State v. Reid

• Decision Date: 26 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. W2019-00636-SC-R11-CD,W2019-00636-SC-R11-CD
• Citation: 620 S.W.3d 685
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee v. Terrell Lamont REID
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

620 S.W.3d 685

STATE of Tennessee

v.Terrell Lamont REID

No. W2019-00636-SC-R11-CD

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Assigned on Briefs November 5, 2020

FILED March 26, 2021

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Katharine K. Decker, Assistant Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; Al Earls, Assistant District Attorney, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

Terrell Lamont Reid, Whiteville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Cornelia A. Clark, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., and Sharon G. Lee, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.

Cornelia A. Clark, J.

On June 24, 2015, Terrell Lamont Reid ("the Petitioner") pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Pursuant to the criminal gang enhancement statute, the firearm offense was enhanced from a Class C to a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-121(b) (2014). On April 7, 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals declared the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process. See State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 158-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016). The Petitioner did not file a post-conviction petition challenging his guilty plea. Instead, the Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (" Rule 36.1"), arguing that the intermediate appellate court's decision declaring the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional rendered his sentence illegal. The trial court denied his motion, concluding it did not state a claim for relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the Bonds decision rendered the Petitioner's sentence for the firearm conviction void and, thus, illegal under Rule 36.1. In accordance with this Court's holding in Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83-85 (Tenn. 1999), we hold that the Petitioner's sentence was voidable, not void and illegal. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals's decision and reinstate the trial court's order denying the Petitioner's motion.

We granted this appeal to clarify whether a petitioner states a colorable claim for relief under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 when he pleads guilty and is sentenced pursuant to a statute that is presumptively constitutional at the time of his sentencing but is later declared unconstitutional. We hold that such a sentence is voidable, not void, and, therefore, is not illegal within the meaning of Rule 36.1. Thus, for the reasons stated herein, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 24, 2015, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (2014), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2014), which was enhanced from a Class C felony to a Class B felony pursuant to the criminal gang enhancement statute.¹ See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-121(b) (2014). The trial court entered judgments on July 15, 2015 and sentenced the Petitioner as a multiple offender² to concurrent seventeen-year sentences for both convictions, each to be served at thirty-five percent.

When the Petitioner was sentenced, the criminal gang enhancement statute was presumptively constitutional. See State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2003) ("In evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption that an act of the General Assembly is constitutional.")). However, on April 7, 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals declared the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process. See State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 158-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), perm app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016); see also State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Tenn. 2018) (recognizing that the intermediate appellate court declared the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional). There is no evidence in the record on appeal suggesting that the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his enhanced sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) - (b)(1) (2018).³

On January 14, 2019, more than two years after the Bonds decision and almost four years after he pleaded guilty, the Petitioner filed a pro se "Motion to Correct [an] Illegal Sentence Pursuant to Tennessee Rule[ ] of Criminal Procedure 36.1." In his motion, the Petitioner argued that his sentence was illegal because his firearm conviction was enhanced under the unconstitutional criminal gang enhancement statute. The Petitioner further asserted that, under Harshaw v. State, No. E2015-00900-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 1103048, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 24, 2017), the intermediate appellate court's decision declaring the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional should be applied retroactively to his case. In response, the State asserted that the Petitioner's case was "final and not pending or under review when the [ Bonds ] decision was rendered." See Minor, 546 S.W.3d at 68, 70 (holding that "[t]he ruling in Bonds applies to all cases pending on direct review when it was decided," subject to "existing jurisprudential principles, such as appellate review preservation requirements and the plain error doctrine"). For this reason, the State argued that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief. On February 26, 2019, the trial court denied the Petitioner's motion.

The Petitioner appealed, still proceeding pro se, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. Relying in part on Perry v. State, No. E2018-00824-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 1077038, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2019), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. June 19, 2019), which rendered a petitioner's enhanced sentence illegal because the criminal gang enhancement statute was "unconstitutional on its face," the court held that "the application of an unconstitutional law renders a sentence void, and therefore, illegal." See State v. Reid, No. W2019-00636-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 868020, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2020). Without discussion, the intermediate appellate court cited this Court's decision in Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1999), for comparison, describing it in a parenthetical as a "case published prior to creation of Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 concluding that a sentence was voidable rather than void when it was imposed under a statute that was later found unconstitutional with the effective [sic] of reviving an earlier statute." Reid, 2020 WL 868020, at *2. Because the court concluded that the Petitioner's sentence was void and illegal, it remanded the case to the trial court "to determine whether the illegal aspect was a material component of the plea agreement." Id. at *3. We granted the State's application for permission to appeal.

II. Standard of Review

This Court has previously defined a "colorable claim" for relief under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as "a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1." State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 593 (Tenn. 2015). The determination of whether a Rule 36.1 motion states a colorable claim for relief is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. at 589.

III. Analysis

On appeal, the State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it failed to conform to this Court's holding in Taylor—that a sentence is not rendered void merely because the statute under which the sentence was imposed is later declared unconstitutional. See Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 85-86. In other words, the State asserts that the Petitioner's sentence is voidable as a result of the intermediate appellate court's holding in Bonds, and, thus, "subject to being corrected only if challenged in a timely post-conviction petition," id. at 83, as opposed to void and illegal , thus entitling him to relief under Rule 36.1. We agree.

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 "was adopted in order to incorporate within the Rules of Criminal Procedure the procedure for correcting illegal sentences, including those arising from plea bargains." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1, 2016 advisory comm'n cmt. Rule 36.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]ither the defendant or the state may seek to correct an illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court in which the judgment of conviction was entered." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(1). The Rule defines an "illegal sentence" as "one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2).

As this Court explained at length in State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 589-95 (Tenn. 2015), "the definition of ‘illegal sentence’ in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition of the term in the habeas corpus context." Thus, in order to further clarify what it means for a sentence to be "illegal," it is appropriate for us to consider principles articulated in cases decided before and after the enactment of Rule 36.1.⁴

While "mistakes in sentencing are inevitable" only a "few sentencing errors render sentences illegal." Id. 478 S.W.3d at 595 (citing Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 448-49 (Tenn. 2011) ). "Sentencing errors fall into three general categories—clerical errors, appealable errors, and fatal errors. Only fatal errors render sentences illegal." Id. (internal citation omitted).

Fatal errors are errors "so profound as to render the sentence illegal and void." Id. (quoting Cantrell, 346 S.W. 3d at 452 ). As described in Taylor, "[a] void judgment is one in...