State v. Reed

• Decision Date: 03 April 1984
• Citation: 473 A.2d 775,192 Conn. 520
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Scott REED et al.

Page 775

473 A.2d 775

192 Conn. 520

STATE of Connecticut v. Scott REED et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 8, 1983.

Decided April 3, 1984.

Robert E. Quish, Milford, for appellant (defendant Llewelyn reed).

Ann Daniels, of the New York bar, New York City, with whom were Stephen Wizner, John L. Pottenger, Jr., New Haven, and, on the brief, Renee D. Chotiner, Boston, Mass., and P.J. Pittman, New Haven, for appellant (named defendant).

Michael A. Arcari, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, PARSKEY, SHEA, GRILLO and MENT, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

After the named defendant had been found not guilty of a murder charge by reason of insanity and had been committed to a state mental hospital pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-47 following his acquittal, the state brought this civil action for reimbursement of the cost of his care during the period of his confinement. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendants ¹ have appealed. The authority relied upon by the state and the court is General Statutes § 17-317, ² which provides that, when a person charged with a criminal offense has been found not guilty because of mental illness and has been committed for confinement or treatment to any institution supported wholly or partly by the state, the expense of such support should be computed and paid for in the same manner as for patients civilly committed by the courts of probate. To the same effect is General Statutes § 53a-47(h). ³ In their appeal from the judgment the defendants challenge the constitutionality of § 17-317 upon the ground that it arbitrarily and irrationally makes persons, like the defendant Scott Reed, who have been confined after an acquittal by reason of insanity, liable for hospital care expenses while other persons similarly deprived of their liberty, such as prison inmates serving sentences, are not required to pay for such care. We agree with this contention and declare § 17-317, as well as § 53a-47(h), invalid as violating the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment to our federal constitution and article first, § 20 of our state constitution. Because this conclusion of error is dispositive and requires a remand with direction to render judgment for the defendants, we do not address the additional claims ⁴ raised by the defendants in this appeal.

There is no dispute about the facts. On January 15, 1974, the defendant Scott Reed was arrested and confined in connection with a homicide. Because he appeared to be in need of observation and treatment for mental illness, he was sent to the Whiting Forensic Institute in Middletown where he remained until May 23, 1974. ⁵ A grand jury on February 11, 1974, indicted him for murder. A mental examination was ordered to determine whether Reed was competent to stand trial. He was found competent on May 23, 1974, and then was returned to the New Haven Correctional Center to await trial.

On November 1, 1974, after a trial before a three judge court, Reed was found not guilty because of mental disease or defect and was committed to the Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH) for a period of ninety days so that he might be examined to determine whether he was "mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others." General Statutes § 53a-47(a)(1). On April 30, 1975, after a hearing pursuant to § 53a-47(a)(4), the court determined that Reed was then mentally ill to the extent that his release would create a danger to himself and others and he was ordered to be confined at CVH until he no longer constituted such a danger. The court set a maximum term of twenty-five years, subject to possible further confinement thereafter in accordance with § 53a-47(d) if he should still be dangerous at that time. The order expressly directed that Reed "not be released from the confines of [CVH] grounds without order of the Court."

While Reed remained at CVH under the orders of confinement he worked without pay as a recreation assistant, supervising patients in such activities as swimming, hiking, camping and spectator sports. On May 1, 1975, the Milford Probate Court appointed the defendant Llewelyn Reed as conservator of the person and estate of Scott Reed. The conservator notified the state department of administrative services that the estate was not liable for the expenses of the confinement of his ward at Whiting Forensic Institute and at CVH.

On June 15, 1976, the court held another hearing in accordance with § 53a-47(c) and concluded that Scott Reed was then no longer a danger to himself or others. He was ordered to be released, as authorized by § 53a-47(e)(2), upon conditions which included the requirements that he " 'remain on a voluntary basis at [CVH] until such time as he obtains employment either at the hospital ... or elsewhere' "; that he remain in the out-patient treatment program at CVH to be checked at least weekly for a period of one year; that he be placed on probation; and that the court's order be reviewed in one year.

The Probate Court on July 9, 1976, determined that Reed was "restored to his capacity," but did not terminate the conservatorship of his person and estate. On July 21, 1976, Reed was hired as a paid employee at CVH in a position involving duties similar to those he had previously been performing without pay. Two days later, on July 23, 1976, he was discharged from CVH as a patient. On the same day the state instituted this suit to collect patient-care charges for Reed's confinement at CVH from the date of his acquittal by reason of insanity to the date of his discharge.

This litigation is a sequel to a holding of the federal district court that § 17-318, prior to its amendment in 1975, was constitutionally infirm because it arbitrarily exempted those incarcerated in specified state correctional institutions from payment of hospital costs incurred during the period of their sentences, while inmates of community correctional centers had to bear such expenses. McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F.Supp. 896 (D.Conn.), supplemented, 386 F.Supp. 1245 (D.Conn.1974), rev'd as to monetary damages only, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3199, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976). Following that decision, the legislature amended § 17-318 to require the state to assume the hospital expenses of persons transferred to a state hospital from community correctional centers as well as those from other prisons. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-416, § 1.

The statutes which imposed liability for the care of persons treated at state hospitals while Reed remained at CVH established the following pattern: Persons who were serving prison sentences and were transferred to a state hospital were not charged during the period of sentence. General Statutes § 17-318. Pretrial detainees who had been determined to be incompetent to stand trial and had been committed for treatment to the custody of the commissioner of mental health or the commissioner of mental retardation were required to pay for such treatment. General Statutes § 54-56d. Other pretrial detainees, including those charged with crimes and also material witnesses, who had been transferred from a state correctional institution to a hospital were cared for without charge. General Statutes § 17-318. All other persons, including those who had been the subject of a civil commitment by the Probate Court, welfare beneficiaries who had later acquired property, and persons committed pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-47(a), like Scott Reed, were liable for their care at state hospitals. General Statutes §§ 17-295b, 17-83e.

The defendants' claim that General Statutes § 17-317, which imposes liability for hospital costs on insanity acquittees, violates the equal protection clauses of our federal and state constitutions is based upon their contention that no rational distinction justifying different financial treatment can be made between such persons and ordinary prisoners held in confinement under a court order for the benefit of society whose hospital expenses are borne by the public in accordance with § 17-318. The state, on the other hand, maintains that persons found not guilty by reason of insanity under § 53a-47(a)(1) may reasonably be treated in the same manner as those who are the subject of a civil commitment by the Probate Court and who must pay for their confinement in a state hospital.

The defendants do not claim that the legislative pattern of liability for hospital costs interferes with fundamental constitutional rights or involves suspect classifications, which would warrant the application of the "strict scrutiny" standard of review of their constitutional challenge and would require the state to demonstrate a "compelling state interest" to justify any disparity in treatment. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). They agree with the state that the applicable standard is the "rational basis" test: whether there exists any reasonable ground to support the distinction in regard to liability for hospital expenses which the legislature has chosen to make between insanity acquittees and prisoners convicted of crimes. If the difference in treatment "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose," it does not constitute an unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. Id., 17, 93 S.Ct. 1288.

"Connecticut undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in relieving its taxpayers by requiring prisoners with earning potential or assets to reimburse the State for the expense of maintaining them in state hospitals." McAuliffe v. Carlson, supra, 900-901. The decisive issue in this case is whether there is any reasonable basis for finding that such a salutary purpose or any other proper legislative objective is advanced by the...