State v. Reeser
| Decision Date | 16 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1354,79-1354 |
| Citation | 63 Ohio St.2d 189,17 O.O.3d 117,407 N.E.2d 25 |
| Parties | , 17 O.O.3d 117 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. REESER, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Thomas J. Wagner, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellant.
Richard C. Foote, Cleveland, for appellee.
The issue in this cause is whether it was reasonable for the trial court, pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H), to extend appellee's date of trial four days beyond the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) and (D). See State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524, and State v. Lee (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 357 N.E.2d 1095.
R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) and (D) provide:
R.C. 2945.72 provides further, in part:
The continuance, as to prosecution of the case, was obviously necessary because the unavailable witness was the chief witness for the state's case. The record, reflecting a previous continuance having been granted the prosecution on November 16, 1977, 12 days before the hearing date of November 28, 1977, because the witness was unavailable and the admission by the prosecution that no proceedings had been attempted to secure and insure the attendance of the witness, presents a strong conclusion that due diligence had not been exercised by the prosecution in preparing to commence this trial within the statutory time period (R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) and (D)). In a series of cases, this court has imposed upon the prosecution and the trial courts the mandatory duty of complying with R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73. See State v. Pudlock, supra ; State v. Cross (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 270, 271 N.E.2d 264. The noticeable lack of timely effort on the part of the prosecution flies in the face of this mandate and any continuance granted because of this circumstance cannot be classified as a " * * * reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion." (R.C. 2945.72(H)). The setting of the trial for December 1 with full knowledge that it could not proceed on that day was an obvious ploy to undercut R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73. Such a practice has been prohibited by this court. See State v. Pudlock, supra.
The judgment of the...
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