State v. Reding

• Decision Date: 10 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 58462-1,58462-1
• Citation: 835 P.2d 1019,119 Wn.2d 685
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Richard REDING, Respondent.

Page 685

119 Wn.2d 685

835 P.2d 1019

STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Richard REDING, Respondent.

No. 58462-1.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Sept. 10, 1992.

Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Michele Hauptman, Deputy, Seattle, for petitioner.

Appelwick, Trickey & Spicer, Michael J. Trickey, Dennis A. O'Leary, Seattle, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

Richard Reding was charged with reckless driving and driving while intoxicated (hereafter DWI). The District Court for Renton decided that the police lacked authority to perform a custodial arrest of Reding for reckless driving under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, it concluded that the evidence of intoxication gathered subsequent to Reding's arrest must be suppressed and his DWI charge must be dismissed. The Superior Court for King County affirmed the District Court's dismissal of Reding's DWI charge. We granted the State's motion for discretionary review and now reverse.

I

In the early morning hours of April 28, 1990, a King County police officer observed a vehicle travelling at a speed well over the posted speed limit. The officer turned onto the roadway and caught up with the speeding vehicle just as it was entering a turn. The officer testified that the driver of the vehicle was going too fast for the curve, was having trouble negotiating the curve and the roadway, and was going over the center line.

As the officer came out of the curve, he activated his lights. The vehicle in front of him slowed abruptly, and turned off the road at a driveway approximately 500 to 1,000 feet after the curve. The officer followed the vehicle roughly 200 to 300 feet up a dark driveway.

Reding drove up to a house and immediately got out of his car. The officer told him to stop. The officer searched Reding for weapons, placed him under arrest, and put him in the back of his police car. Once Reding was seated in the backseat of the police car, the officer smelled alcohol on his breath. He also noticed Reding's eyes were glassy and his face was flushed and puffy. The officer drove Reding to the Renton Police Department and read him his rights. Reding made statements there and agreed to perform some field sobriety tests.

In a pretrial motion, Reding argued that the evidence of his intoxication gathered after his arrest should be suppressed because the officer lacked authority to make a custodial arrest for reckless driving. The District Court concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest Reding for reckless driving. It concluded, however, that a custodial arrest was not permissible, even for concerns of officer safety. Clerk's Papers, at 51-52. In support of its conclusion, the District Court cited our decision in State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527 (1978), and its progeny. Accordingly, it suppressed all evidence of intoxication gathered after the arrest and dismissed the DWI charge. On RALJ appeal, the Superior Court for King County affirmed the District Court's decision, noting that a Terry stop would have been sufficient. Clerk's Papers, at 82. We granted the State's petition for direct review and now reverse.

II

The central issue in this case is the relation between our decision in State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527 (1978), and subsequent legislation, contained in RCW 10.31.100 and RCW 46.64.015. We conclude that that legislation codified our rule in Hehman that officers generally may not perform custodial arrests for minor traffic offenses. We hold, however, that custodial arrests are permissible for traffic offenses that are not minor, such as reckless driving.

A

In Hehman, a deputy sheriff followed a car with a broken taillight. 90 Wash.2d at 46, 578 P.2d 527. After the defendant stopped his car in his passenger's driveway, the deputy approached and asked for the defendant's driver's license. The license had expired a few weeks previously. The officer arrested the defendant, assuming that unless placed in custody he would drive to work. Illegal drugs were found on the defendant during a search incident to arrest. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d at 46-47, 578 P.2d 527.

In Hehman, we held "as a matter of public policy that custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant signs the promise to appear as provided in RCW 46.64.015." 90 Wash.2d at 47, 578 P.2d 527. We emphasized the growing trend of decriminalization of traffic offenses, and the use of citations in lieu of arrest. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d at 47-48, 578 P.2d 527. We failed, however, to specify precisely what constitutes a minor traffic violation.

