Christopher Cooklin, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John Courter, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

SNELL, Justice.

This case considers the validity of defendant's guilty plea. The specific point raised is whether the guilty plea by defendant was made voluntarily, intelligently, and understandingly, as required by our rules of criminal procedure and constitutional standards. Defendant asserts it was not because he was not informed that the maximum punishment that could be imposed included consecutive sentences. We agree the plea was invalid and therefore reverse and remand.

Gary Dean White pled guilty to two offenses of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, in Iowa classified as class "C" felonies. See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(c)(6) (1997). The plea was pursuant to a plea bargain with the State which reduced the charges from class "B" felonies. Id. § 124.401(1)(b)(7). The sentencing judge ordered the defendant to serve ten years in prison for each offense and fined the defendant $1000 for each offense. The court advised that by operation of law a mandatory one-third minimum must be served. Next, the court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.

The record shows that defendant was never advised of the possibility of consecutive sentences being imposed, either by the judge or by any other source. Defendant claims that for this reason his rights under guilty plea procedures established by Iowa statutes and the United States Constitution have been violated and he should consequently be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant's argument is sound and he should be permitted to plead anew.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b) states:

b. Pleas of guilty. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:

(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered.

(2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered.

Our focus is on the language and import of Rule 8(2)(b)(2).

Our appellate review standard in this case is for errors of law. Iowa R.App. P 4. We have held that substantial compliance is the measure for judging whether the requirements of Rule 8(2)(b)(2) have been met. State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1990).

The constitutional standards for acceptance of a guilty plea have been established by several United States Supreme Court cases. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1786, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 922 (1964), the Supreme Court decided that admissibility of a confession must be based on "a reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant."

The Supreme Court later applied the same standard to acceptance of guilty pleas:

The requirement that the prosecution spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no constitutional innovation. In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, we dealt with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. We held: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."

We think that the same standard must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made. For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1078, 13 L.Ed.2d 934.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279 (1969).

Our court has recognized the standard set forth in Jackson and Boykin:

The requirement of voluntariness stems from the due process mandate that a waiver of constitutional rights, which is implicit in guilty pleas, must be made voluntarily. McCarthy [v. United States], 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d at 425. To be truly voluntary, the plea must not only be free from compulsion, but must also be knowing and intelligent. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 & n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257-58, 49 L.Ed.2d 108, 114 (1976); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d at 425. Thus, the defendant should be cognizant of the constitutional protections to which he would otherwise be entitled, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969), and the nature of the crime with which he is charged, Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 332-34, 61 S.Ct. 572, 573-74, 85 L.Ed. 859, 861-62 (1941).

State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Iowa 1980).

In 1976 and 1977, the Iowa legislature enacted standards for arraignments and the court's acceptance of a defendant's guilty plea, which are now contained in the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 8. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b) provides that "the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands ... the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered." Defendant claims that the words "maximum possible punishment" in Rule 8 mean and require, to be consistent with the constitutional requirements, that he be advised and understand that his guilty plea may result in the imposition of consecutive sentences for his two convictions. It is clear from the language used in Rule 8 and its obvious purpose to recognize rights of defendants, that constitutional rights are implicated. In fact, we have previously said that a defendant's constitutional rights are specified in Rule 8(2)(b). See Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d at 861.

The Supreme Court has held that the accused must be fully aware of the direct consequences of a guilty plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970). Sentences to be served consecutively are a direct consequence of a guilty plea. We are not here concerned with the much adjudicated distinction between direct and collateral consequences. See, e.g., State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Iowa 1998).

Nor does the result here depend on whether it is the judge's responsibility to advise the defendant that "maximum possible punishment" means consecutive sentences are possible or whether defendant's knowledge and understanding can be gleaned from other indicia in the record. See Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d at 804-05; Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d at 863-64; State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1977); Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Iowa 1974); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Iowa 1969).

In the instant case no statement about possible consecutive sentences was made by the judge to the defendant. Also, the record is silent as to any advice to defendant by his attorney or from any other source that consecutive sentences were possible if he pled guilty.

The record discloses that at the hearing during which the guilty plea was accepted there was no advice or discussion of consecutive sentences by the judge or defendant's lawyer, nor was there any other evidence introduced that shows defendant's awareness of the possibility of consecutive sentences or even any knowledge of how a concurrent sentence differed from a consecutive sentence. No information from any source indicated to the defendant in any way that his maximum possible punishment was twenty years of imprisonment as a result of sentences imposed to be served consecutively. The guilty plea was accepted from a silent record on this matter.

The sentencing hearing occurred six weeks later. At that hearing the record again discloses that no information concerning the possibility of consecutive sentences was communicated to the defendant. In fact, the defendant was probably misled, as well as being unadvised, by the discussion about concurrent sentences during the hearing. The prosecutor advised the judge that pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended that the sentences run concurrently to each other. Remaining counts in both criminal matters were to be dismissed along with two misdemeanor files. The prosecutor next agreed with defendant's counsel that pursuant to the plea agreement the State recommended that the sentences in the Polk County cases run concurrently with a case against defendant in Boone County.

After this presentation to the court, extended discussion ensued on whether defendant could be released with his bond continued prior to sentencing. Defendant personally pleaded with the court for a two-week period to locate a place for his wife to live and make arrangements for his four dependent children, including a new baby. Defendant's counsel argued this matter as well. The judge listened to these arguments and then inquired of the prosecutor and the defendant's counsel if either would like to make any further record. Both attorneys said no. The record...