B

A year later, the Legislature decriminalized most traffic offenses by Laws of 1979, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 136, § 2, codified as RCW 46.63.020. Certain traffic offenses, such as reckless driving, remained criminal. RCW 46.63.020(33). Reckless driving was a misdemeanor at the time of Reding's arrest. Former RCW 46.61.500. ¹

In addition, the Legislature amended RCW 46.64.015 and RCW 10.31.100, to clarify when officers must issue citations and when they may arrest a suspect without a warrant. Laws of 1979, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 28. After setting forth the procedures for the issuance of traffic citations, RCW 46.64.015 provides in pertinent part:

Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of the traffic laws or regulations which is punishable as a misdemeanor or by imposition of a fine, the arresting officer may serve upon him or her a traffic citation and notice to appear in court.... The detention arising from an arrest under this section may not be for a period of time longer than is reasonably necessary to issue and serve a citation and notice, except that the time limitation does not apply under any of the following circumstances:

(1) Where the arrested person refuses to sign a written promise to appear in court as required by the citation and notice provisions of this section;

(2) Where the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the arrested person has committed any of the offenses enumerated in RCW 10.31.100(3), as now or hereafter amended;

(3) Where the arrested person is a nonresident and is being detained for a hearing under RCW 46.64.035.

The relevant portions of RCW 10.31.100 in turn provide:

A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant for committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor only when the offense is committed in the presence of the officer, except as provided in subsections (1) through (8) of this section.

....

(3) Any police officer having probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a violation of any of the following traffic laws shall have the authority to arrest the person:

....

(c) RCW 46.61.500 or 46.61.530, relating to reckless driving or racing of vehicles ...[.] These statutes more clearly delineate when officers only have authority to cite and release those who commit traffic infractions.

In construing a statute, our paramount duty is to ascertain and give expression to the Legislature's intent. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 104 Wash.2d 344, 348, 705 P.2d 776 (1985). In searching for the intent of the Legislature, we " 'must look first to the language of the statute.' " Service Employees, 104 Wash.2d at 348, 705 P.2d 776 (quoting Condit v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 101 Wash.2d 106, 110, 676 P.2d 466 (1984)). The plain language of RCW 46.64.015 indicates the legislature intended to codify, rather than change, our holding in State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527 (1978). Like Hehman, RCW 46.64.015 generally requires officers to cite and release those motorists stopped for minor traffic offenses.

In addition, both the State and Reding agree that the amendments to RCW 46.64.015 were essentially designed to codify Hehman. Brief of Petitioner, at 10; Brief of Respondent, at 19. The legislative history of Laws of 1979, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 28 also indicates the Legislature intended to codify Hehman. In the past, this court has looked to legislative bill reports and analyses to discern the Legislature's intent. State v. Standifer, 110 Wash.2d 90, 750 P.2d 258 (1988); State v. Turner, 98 Wash.2d 731, 658 P.2d 658 (1983). The House Bill Analysis sets forth our holding in Hehman and indicates the purpose of the amendment to RCW 46.64.015 was to codify, not replace, Hehman:

The current statutes limit the officer's authority to make a custodial arrest only in the "investigating at the scene of an accident" situation. Recent case law, however, makes this limitation applicable to all "minor" traffic offenses. State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45 (1978). The amendment to RCW 46.64.015 thus codifies this restriction and makes it of general applicability.

House of Representatives Bill Analysis, HB 22, at 2 (Mar. 2, 1979).

The Legislature also provided for limited exceptions to the cite and release procedure for traffic offenses. For example, when a motorist commits one of the more serious traffic offenses listed in RCW 10.31.100(3), the Legislature placed no time limit on detention. RCW 46.64.015(2). A review of the traffic offenses listed in RCW 10.31.100(3) indicates they are more serious than the minor traffic offenses we considered in Hehman. In addition to reckless driving, RCW 10.31.100(3) lists several other traffic offenses that were not decriminalized in 1979: failing to take the necessary steps after striking an unattended car or property (a misdemeanor under RCW 46.52.010); failing to take the necessary steps when there is injury or death of a person or damage to an attended vehicle (a class C felony or gross misdemeanor under RCW 46.52.020); driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (pursuant to RCW 46.61.502 and .504); driving while driver's license is suspended or revoked (a gross misdemeanor under RCW 46.20.342); or negligent driving (a misdemeanor under RCW 46.61.525). Therefore, for a few...